Sun Insurance Co. v. Jones
Decision Date | 04 April 1891 |
Citation | 15 S.W. 1034,54 Ark. 376 |
Parties | SUN INSURANCE COMPANY v. JONES |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
APPEAL from Pulaski Circuit Court, JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Judge.
S. M Jones & Co. sued the Sun Mutual Insurance Co. in the Pulaski circuit court on a policy of insurance for $ 2000, on a house and stock of goods which had been destroyed by fire at Riverside, Arkansas.
Defendant answered, alleging that, by the terms of the policy of insurance, it was stipulated as follows:
"The assured under this policy hereby covenants and agrees to keep a set of books, showing a complete record of all business transacted, including all purchases and sales, both for cash and credit, together with the last inventory of said business; and further covenants and agrees to keep such books and inventory securely locked in a fire-proof safe at night and at all times when the store mentioned in the within policy is not actually open for business, or in some secure place not exposed to a fire, which would destroy the house where such business is carried on; and in case of loss the assured agrees and covenants to produce such books and inventory, and in the event of the failure to produce the same, this policy shall be deemed null and void, and no suit or action at law shall be maintained thereon for any such loss."
That the plaintiffs failed to keep a set of books showing a complete record of all transactions and a last inventory, and failed to keep said books and inventory securely locked in a fire-proof safe at night, and at all times when their store was not actually open for business, or in a secure place not exposed to fire which would destroy their business house; but they left their books out of the safe at night when no business was being carried on, so that they were destroyed by the fire which consumed the building, and were not produced in accordance with the terms of the said policy.
The defendant also pleaded that, by the terms of the policy, it was provided that no suit should be maintained thereon unless brought within one year after the loss, and that this suit was not brought until the lapse of more than one year.
The case was tried by the court sitting as a jury, and the following findings of fact were made:
The defendant asked the court to declare the law to be that the plaintiffs were debarred from recovering by reason of their failure to keep their books in an iron safe at night and at all times when their store was not actually open for business, and that the suit was barred because not brought within one year next after the date of the fire; but the court refused both declarations, and to its action in so doing the defendant excepted at the time.
From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs defendant has appealed.
Judgment affirmed.
U. M. & G. B. Rose and E. W. Kimball for appellant.
1. The iron-safe clause has been frequently passed upon and sustained. 5 S.E. 125; 18 Ins. Law Jour., 813; 13 S.W. 799; ib., 1103. This clause required the books kept in a fire-proof safe at night and when the store was not actually open for business. The proof shows that the fire occurred at night, and that the books were not locked in the safe, and that the store was not actually open.
2. The suit not having been brought within one year after the loss, it was barred. The "loss" is the fire, and not the "proof of loss." 7 Gray, 61; 7 Wall., 386; 26 La. An., 298; 16 U. C. Q. B., 135; 83 Va. 741; 91 Ill. 92; 51 Conn. 17; 1 Bradw. (Ill.), 309; 66 Mo. 32; 1 Ohio Ct. Ct., 192; Berryman's Ins. Dig., 792; 21 New B., 544; 20 Bradw., 431; 12 Ont. App., 418, cited Ber. Ins. Dig., 794.
J. M. Moore for appellees.
1. The iron-safe clause is to be construed with reference to the well known and long established commercial usages of the country. The store was open for business until the business of the day was closed, which was often as late as 10 or 11 o'clock at night. "At night" means during the night when the store was closed and business suspended. For cases where similar clauses have been reasonably construed, see 38 F. 19, and cases cited; 8 Cush., 79; 8 Metc. (Mass.), 124; ib., 125; 12 Wall., 404; 27 Cent. Law Jour., 284; 6 A. & E., 170; id., 75; 2 C. M. & R., 447; 17 N.E. 771, 776; 31 Me. 221-4-5; 1 Wood, Fire Insurance, 145.
2. The limitation did not begin to run until the right of action accrued, which, under the provisions of the policy, was sixty days after proof and adjustment of the loss. 2 Wood on Fire Ins., p. 1029; May on Ins., sec. 470; Flanders on F. Ins., p. 580; Bacon on Ben. Soc., sec. 446; 9 Ins. L. J., 113; 39 N.Y. 45; ib., 315; 28 Wis. 472; 16 W.Va. 658; 33 id., 409; 62 Ia.; 12 Ia. 384; 19 id., 364; 44 Mich. 420; 45 N.W. 285; 17 F. 568; 25 id., 296; 30 id., 668; 83 Cal. 473; 53 Ark. 300; Berryman's Ins. Dig., 782. The policy is construed most strongly against the insurer. 9 Ky. Law. Rep., 147; Ber. Ins. Dig., 783, and cases supra.
The only contention made by counsel for the appellant on the first ground of defense is that the store was not "actually open for business" at the time of the fire. And it is argued that the book-keeper, who was last in charge of the store on the night it was burned, had left it locked and unoccupied, and it could not therefore have been at any later time open for business. But the facts as found by the court are, that the book-keeper, who was also a salesman, was engaged in writing up the record of the day's business, a duty which the policy itself enjoined when, passing out of the building by a window, he went into an adjoining store, expecting to return in a short time and complete his...
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