McFarland v. Railway officials and Employees Accident Association of Indianapolis, Indiana

• Decision Date: 14 November 1894
• Parties: McFARLAND v. RAILWAY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

38 P. 347

5 Wyo. 126

McFARLAND v. RAILWAY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

Supreme Court of Wyoming

November 14, 1894

Rehearing Denied December 28, 1894, Reported at: 5 Wyo. 126 at 146.

On reserved questions from the District Court for Laramie County. HON. RICHARD H. SCOTT, Judge.

This was an action brought by Mary E. McFarland upon a policy of insurance upon the life of her husband. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Judgment rendered.

A. C Campbell and R. W. Breckons, for plaintiff.

The language of the policy should be construed most strongly against the insurer. (Kratzenstein v. Ins. Co., 116 N.Y. 59; Allen v. Ins. Co., 85 N.Y. 473; Herman v. Ins. Co., 81 id., 184; Dilleber v. Ins. Co., 69 id., 256; Hoffman v. Ins. Co., 32 id., 405; U. S. M. A. Assn. v. Newman, 84 Va. 52; Paul v Ins. Co., 112 N.Y. 472; Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 68 Tex. 144; DeGraff v. Ins. Co., 38 Minn. 501; Chandler v. Ins. Co., 21 id., 85.) The limitation runs from the time an action is maintainable, and not from the date of the injury. (Steel v. Ins. Co., 47 F. 863; id., 51 F. 721; Friezen v. Ins. Co., 30 id., 354; Vette v. Ins. Co., id., 668; Wood on Ins., sec. 443; Miller v. Ins. Co., 70 Ia. 704; McConnell v. Ins. Co., 79 id., 757; Ins. Co. v. Fairbank, 32 Neb. 750; Ins. Co. v. Buckstaff, 38 Neb. 135; Hon Sling v. Ins. Co., 8 Utah 135; Ins. Co. v. Chandler, supra; Matt v. Ins. Co., 81 Ia. 135; Case v. Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 474; Barber v. Ins. Co., 16 W.Va. 658; Murdock v. Ins. Co., 33 id., 410; Ins. Co. v. Jones, 54 Ark. 376; Barnes v. McMurtry, 29 Neb. 178; Cooper v. Ass'n, 10 N. Y. S., 749; Ames v. Ins. Co., 14 N.Y. 253; Mayor v. Ins. Co., 39 id., 45; Hay v. Ins. Co., 77 id., 235; Steen v. Ins. Co., 89 id., 315.)

Lacey & Van Devanter, for defendant.

The limitation runs from date of injury. (King v. Ins. Co., 47 Hun., 1; Cooper v. Ass'n, 132 N.Y. 334; Elliott v. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. Sup., 696; George, Admr., v. Ry. Co., 51 Wis. 603; Rugland, Admr., v. Anderson, 30 Minn. 386; The Harrisburgh, 119 U.S. 199-214; Cavanagh v. Nav. Co., 13 N.Y.S. 540; Taylor v. I. C. Co., 94 N.C. 525; Best v. Kingston, 10 S.E. 997; Ry. Co. v. Hine, Admx., 25 Ohio St. 629; Hill v. New Haven, 37 Vt. 501; Benjamin v. Eldridge, 50 Cal. 612; Andrews, Admr., v. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Conn. 57; Sherman v. Stage Company, 24 Iowa 515-552; Ewell, Admx., v. C. & N.-W. Ry. Co., 29 F. 57; Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sanders, 86 Ky. 259; Riddlesbarger v. Ins. Co., 7 Wal., 386; Hart v. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 77; State Ins. Co. v. Meesman, 2 Wash. St., 459; McElroy v. Ins. Co., 48 Kan. 200; State Ins. Co. v. Stoffels, id., 295; Johnson v. Ins. Co., 91 Ill. 93; Semmes v. Ins. Co., 13 Wal., 158; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., 1 N. D., 151; 20 Ill.App. 431; 83 Va. 736; 51 Conn. 17; 27 A. (Conn.), 1059; 7 Gray, 61; 66 Mo. 32; 87 Ky. 119; 36 La. Ann., 599; 58 N.H. 469; 27 Vt. 99; 94 Mich. 266; 96 Mich. 445; 94 Pa. 345; 106 Pa. 20; 130 Pa. 170; 2 Phila., 286; 25 F. 296; 47 F. 863.)

CONAWAY, JUSTICE. GROESBECK, C. J., concurs. CORN, J., did not sit in this case.

OPINION

CONAWAY, JUSTICE.

This action was brought on a certificate of membership of the defendant association, in the nature of a policy of accident and life insurance, whereby defendant insured the life of William W. McFarland for twelve months commencing June tenth, 1891, against death by external, violent and accidental means, in the sum of two thousand dollars, payable to plaintiff, wife of the insured, should death result within ninety days from the time of the injury.

On May first, 1892, the insured received injuries such as he was insured against by virtue of the certificate or policy mentioned, from which injuries he died the same day. Deceased was also insured in the same instrument against injuries not resulting in death; but this branch of the subject it is not necessary to consider.

The certificate contains the following provision: "No suit in law or equity shall be maintained on this certificate on any accidental injury or death unless such suit be brought within one year from the date of the happening of the alleged injury, and failure to bring suit within one year shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against the validity of such claim and of forfeiture of all right under this certificate." Suit was not brought on this policy or certificate within one year from the date of the happening of the injury to and the death of the insured, but was brought a little more than thirteen months after. Plaintiff admits that it was competent for the parties to limit the time for bringing suit by a provision inserted in the certificate by the association and accepted by the insured, but plaintiff insists that under the conditions of the certificate, the time of the limitation should not run "from the date of the happening of the alleged injury," but should run from the time the cause of action accrued, or, in other words, from the time when the company might be sued.

This could not be done until the expiration of ninety days after the claimant had furnished verified affirmative proof in writing of the injury, which proof was required to be furnished within seven months from the happening of such injury.

It appears that proofs of death were furnished by plaintiff on August 24, 1892, less than four months after the injury to and death of the insured. It further appears that the defendant finally denied its liability and refused to pay plaintiff's claim on September first, 1892, just four months after such death and injury.

By written stipulation of the parties filed in the cause, it is in effect agreed that if the Court should be of the opinion that the suit is not barred by the limitations contained in the certificate, judgment shall go in favor of the plaintiff; otherwise in favor of the defendant.

Under these facts and conditions the District Court finds that three difficult and important questions arise, upon which it reserves its decision and sends the cause to this Court for its decision of the questions under the statute authorizing this course of procedure. The questions so reserved are these:

1. Under the allegations contained in the pleadings herein was this action commenced in time, or was the claim of the plaintiff barred at the commencement of this action by reason of the provisions of the policy sued upon, as set forth in the pleadings?

2. Under the pleadings herein did the limitations named in the policy begin to run at the death of the insured, or at the expiration of ninety (90) days after the receipt by defendants of proofs of death, or at the time when defendants refused to pay the plaintiff's claim?

3. Under the written stipulation of the parties herein should judgment be rendered for the plaintiff or for the defendant?

The District Court asks: "Was this action commenced in time?" The answer to this question must determine what the judgment shall be. But to answer this and the other questions reserved and submitted we must consider and determine from what date the limitation runs.

Three dates to be considered are indicated in the questions of the Court, and in the briefs and oral arguments of counsel: First, the date of the death of the insured, May first, 1892; second, the date of the final refusal of defendant to pay the claim of plaintiff, September first, 1892; and, third, ninety days after proofs of death were furnished, the expiration of the ninety days occurring November twenty-fourth, 1892.

The question of the date from which the limitation runs is an important one, involving, as it does, leading and elementary principle in the construction of contracts, and being the question of first impression in the courts of this State. And it must be considered a difficult question since eminent courts are in conflict in their views of contracts of insurance similar to the one under consideration.

These conditions require a careful consideration of the question and a careful scrutiny and weighing of the authorities on both sides.

The main contention of plaintiff seems to be that the limitation of the time for bringing suit to "one year from the date of the happening of the alleged injury," shall be held to mean one year from the date when the cause of action accrues.

The doctrine upon which the contention is based is stated in Wood on Insurance, Second Edition, changing the language used in the first edition to these words: "Sec. 469. It is held in some of the cases that when a policy stipulates that no action shall be brought unless commenced within a certain time after loss or damage shall accrue, and there is a provision in the policy that the company will pay in thirty, sixty, ninety, or any other number of days after proofs of the loss have been served, the limitation does not attach until after the period which the company has in which to pay the loss has expired.

"The limitation does not apply until the right of action has accrued, and until the period has expired which the company has to pay the loss in, no right of action exists."

Cases from New York, Michigan, and West Virginia are cited in a note to support this view. The note continues: "But a contrary doctrine is held in some of the States," citing cases from New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont and Illinois. The exhaustive researches of counsel have resulted in the collection of a large number of cases from nearly half of the States in the Union, as bearing more or less directly upon the question under discussion. It is admitted by plaintiff that it is lawful for the parties to a contract of insurance to limit the time within which an action may be brought upon such contract by a provision inserted therein; so cases cited to establish this proposition...