Sumstad v. Wilson, No. A08-0019 (Minn. App. 1/27/2009)
| Decision Date | 27 January 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-0019.,No. A08-0020.,A08-0019.,A08-0020. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Kevin Sumstad, Appellant, v. Mark Edward Wilson, M.D., et al., Respondents, Minnesota Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgeons, LLC, et al., Respondents. |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 27-CV-06-2747.
William M. Fishman, Michael C. Van Berkom, Howard L. Bolter, Borkon, Ramstead, Mariani, Fishman & Carp, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, (for appellant)
Katherine A. McBride, Barbara A. Zurek, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, (for respondents Mark Edward Wilson, et al.)
Sarah M. MacGillis, MacGillis Law P.A., Minneapolis, MN; and David D. Alsop, Gislason & Hunter LLP, Minneapolis, MN, (for respondents Minnesota Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgeons, et al.)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Huspeni, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this action alleging medical malpractice, appellant Kevin Sumstad challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondent Minnesota Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgeons, LLC (Thoracic). Appellant also challenges several of the district court's rulings in his medical malpractice action against respondent Dr. Mark Edward Wilson. We affirm.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Thoracic by concluding that appellant's expert affidavits failed to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 145.682 (2008). We disagree.
On appeal from summary judgment we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). "On appeal, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993) (citation omitted). But we will reverse a district court's dismissal of a malpractice claim for noncompliance with expert disclosure only if the district court abused its discretion. Broehm v. Mayo Clinic Rochester, 690 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Minn. 2005) (citation omitted).
Section 145.682 is designed to prevent frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to file expert affidavits in support of their malpractice allegations. Canfield v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 610 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Thus, in order to comply with the requirements of subdivision 4 of section 145.682 following commencement of a suit for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must serve an expert-disclosure affidavit that (1) discloses specific details concerning the expert's expected testimony, including the applicable standard of care; (2) identifies the acts or omissions that the plaintiff alleges violated the standard of care; and (3) includes an outline of the chain of causation between the violation of the standard of care and the plaintiff's damages. Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minn., 645 N.W.2d 420, 428 (Minn. 2002) (citing Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. 1990)).
A plaintiff's prima facie case "must prove, among other things, that it is more probable than not that his or her injury was a result of the defendant health care provider's negligence." Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. 1992) (); Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762 (). Thus, to survive summary judgment, appellant must establish, as a matter of law, that it is more probable than not that the negligence of Thoracic's treating doctor, Dr. Lyle D. Joyce, caused him injury.
Appellant first brought a medical malpractice claim against respondent Wilson and submitted an expert affidavit for this claim prepared by appellant's expert. Appellant later amended his complaint and joined Thoracic as a defendant, asserting a claim of medical malpractice by one of Thoracic's surgeons, Dr. Joyce. Appellant's expert prepared a supplemental affidavit considering the care provided to appellant by Dr. Joyce. Both respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to meet the requirements of section 145.682. Appellant then submitted a second supplemental affidavit by his expert. The second supplemental affidavit states in relevant part:
Dr. Joyce's delay in performing the surgery made it more probable than not and was a substantial contributing factor in taking away Mr. Sumstad's quantifiable chance of a curative outcome. For example research and my experience would have placed that opportunity at approximately 20-30 percent of the time.
(Emphasis added.) By this statement appellant's expert claims that Dr. Joyce's delay in performing surgery made it more probable than not that appellant would have an adverse outcome. But the expert opinion quantifies appellant's chance of a curative outcome at only 20-30 percent absent any surgical delay. It follows from this quantification that even without any delay in surgery, appellant still had a 70 to 80 percent chance of an adverse outcome. Therefore, appellant's expert affidavit does not establish that Dr. Joyce's allegedly negligent act of delaying surgery more likely than not caused appellant's adverse outcome. Consequently, appellant's affidavit does not meet the causation requirements of section 145.682. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
The district court denied Dr. Wilson's motion for summary judgment, and the case was tried to a jury. Appellant moved for, and was granted, a directed verdict against Dr. Wilson on the issue of negligence. But the jury found that Dr. Wilson's negligence was not the cause of appellant's injuries. Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his pretrial motion in limine, the quashing of his subpoena, the admission of several of Dr. Wilson's experts, and the denial of appellant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the district court and the court's ruling will only be reversed if it is based on an erroneous view of the law or constitutes an abuse of discretion. Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997). "Entitlement to a new trial on the ground of improper evidentiary rulings rests upon the complaining party's ability to demonstrate prejudicial error." Id. at 46. In the absence of some indication that the district court exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to legal usage, the appellate court is bound by the result. Id.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Dr. Wilson from asserting Thoracic's negligence as a defense to his own medical malpractice. We disagree.
Whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation of an issue is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004). For collateral estoppel to apply, the following four prongs must be met:
(1) the issue must be identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
Appellant argues that the issues of Thoracic's negligence and causation were litigated and decided at summary judgment and therefore Dr. Wilson could not assert Thoracic's negligence as a defense. We disagree. Summary judgment dismissal of appellant's claim against Thoracic was based on appellant's failure to establish a prima facie case of causation against Thoracic as required by section 145.682. Thus, Dr. Wilson's assertion of Thoracic's negligence as a defense was not a relitigation of an identical issue, and therefore, appellant's collateral estoppel argument fails.
Moreover, appellant's argument also fails because there is a lack of privity between respondents. Hentschel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 95, 153 N.W.2d 199, 206 (1967). In general, privity involves a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. McMenomy v. Ryden, 276 Minn. 55, 585-9, 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1967).
Here, the fact that both Thoracic and Dr. Wilson were defendants does not establish privity between them for purposes of collateral estoppel. Indeed, in many respects respondents' interests are adverse to each other and those interests are not so common that they represent the same legal right. Consequently, collateral estoppel did not bar Dr. Wilson from discussing or referencing Thoracic's deviation from the standard of care in its own defense. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion in limine.
Quashing the subpoena
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it quashed a subpoena served on Dr. Joyce. We disagree.
"`In ruling on a motion to quash [a subpoena], the court should balance the need of the party to inspect the documents or things against the harm, burden, or expense imposed upon the person subpoenaed.'" Ciriacy v. Ciriacy, 431 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. App. 1988) (quoting 2 D. Herr & R. Haydock, Minnesota Practice § 45.7 at 374 (1985)). The...
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