Summit Cnty. Children Servs. v. Stucki
| Decision Date | 29 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | C. A. 29911 |
| Citation | 2021 Ohio 4584 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SUMMIT COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES Relator v. SUMMIT COUNTY JUVENILE JUDGE DAVID E. STUCKI Respondent |
ORIGINAL ACTION IN PROCEDENDO AND PROHIBITION
DONALD J. MALARCIK and NOAH C. MUNYER, Attorneys at Law, for Relator.
KIMBERLY VANOVER RILEY and LISA M. ZARING, Attorneys at Law for Respondent.
{¶1} Relator, Summit County Children Services ("SCCS" or "the agency"), has filed a Complaint for Writ of Prohibition and for Procedendo, as well as a Motion for Stay. SCCS seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondent, Judge David E. Stucki, from (1) requiring the agency to contract with a court-appointed evaluator, and (2) holding the agency's Executive Director in contempt for not complying with his order. SCCS seeks a writ of procedendo to compel Judge Stucki to hold an evidentiary hearing. Additionally SCCS seeks a stay of Judge Stucki's order and any contempt proceedings pending a ruling upon its complaint. Judge Stucki has moved to dismiss the complaint, SCCS has responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss, and Judge Stucki has filed a reply. This Court also has received a Motion for Emergency Ruling on Contempt Issue and Remand to the Trial Court. That motion has been filed by one of the parties in the underlying juvenile court case that led to this original action. SCCS has responded to the Motion for Emergency Ruling by filing a Motion to Strike. For the following reasons, this Court grants the motion to dismiss and denies all other outstanding motions.
{¶2} When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must presume that all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490 (1994). A complaint can only be dismissed when, having viewed the complaint in this way, it appears beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to the relief requested. Goudlock v. Voorhies, 119 Ohio St.3d 389, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7.
{¶3} "Typically, 'courts cannot rely on evidence or allegations outside the complaint to decide a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.'" State ex rel. Evans v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St.3d 579, 2018-Ohio-5089, ¶ 6, quoting Jefferson v. Bunting, 140 Ohio St.3d 62, 2014-Ohio-3074, ¶ 11. If a motion to dismiss depends on extrinsic evidence, a court generally must "convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and provide the opposing party with notice and an opportunity to respond." Jefferson at ¶ 12. However, "'[m]aterial incorporated in a complaint may be considered part of the complaint for purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss"" State ex rel. Peoples v. Schneider, 159 Ohio St.3d 360, 2020-Ohio-1071, ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249 (1997), fn. 1. Moreover, "a court may take notice of the docket and record in a closely related case to determine whether the current complaint states a claim for relief." State ex rel. Neguse v. McIntosh, 161 Ohio St.3d 125, 2020-Ohio-3533, ¶ 18.
{¶4} Judge Stucki attached to his motion to dismiss (1) journal entries that he and his predecessor issued in the underlying juvenile court case in this matter, (2) a motion filed by the father in the underlying juvenile court case, (3) a prior appellate decision that this Court issued in the underlying juvenile court case, and (4) a prior decision that this Court issued in response to a writ of mandamus filed by the father in the juvenile court case. SCCS referred to this Court's prior appellate decision and prior mandamus decision in its complaint. Additionally, the juvenile court orders that SCCS attached to its complaint refer to those decisions. Because this Court's prior decisions are incorporated into the agency's complaint, we will consider them in ruling on Judge Stucki's motion to dismiss and the agency's complaint. See State ex rel Peoples at ¶ 9. To the extent Judge Stucki attached other materials to his motion and to the extent SCCS attached additional materials to its response, this Court need not determine whether those materials are reviewable in the context of a motion to dismiss, as they are not dispositive to our review.
{¶5} According to the complaint and this Court's prior decisions, SCCS initiated an abuse and dependency action that led to three children being adjudicated dependent, placed in their mother's legal custody, and placed under the agency's protective supervision. The children's father later sought a reallocation of custody and moved to modify the case plan to address his concerns about parental alienation by the mother. Meanwhile, SCCS filed a motion to terminate its protective supervision. The juvenile court scheduled the matter for final hearing and did not rule upon the father's motion to modify the case plan before the hearing. Instead, the father presented evidence of parental alienation at the final hearing. When the hearing concluded the juvenile court denied the father's motion to modify the case plan, as well as his other pending motions, and granted the agency's motion to terminate protective supervision. The father then appealed from that judgment.
{¶6} On appeal, the father argued that the juvenile court had erred by proceeding to final judgment without first addressing his motion to modify the case plan to include an assessment to address parental alienation by the mother. This Court agreed and determined that "the juvenile court should have at a minimum considered the merits of [the father's] motion to modify the case plan at a time when any issue could still be addressed to effect the primary goals of supportive services * * *." In re MB., 2019-Ohio-3166, at ¶ 26. We noted that "the proper procedure would have been for the juvenile court to fully consider whether a case plan amendment was warranted in a separate hearing in advance of the final dispositional hearing." Id. This Court sustained the father's argument, reversed the judgment of the juvenile court, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶7} According to the complaint and attachments thereto, on remand, the juvenile court ordered that the case plan be amended "to require an assessment to determine if the children have rejected their father due to parental alienation * * *." The juvenile court further ordered the parties to submit for its consideration the names of evaluators who might assess the children, updated financial statements regarding their ability to pay for the evaluator, and any arguments they might have as to the apportionment of the evaluator's fees. When the father, the mother, and SCCS responded, there was a "mutual exclusion" of the evaluators that each of the parties had proposed. The juvenile court found that the exclusion "limit[ed] [it] to find[ing] an appropriate expert, far outside the greater Summit County, Ohio area, not listed by any of the parties." The juvenile court appointed an evaluator with offices in California and Hawaii and ordered the parties to "contact [the evaluator] and [make] necessary arrangements for payment of his fees and expenses within 14 days of the date of [the court's] order." The juvenile court indicated that the evaluator should clinically assess and/or treat the children for parental alienation through "whatever type of assessment his expertise would dictate" so as to provide the parties and the court "insight on how to best provide Case Plan and other services to these children to assist in their development and to provide for their best interests." The juvenile court indicated that the father and the mother would each be responsible for paying 10% of the evaluator's fees and costs and SCCS would be responsible for the remaining 80%. In doing so, the juvenile court rejected several arguments that SCCS raised regarding the court's authority to order the agency to pay a portion of the evaluator's fees. The juvenile court indicated that a failure to timely comply with its orders might constitute a basis for a future finding of contempt.
{¶8} According to the complaint, SCCS contacted the evaluator's practice to gather information about his fees and licensing. SCCS determined that the evaluator might not be able to obtain a temporary license to practice in Ohio and, in any event, that the costs and fees of his services would be approximately $60, 000. SCCS filed another motion to terminate protective supervision, a motion to modify the juvenile court's selection of the evaluator, and a motion to modify the allocation of responsibility for his costs and fees. Additionally, the father filed a motion in which he asked the juvenile court to designate a different expert.
{¶9} The complaint alleges that the juvenile court scheduled the matter for a hearing on the pending motions, but the hearing never occurred. It was rescheduled several times due to COVID-19 and then continued because the father filed a writ of mandamus in this Court. After this Court denied the writ the juvenile court scheduled the matter for a status hearing. It also ordered the parties to file written documentation of their compliance with its prior order to contact the evaluator and make financial arrangements for the payment of his costs and fees. SCCS responded by moving for a hearing on all pending motions and requesting a stay of the order for written documentation. Following the agency's filing, the juvenile court issued a journal entry in which it determined that none of the parties had complied with its previous...
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