Sumlin Constr. Co., LLC v. Taylor
Decision Date | 11 October 2002 |
Parties | SUMLIN CONSTRUCTION CO., L.L.C., et al. v. William Buck TAYLOR III et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
L. Daniel Mims, Mobile, for appellants.
Mylan R. Engel and Edgar P. Walsh of Engel, Walsh & Associates, Mobile, for appellees.
On November 10, 1999, Sumlin Construction Co., L.L.C. (hereinafter "the LLC"), and Ray J. Sumlin (hereinafter "Sumlin") sued William Buck Taylor III and American Construction Corporation in the Mobile Circuit Court. Sumlin brought his action derivatively on behalf of the LLC and also asserted individual claims.1 On February 23, 2001, the defendants filed an answer and counterclaim. In their counterclaim, the defendants alleged that Sumlin had violated the operating agreement of the LLC and had breached his fiduciary duty.
The parties filed a succession of pleadings and motions, resulting ultimately in the following dispositions pertinent to this appeal: a summary judgment was entered for the defendants as to all claims of both plaintiffs against both defendants and the counterclaim was dismissed. Later, however, the trial court reinstated the LLC's claims, only to again enter a summary judgment for the defendants as to them. While the LLC's claims were pending, the summary judgment against Sumlin was certified as final and appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. After the summary judgment was entered on the LLC's claims, Sumlin and the LLC filed a notice of appeal. The appeal as to Sumlin was dismissed by this Court as untimely on April 12, 2002, because the time for taking his individual appeal, as triggered by the Rule 54(b) certification, had expired, and Sumlin's request to this Court for leave to file a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion with the trial court relative to his individual claims was denied. Accordingly, in the final analysis, the only claims eligible for consideration on this appeal are Sumlin's derivative claims on behalf of the LLC. We shall, nonetheless, continue to refer to Sumlin where appropriate.
Sumlin and the LLC argued on appeal that the summary judgment for the defendants on Sumlin's derivative claims was erroneous because, they say, the trial judge could not properly have held contrary to any of these propositions: 1) judicial estoppel would not apply against Sumlin; 2) the LLC and Sumlin are the real parties in interest for a derivative claim, or opposed to the trustee in Sumlin's bankruptcy proceeding; and 3) Sumlin possessed standing to bring the derivative action on behalf of the LLC. Because we consider the standing issue to be dispositive of the appeal, we do not fully address the other two arguments.
Our review of a summary judgment is de novo.
Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).
The record reveals that on April 23, 1998, Ray J. Sumlin entered into an operating agreement with William Buck Taylor III and American Construction Corporation (of which Taylor was the sole shareholder) to form Sumlin Construction Co., L.L.C. The operating agreement provided, in pertinent part:
The articles of organization of the LLC provide, in pertinent part:
Subsequently, Taylor...
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