Summerville v. City of Forest Park

• Decision Date: 27 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009–2106.,2009–2106.
• Citation: 943 N.E.2d 522,128 Ohio St.3d 221
• Parties: SUMMERVILLE, Admr., Appellee,v.CITY OF FOREST PARK et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

128 Ohio St.3d 221

943 N.E.2d 522

2010 -Ohio- 6280

SUMMERVILLE, Admr., Appellee,

v.CITY OF FOREST PARK et al., Appellants.

No. 2009–2106.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Oct. 12, 2010.Decided Dec. 27, 2010.

Syllabus of the Court

An order denying a motion for summary judgment in which an employee of a political subdivision sought immunity from claims brought under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).

Law Offices of Marc Mezibov and Marc D. Mezibov, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Schroeder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, Lawrence E. Barbiere, and Jay D. Patton, Mason, for appellants.Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A, Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand, Cleveland, and Stephen J. Smith, Columbus; and John Gotherman, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League.Dinkler Pregon, L.L.C., Lynette Dinkler, and Jamey T. Pregon, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.

O'CONNOR, J.

O'Connor, J.

[Ohio St.3d 221] {¶ 1} In this appeal, we reconcile R.C. 2744.02(C) with R.C. 2744.09(E) and determine whether the denial of a motion for summary judgment in which a political subdivision or its employee sought federal qualified immunity from claims brought under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code is a final, appealable order.

{¶ 2} R.C. Chapter 2744 governs political-subdivision immunity. Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), orders denying employees of a political subdivision immunity from liability under any provision of law are final, appealable orders. R.C. 2744.01(D) defines the term “law” to include federal laws.

{¶ 3} R.C. 2744.09 sets forth exceptions to the applicability of R.C. Chapter 2744. Pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(E), the chapter does not apply to civil claims based upon alleged violations of the federal constitution or statutes.

{¶ 4} R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2744.09(E) conflict inasmuch as the former specifically applies to immunity allowed under any provision of law, including federal law, while the latter precludes application of the chapter to civil actions premised on alleged violations of federal law. As the more recent and more specific statute, R.C. 2744.02(C) prevails over R.C. 2744.09(E). Accordingly, we hold that an order denying a motion for summary judgment in which an employee of a [Ohio St.3d 222] political subdivision sought federal qualified immunity from claims brought under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).

Relevant Background

{¶ 5} Appellants Adam Pape and Corey Hall are police officers for appellant city of Forest Park, Ohio. On September 15, 2005, Officers Pape and Hall responded to a 9–1–1 telephone call from appellee, Leola Summerville, who reported that her husband, Roosevelt Summerville, may have committed suicide. Officer Pape saw Mr. Summerville stab himself in the chest multiple times with what looked like a knife. He ordered Mr. Summerville to stop stabbing himself, and when Mr. Summerville refused to comply with the order, Officer Pape deployed his taser. The taser did not subdue Mr. Summerville, who lunged at Officer Pape with the knife. Officers Pape and Hall simultaneously shot Mr. Summerville. He died as a result of the gunshot wounds.

{¶ 6} On September 6, 2007, Mrs. Summerville, individually and in her capacity as administrator of her husband's estate, filed a complaint against Forest Park, Police Chief Kenneth Hughes, and Officers Pape and Hall, asserting causes of action for (1) excessive use of force under Section 1983, (2) deliberate indifference in failing to provide adequate medical care under Section 1983, (3) deliberate indifference in failing to adequately train under Section 1983, (4) wrongful death under R.C. 2125.01, (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (6) loss of consortium.

{¶ 7} Appellants and Police Chief Hughes moved for summary judgment on all claims. They argued that they were entitled to immunity on the state-law claims pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. Hughes, Pape, and Hall also claimed that they were entitled to federal qualified immunity¹ for the alleged violations of Section 1983. Forest Park did not claim immunity relating to Summerville's Section 1983 [Ohio St.3d 223] claims. Instead, the city argued that the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply and therefore it was not liable for the officers' conduct.

{¶ 8} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellants on the state-law claims and the Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference in failing to provide adequate medical care. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Police Chief Hughes on all claims. The trial court denied summary judgment to Officers Pape and Hall with respect to Summerville's Section 1983 claim for excessive force and to the city on the Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference in failing to adequately train.

{¶ 9} Appellants appealed the trial court's denial of summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims to the First District Court of Appeals. The notice of appeal was filed pursuant to the authority of R.C. 2744.02(C), because the appeal related to the denial of qualified immunity to Officers Pape and Hall. The city requested that the court of appeals exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over its claimed errors because “the issues involving the City of Forest Park's appeal [were] inextricably intertwined with the issues relating to the appeal of defendants, Adam Pape and Corey Hall.”

{¶ 10} Summerville moved to dismiss the appeal. She argued that R.C. Chapter 2744 did not apply to claims brought pursuant to Section 1983, and therefore, the trial court's denial of summary judgment was not a final, appealable order. The court of appeals granted Summerville's motion and dismissed the appeal without issuing an opinion. We accepted discretionary review of appellants' sole proposition of law, which states: “A trial court's decision overruling a Motion for Summary Judgment in which a political subdivision or its employee sought immunity from claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an order denying ‘the benefit of an alleged immunity’ and is, therefore, a final appealable order under R.C. 2744.02(C).” ² Summerville v. Forest Park, 124 Ohio St.3d 1473, 2010-Ohio-354, 921 N.E.2d 245.

Analysis

{¶ 11} “ ‘It is well-established that an order must be final before it can be reviewed by an appellate court. If an order is not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction.’ ” Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 9, quoting [Ohio St.3d 224] Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266. The denial of summary judgment generally is not a final, appealable order. Id., citing State ex rel. Overmeyer v. Walinski (1966), 8 Ohio St.2d 23, 24, 37 O.O.2d 358, 222 N.E.2d 312. However, appellants argue that pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), the denial of a motion for summary judgment in which a political subdivision or its employee sought federal qualified immunity from claims brought under Section 1983 is a final, appealable order and, therefore, is an exception to the general rule.

{¶ 12} Under R.C. 2744.02(C), “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.”

{¶ 13} In Hubbell, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, at ¶ 2, we held that pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), “when a political subdivision or its employee seeks immunity, an order that denies the benefit of an alleged immunity is a final, appealable order.” In that case, we reversed the dismissal of an appeal from the denial of summary judgment on a claim of state-law immunity.

{¶ 14} We expanded upon Hubbell in Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88, stating: “R.C. 2744.02(C) * * * makes final an order denying a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability. * * * Therefore, there is no reason for a trial court to certify under Civ.R. 54(B) that ‘there is no just cause for delay.’ When the denial of political-subdivision immunity is concerned, the trial court has no discretion to determine whether to separate claims or parties and permit an interlocutory appeal.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing Hubbell at ¶ 27.

{¶ 15} Although Hubbell and Sullivan involved state-law immunity, R.C. 2744.02(C) expressly applies to the denial of the benefit of an alleged immunity as provided in any provision of law. R.C. 2744.01(D) defines the term “law” for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2744 and provides that “law” means “any provision of the constitution, statutes, or rules of the United States or of this state.” Accordingly, the express terms of R.C. 2744.01(D) and 2744.02(C) render the denial of immunity afforded under state or federal law a final, appealable order.

{¶ 16} However, pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(E), R.C. Chapter 2744 does not apply to “[c]ivil claims based upon alleged violations of the constitution or statutes of the United States, except that the provisions of section 2744.07 of the Revised Code shall apply to such claims or related civil actions.” This case involves a civil action, and the allegations in question are based upon federal law–Section 1983. And Officers Pape and Hall claim federal qualified immunity. Appellee argues that because R.C. 2744.09(E) renders R.C. Chapter 2744 inapplicable to civil actions based on alleged violations of federal laws, R.C. 2744.02(C) [Ohio St.3d 225] does not apply and the trial court's denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment is not a final, appealable order.

{¶ 17} We must construe the statutes to determine whether R.C. 2744.09(E) renders R.C. 2744.02(C) inapplicable to this case. We hold that it does not.

Statutory Interpretation

{¶ 18} “We must first look to the...