Summers v. Summers
Decision Date | 09 June 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96,96 |
Citation | 699 N.E.2d 958,121 Ohio App.3d 263 |
Parties | SUMMERS, Appellant, et al., v. SUMMERS, Appellee, et al. * , 1 CA 46. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
William T. Bonham, Gahanna, and William A. Fields, Marietta, for appellant Scott C. Summers.
Roland W. Riggs III, Marietta, for appellee Craig P. McCurdy.
Scott C. Summers, trustee ("trustee"), appeals the judgment awarding Craig P. McCurdy the beneficial and possessory interests of the trust created by Cynthia Frances Summers ("Summers") in her will for the benefit of her son, Benjamin Robert McCurdy ("Ben"). The trustee asserts that the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, erred by not finding that a resulting trust in favor of Frances W. Summers and Betty C. Summers ("maternal grandparents") was appropriate. The trustee argues that the underlying trust failed and distribution of the trust to McCurdy would amount to unjust enrichment. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The parties stipulated the relevant facts in this action. Summers and McCurdy divorced in 1983. Summers took custody of their only son, Ben. Summers died testate in 1994. Item three of her Last Will and Testament, executed in 1984, created the testamentary trust which is the subject of this action.
Summers's will was silent as to who the trust beneficiary would be if Ben never reached the age of twenty-five and was unable to take. The maternal grandparents are the heirs at law of Summers and the stipulated natural objects of Summers's affection in the absence of Ben.
Ben died intestate in 1995 at the age of twenty. Ben's heir at law is his father, McCurdy. The trustee brought this declaratory judgment action to determine who is entitled to the trust estate remaining after Ben's death. The trial court determined that (1) the trust vested in Ben at the time of Summers's death, (2) Ben died intestate, and (3) the trust estate should be distributed to Ben's heir at law, McCurdy.
The trustee asserts three assignments of error on appeal:
The essence of the trustee's argument is that (1) Ben's interest became divested when he died prior to the distribution of the trust, (2) a resulting trust arose from the remainder of the trust, and (3) the maternal grandparents, as Summers's heirs at law, are entitled to immediate distribution of the resulting trust by application of the doctrine of acceleration.
In his first assignment of error, the trustee asserts that the trust, if ever vested at all, divested upon Ben's death. In support of this argument, the trustee contends that divesting the trust is necessary to effectuate Summers's intent. We disagree.
It is well settled that the interpretation of wills is a question of law, and, thus, when determining a testator's intent and the terms of her testamentary trust, we apply a de novo standard of review. See McCulloch v. Yost (1947), 148 Ohio St. 675, 677, 36 O.O. 274, 275, 76 N.E.2d 707, 708; Leyshon v. Miller (Oct. 20, 1994), Washington App. No. 93CA37, unreported, 1994 WL 585743. In the construction of wills, Ohio courts consistently follow the general rules set forth in paragraphs one through four of the syllabus in Townsend's Exrs. v. Townsend (1874), 25 Ohio St. 477, as follows:
See, also, Ohio Natl. Bank v. Adair (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 26, 8 O.O.3d 15, 374 N.E.2d 415.
A will must be read "with the presumption that the testator was knowledgeable of the law." Wendell v. AmeriTrust Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 74, 76, 630 N.E.2d 368, 370.
The law favors early vesting and will postpone vesting beyond the death of the testator only if the will clearly expresses an intent to do so. Ohio Natl. Bank of Columbus v. Boone (1942), 139 Ohio St. 361, 22 O.O. 414, 40 N.E.2d 149, paragraph two of the syllabus. Merely delaying the distribution of a trust until the beneficiary reaches a certain age will not delay vesting beyond the death of the testator. Provident Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Volhard (1936), 54 Ohio App. 327, 333, 8 O.O. 56, 58-59, 7 N.E.2d 234, 237; Heiser v. Heiser (App. 1929), 8 Ohio Law Abs. 433; Green v. Green (1966), 9 Ohio Misc. 15, 20, 37 O.O.2d 394, 396-397, 221 N.E.2d 388, 392-393. When a testator gives a trust and its remainder to one beneficiary, and that person dies prior to termination of the trust, "since the beneficiary had the entire beneficial interest, the resulting trust should be in favor of * * * succeeding to his interest, and not for the settlor who had transferred his whole interest in the property." 5 Scott, Trusts (4 Ed.1989) 37-38, Section 411.5. See, also, Provident Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 54 Ohio App. at 333, 8 O.O. at 58-59, 7 N.E.2d at 237.
Applying these principles here, we find that Summers intended the remainder interest of the trust she created to vest in Ben at her death. There is no language in the will which evidences, much less clearly expresses, an intent to delay vesting of the trust. Moreover, the trust disposed of the entire beneficial interest in Ben. Presuming Summers knew the law when she executed her will, she was aware that if Ben died intestate, his estate would pass to his heirs at law. As pointed out by the trial court, if Ben had married or had a child prior to his death, his estate, including the trust created for him, would have passed to them. Summers did not express an intent to avoid this result. Accordingly, the trustee's first assignment of error is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, the trustee asserts that a resulting trust should have been created in favor of the maternal grandparents upon Ben's death. A resulting trust is an equitable remedy arising in favor of a grantor when circumstances of a transfer raise the inference that the grantor did not intend to transfer beneficial interest to the holder of legal title. First Natl. Bank of Cincinnati v. Tenney (1956), 165 Ohio St. 513, 515, 60 O.O. 481, 482, 138 N.E.2d 15, 16; Croston v. Croston (1969), 18 Ohio App.2d 159, 165, 47 O.O.2d 260, 263-264, 247 N.E.2d 765, 769. "The device has historically been applied to three situations: (1) purchase-money trusts; (2) instances where an express trust does not exhaust the res given to the trustee; and (3) express trusts which fail, in whole or in part." First Natl. Bank of Cincinnati at 515-516, 60 O.O. at 482, 138 N.E.2d at 17.
The trustee does not make clear which of these three situations he believes is applicable to this case. The first, generally arising out of a debtor-creditor relationship, can clearly be eliminated on the facts.
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the second situation may give rise to a resulting trust for a grantor's heir in Broadrup v. Woodman (1875), 27 Ohio St. 553. In Broadrup, a trust was created to provide for the support of the grantor's wife and child as long as necessary, but did not provide for disposition of the remainder of the trust property. When the wife remarried and the child reached the age of the majority, the support was no longer "necessary," and therefore the...
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