Sullivan v. State
| Decision Date | 09 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 00068, September Term, 2007.,00068, September Term, 2007. |
| Citation | 948 A.2d 121,180 Md. App. 35 |
| Parties | Christopher Carl SULLIVAN v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Steven D. Kupferberg (Debyn W. Purdie on the brief), Rockville, for Appellant.
Gary E. O'Connor (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. General on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.
Panel: ADKINS, FREDERICK J. SHARER,* and JAMES A. KENNEY, III (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
After a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County found appellant Christopher Carl Sullivan guilty of driving a motor vehicle on a highway on a revoked "license or privilege to drive," in violation of Md.Code (1976, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2007 Cum.Supp.), section 16-303(d) of the Transportation Article (Trans.).1 He challenges that conviction, raising two issues for our review, the first of which presents a question of first impression in Maryland:
I. Did the trial court err in rejecting Sullivan's argument that he could not be convicted of driving on a revoked license when he has never been issued a driver's license?
II. Did the trial court err in admitting a copy of Sullivan's MVA record in the place of the original when the copy is without an appropriate foundation and compliance with the Maryland Rules?
Concluding that Sullivan could not be convicted of driving on a revoked license when he has never been issued a driver's license, we reverse his conviction.
At approximately 7:15 p.m. on August 31, 2006, Montgomery County patrol officer Darrell Furdock stopped Sullivan while he was driving near the intersection of Fisher Avenue and Milford Mill Road. Furdock noted the odor of alcohol. Sgt. Furdock asked Sullivan, a Maryland resident, for his driver's license, but appellant could not produce a license. He ticketed Sullivan for, inter alia, driving on a revoked "license or privilege to drive" in violation of section 16-303.
At trial, Sullivan testified that he had never been issued a Maryland driver's license. Sullivan moved for acquittal on the ground that he could not be convicted of driving on a revoked license because he never had a license, much less had one revoked. In his view, the appropriate charge would have been driving without a license under section 16-101(a), which carries a lesser penalty.
The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that one could have a privilege to drive even without having a license. The court said: "[T]he right to drive, it's a privilege to drive, it's not a card you carry in your pocket[.]" When defense counsel disagreed, the following colloquy occurred:
The trial court then observed that MVA records "show[ed] that based upon accumulation of points, the State of Maryland has revoked his privilege[.]" This record shows that, as of March 20, 2007, Sullivan had 15 "total current points," and lists Sullivan's "license status" as "revoked & suspended." It identifies Sullivan's "OLN" as S-415-115-108-830, and lists various offenses and administrative actions beginning March 30, 1997. An entry for September 13, 2003 reads: "DELETED FROM RECORD POINT SYSTEM REVOCATION." Other entries show that Sullivan's license was "revoked" on October 3, 2003 and "suspended" on July 8, 2005.2
Rejecting Sullivan's argument that, having never acquired a license, he could not be convicted under section 16-303(d), the trial court found Sullivan "guilty of driving on revoked privilege." Sullivan noted this timely appeal.
Established principles of statutory construction govern our review. To discern the legislature's intent in enacting a penal statute such as this traffic law, "we look first to the language of the statute," which we "read in light of the full context of the statute[.]" Jones v. State, 357 Md. 141, 159, 742 A.2d 493 (1999). Our interpretation of this motor vehicle law is informed by "a common sense approach" that eschews the use of "narrow and strained construction" to exclude from its operation circumstances that fall within the plain meaning and scope of the language used by the legislature. See State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275 (1975); Comstock v. State, 82 Md.App. 744, 752, 573 A.2d 117 (1990). Moreover,
"[w]here statutes relate to the same subject matter, and are not inconsistent with each other, they should be construed together and harmonized where consistent with their general object and scope." We accept the presumption that the Legislature intended that which it enacted and "[n]either statute should be read ... so as to render the other, or any portion of it, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory."
Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822 (2005) (citations omitted).
Driving On A Revoked "Privilege To Drive"
Under section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article, all drivers of passenger cars on Maryland highways must be either licensed or exempted from licensing requirements:
(a) In general. — An individual may not drive or attempt to drive a motor vehicle on any highway in this State unless:
(1) The individual holds a driver's license issued under this title;
(2) The individual is expressly exempt from the licensing requirements of this title; or
(3) The individual otherwise is specifically authorized by this title to drive vehicles of the class that the individual is driving or attempting to drive.
Section 16-102, in turn, excludes certain drivers from the licensing requirement, but none of these exclusions applies to Sullivan.3 A misdemeanor conviction for "driving while not licensed" results in the assessment of five points and a fine of up to $500. See Transp. § 16-402(a)(14)(after conviction for violation of vehicle laws, "points shall be assessed" as specified in this subsection); Transp. § 27-101(b)("Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of any of the provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law is subject to a fine of not more than $500").
At issue in this appeal is section 16-303(d), which provides that "[a] person may not drive a motor vehicle on any highway ... while the person's license or privilege to drive is revoked in this State."4 A conviction may be punished, for a first offense, by "a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both[,]" and "[f]or any subsequent offense, a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or both." Transp. § 27-101(h). In addition, with exceptions not relevant here, a conviction for driving after revocation results in the assessment of 12 points. See Transp. § 16-402(a)(30).
Although the term "license" has been defined by the General Assembly,5 the phrase "privilege to drive" has not. This language regularly appears in the disjunctive with the term "license," but there is neither regulation nor case law defining "privilege to drive" in the context of section 16-303(d), or otherwise explaining how a "privilege to drive" differs from a "license."
On appeal Sullivan renews his arguments that he cannot be convicted of driving on a revoked license because he has never been issued a license, and that he cannot be convicted of driving on a revoked privilege to drive because he has never qualified to drive without a license. Acknowledging that there is no Maryland precedent on this question, Sullivan interprets "privilege to drive" to mean only the permission granted to drivers under those exceptions to the licensing requirements set forth in section 16-102. He also cites dictum in Tederick v. State, 125 Md.App. 37, 723 A.2d 917, aff'd sub nom. Jones v. State, 357 Md. 141, 742 A.2d 493 (1999), and out-of-state cases adopting his reasoning.
Sullivan points first to a philosophical query posed in dictum in Tederick, which he suggests supports his position. In Tederick, this Court held that double jeopardy principles did not preclude two separate convictions under section 16-303(d) for a single act of driving on a license that had, on separate occasions, first been revoked and then later suspended. See Tederick, 125 Md.App. at 47, 723 A.2d 917. Writing for the Court, Judge Moylan offered the following aside:
We are not even tempted to grapple with the intimidating philosophical question of how one can suspend something that has earlier been revoked. When the privilege to drive is revoked, it thereby becomes nonexistent. How, then, can one subsequently suspend nothing?
Id. at 45 n. 3, 723 A.2d 917. The Court of Appeals, reviewing our decision, treated driving on a revoked license and driving on a suspended license as separate offenses, but held that a single act of driving cannot be punished twice under sentencing merger principles. See Jones, 357 Md. at 152, 742 A.2d 493. In doing so, the Court quoted Judge Moylan's "cogent footnote," and decided to "likewise follow the same path." See id. at 152 n. 5, 742 A.2d 493.
This case requires us to answer the analogous and likewise challenging question of how the State can revoke a license that has never been issued. As Sullivan points out, many courts called upon to construe similar statutory schemes have held that a...
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...testamentary and probate law.26 There is a final piece to our statutory analysis. As this Court noted in Sullivan v. State , 180 Md. App. 35, 39–40, 948 A.2d 121 (2008), aff'd , 407 Md. 493, 966 A.2d 919 (2009), statutes that relate to the same subject matter "should be construed together a......
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State v. Sullivan
...of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and vacated Sullivan's conviction. Sullivan v. State, 180 Md.App. 35, 948 A.2d 121 (2008). Noting that "neither the Transportation Article, nor Maryland case law defines `privilege to drive'" or prov......