Sunrise Turquoise, Inc. v. Chemical Design Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-CA-000029-MR,94-CA-000029-MR
• Parties: SUNRISE TURQUOISE, INC., Appellant, v. CHEMICAL DESIGN COMPANY, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 856

899 S.W.2d 856

SUNRISE TURQUOISE, INC., Appellant, v. CHEMICAL DESIGN COMPANY, INC., Appellee.

No. 94-CA-000029-MR

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 14, 1995.

J. Michael Poole, Bruce Garrett Anderson, George Salem, Jr., Louisville, for appellant.

Mark J. Sandlin, Stephen B. Humphress, Louisville, for appellee.

Before EMBERTON, McDONALD and SCHRODER, JJ.

OPINION

EMBERTON, Judge.

Sunrise Turquoise, Inc., appeals from the trial court's order which held that a judgment entered by a Florida state court was valid and entitled to full faith and credit in Kentucky. The issues before this court involved the enforceability of a judgment obtained in another state which has been registered in Kentucky pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Ky.Rev.Stat. (KRS) 426.950-.990. The other issue is whether a counterclaim may be filed once a judgment is registered under the Act. We conclude that the trial court properly enforced the Florida court's order.

Appellee, Chemical Design Company, Inc. (CDC), a Florida corporation, filed suit in a Florida state court against Sunrise, a corporation organized under the laws of Kentucky. No answer was filed by Sunrise in response to this lawsuit, although it acknowledges notice of the action. Since Sunrise entered no answer, nor entered a special appearance to contest jurisdiction, the Florida court entered default judgment against it.

CDC then sought to enforce the judgment in Kentucky pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act and filed the appropriate papers with the Jefferson Circuit Court. In response, Sunrise filed motions to set aside the judgment and to stay its execution. Sunrise also attempted to assert a counterclaim presenting affirmative defenses. Sunrise took the position that the Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction; that the judgment was void; and, therefore, not entitled to full faith and credit in Kentucky. Finally, Sunrise argued that the Florida judgment should be set aside because it was a default judgment.

The trial court determined that the Florida court had personal jurisdiction over Sunrise pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute and Florida case law. The trial court denied Sunrise's motion to stay execution and held the default judgment was final and was properly registered in Kentucky. Sunrise then moved, pursuant to CR 59.05, to vacate the order. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal followed.

Sunrise first argues that the Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction and improperly exercised jurisdiction in violation of the United States and Kentucky constitutions. In support of its argument, Sunrise maintains it did not have the requisite minimum contacts with the state for the Florida court to invoke jurisdiction. It argues then that since the exercise of jurisdiction by the Florida court was improper, the judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit in Kentucky.

Our analysis begins with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. KRS 426.950 defines a foreign judgment as "any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this Commonwealth."

KRS 426.955 outlines the procedure for filing and the status of foreign judgments as follows:

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of any court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.

No doubt, the purpose of the act is to give holders of foreign judgments the same rights and remedies as the holder of a domestic judgment. While Kentucky has not yet addressed questions under the uniform act, other jursidictions have.

The law in Kentucky is that a sister state's judgment is entitled to full faith and credit and to registration if the judgment is valid under that state's own laws. Morrel & West v. Yazel, Ky.App., 711 S.W.2d 501, 502 (1986). Therefore, the question before us is whether the trial court properly applied the Florida long-arm statute in finding that the Florida Court had personal jurisdiction over Sunrise.

We agree with the trial court that personal jurisdiction over Sunrise is supported under two provisions of the long-arm statute. Florida Statute 48.193(1)(a) allows personal jurisdiction over non-residents for "operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on business ... in this state." Subsection (g) also allows personal jurisdiction for "breaching a contract in the state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." See also Venetian Salami Co. v. J.S. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989).

Sunrise argues that jurisdiction is not supported because it had no offices, nor employees in the state of Florida. Further, Sunrise contends that its initial contact with CDC was at a trade show in California. According to Sunrise, a CDC representative visited Sunrise at its Kentucky office. Afterwards, Sunrise placed orders from Kentucky, and continued to do so over a period of years. Sunrise was never physically present to transact business with CDC in Florida.

We find sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction of the Florida court. There was evidence before the trial court that Sunrise:

(a) mailed catalogues to businesses in Florida;

(b) attended and sold products at trade shows in Florida;

(c) sold products to and through Florida distributors;

(d) entered over fifty contracts with CDC in an 18 month period;

(e) mailed payments, pursuant to contractual agreements, to CDC in Florida;

(f) mailed payments and checks to CDC in Florida;

(g) knew that CDC's principal place of business was located in Florida;

(h) knew that the goods which Sunrise purchased from CDC were made in and shipped from Florida;

(i) knew that CDC's cause of action arose from Sunrise's activities in Florida.

Sunrise contends that Florida is without jurisdiction since its initial meeting with CDC took place in California. However, we find this minor fact, when considered in the face of the numerous and long established course of conduct, to be of little significance.

Since it appears that Sunrise had the contacts with Florida to support a finding of jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute, a further question is whether Sunrise had minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90...