Summers v. Hinds Cnty.

• Decision Date: 12 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:20-CV-266-DPJ-FKB
• Parties: CASEY H. SUMMERS, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS v. HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

CASEY H. SUMMERS, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS
v.
HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-266-DPJ-FKB

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division

January 12, 2023

ORDER

DANIEL P. JORDAN III CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendants seek summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive-force case related to a traffic stop. Mot. [59]. As explained below, their motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts are sharply disputed, but the Court must consider them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff Casey Summers and her husband Jonathan Summers loaded their six children-who ranged in age from 5 months to 11 years- into the back of their Mercury Grand Marquis, left their home in Raymond, Mississippi, and headed into Jackson to pick up something to eat. On the return drive, Casey (who was riding in the front passenger seat next to her husband), received a phone call and learned that Hinds County law enforcement officers were at their home looking for Jonathan. At the time, Jonathan was subject to several active misdemeanor warrants as well as a felony warrant for fleeing/alluding.

Around that time, Defendant Hinds County Deputy Jason Pittman spotted the Grand Marquis and informed Defendant Deputy Joel Williams; Williams initiated a traffic stop. After Jonathan pulled over, Deputy Pittman and his ride-along trainee, Defendant Deputy Louis Hall,

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joined Williams to assist. Defendant Deputy Tony Taylor was the last to arrive and parked his patrol car in front of the Summerses' parked vehicle.

Deputy Williams approached the driver's side window with his gun drawn, and Deputy Taylor approached Casey's passenger-side window with a drawn taser. Two of the children testified that they saw Deputies Pittman and Hall behind the Summerses' vehicle with guns drawn. Taylor observed eight occupants in the vehicle, IAD Report [68-5] at 3, and one child heard him tell the deputies that there were children present. All four windows were rolled down throughout the encounter.

According to Casey, Jonathan was compliant with the deputies' commands, and she did not see him drop his hands after being instructed to raise them. Casey and three of the children testified that while the vehicle was stationary on the side of the road, Deputies Pittman and Hall fired two to three gunshots at the car. Casey and one child claim they were grazed by the bullets. Casey claims that after the shots began, she instructed Jonathan to drive away; as he did, he struck Deputy Taylor's patrol vehicle.^[1]

Deputies Pittman and Hall fired additional shots as Jonathan drove off. Then, Deputies Pittman, Hall, and Williams began a high-speed pursuit of the vehicle. According to Casey, the deputies never abandoned their pursuit and were “behind [their car] the entire time.” Casey Dep. [68-1] at 48-49. The chase ended when Jonathan ran a red light and was struck by a Nissan

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Titan pick-up truck. Casey and the children all sustained injuries in the crash; some were serious.^[2]

On February 4, 2020, Casey (individually and as the mother and next friend of her six minor children) filed this lawsuit against Hinds County and Deputies Williams, Pittman, Hall, and Taylor in their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' illegal-search claim under Rule 12(b)(6), see Dec. 21, 2020 Order [19], leaving Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for excessive force. At the close of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Court has both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case[] and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion[] and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The

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nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). It must “interpret all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016); accord Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014). But conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)); accord Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

III. Analysis

Under § 1983, “[a] police officer who, acting under color of state law, subjects a United States citizen to a deprivation of his constitutional rights is liable for damages to the injured party.” Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Plaintiffs say Defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive force during and after the traffic stop.

A. Individual-Capacity Claims against the Deputies

The deputies assert that qualified-immunity bars the individual-capacity claims for excessive force. Qualified immunity “shields government officials from liability when they are acting within their discretionary authority and their conduct does not violate clearly established

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statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.” Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v. Jones, 922 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 2018)).

Once a defendant raises qualified immunity, “the burden . . . shifts to the plaintiff to rebut the qualified immunity defense.” Cherry Knoll, 922 F.3d at 318. That requires showing “that the state actor (1) violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Can. Hockey, L.L.C. v. Marquardt, No. 2020530, 2022 WL 252186, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2022) (citing King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016)). On the second point, “the salient question . . . is whether the state of the law [at the time] gave [the defendants] fair warning” that their alleged conduct violated the federal standard. Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)); accord Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). “The rule must [have been] ‘settled law,' which means . . . dictated by ‘controlling authority' or ‘a robust “consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”'” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (citations omitted) (first quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); then quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); and then quoting id. at 742).

As the Court noted in an earlier order, “only one constitutional amendment can apply to Plaintiffs' excessive-force allegations.” Order [19] at 6 n.1 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 386, 394 (1989)). The parties agree that the Fourth Amendment controls everything that happened during the traffic stop, and Plaintiffs offer no authority suggesting that the Fourth Amendment continued to control after Jonathan fled the stop. The Court finds that it is more consistent with the facts and the law to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the events once Jonathan fled the scene.

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1. Fourth Amendment (Excessive Force While Seized)

“To bring a § 1983 excessive[-]force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must first show that she was seized.” Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 388). This element is not disputed during the traffic stop. “Next she must show that she suffered (1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citing Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 2000)). Defendants contest all three elements.

a. Injury

“A plaintiff alleging an excessive force violation must show that she has suffered ‘at least some injury.'” Id. at 397 (quoting Jackson v. R.E. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993)). Defendants say none of them did.

“[A]lthough a de minimis injury is not cognizable, the extent of injury necessary to satisfy the injury requirement is directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances.” Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Any force found to be objectively unreasonable necessarily exceeds the de minimis threshold, and,

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