Sunshine Children's Learning Ctr. v. Waste Connections of Fla.

Decision Date24 April 2023
Docket Number21-cv-62123-BLOOM/Valle
PartiesSUNSHINE CHILDREN'S LEARNING CENTER, LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. WASTE CONNECTIONS OF FLORIDA, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

ORDER ON MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

BETH BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Sunshine Children's Learning Center, LLC's Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. [132] (“Motion”). Defendant Waste Connections of Florida, Inc. filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [137], to which Plaintiff filed a Reply, ECF No. [148] (“Reply”). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, all opposing and supporting submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below the Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) on November 17, 2021, asserting two counts against Defendant breach of contract (“Count I”); and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (“Count II”). See generally ECF No. [35]. The basis for Plaintiff's claims against Defendant is that Defendant increased its rates in breach of the Parties' contract and in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See id. The contract enumerates two categories of rate increases, Section 5(a) and Section 5(b):

5) Rate Adjustments.
(a) Contractor may increase the rates and/or charges set out on the front of this Agreement and Customer agrees to pay the increased charges and/or rates provided that such increased charges and/or rates are base [sic] upon increased costs to Contractor including as a result of increases in any one or more of the following: disposal facility costs, landfill costs (including due to recycling costs or otherwise), fuel costs or surcharges, transportation costs, increases in fees or taxes imposed by local, state or federal governments and costs of regulatory compliance. “Landfill costs” means and includes all costs of disposal, however and whenever incurred by Contractor in respect of [sic] the disposal of Waste Materials collected from Customer. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, disposal costs shall include the costs of disposal incurred by Contractor may [sic] also increase the rates and/or charges annually to reflect increases in the Consumer Price Index.
(b) Adjustments to the rates and/or charges set out on the front of this Agreement other than as provided in Section 5 (a) hereof may be made by the Contractor by giving the Customer thirty (30) days prior written notice. Such rate adjustment will be effective on the date specified in the Contractors' notice unless the Customer gives written notice that it objects to the proposed adjustment within 15 days of receipt of the Contractor's notice. If the Customer gives written notice of objection pursuant to this subsection (b), this Agreement shall continue at the previous rate, but the Contractor may, at any time thereafter, terminate this Agreement by giving the Customer thirty (30) days prior written notice.

ECF No. [35] ¶ 26; see also ECF No. [35-1] at 3. Plaintiff also asserts class representation allegations. See ECF No. [35] ¶¶ 44-53.

On January 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion seeking class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). See generally ECF No. [132]. Plaintiff includes the following class definition:

The proposed Class is defined as follows:
Any commercial customer of Waste Connections of Florida, Inc., that - from September 9, 2016 through December 31, 2021 (“the Class Period”) - was governed by a “Contract-At-Issue”[1]and assessed a periodic increase to its basic service, monthly disposal, and/or monthly charge.
Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its parents and affiliates; all customers who make a timely election to be excluded; and all customers in which the judges assigned to this litigation and/or their immediate family members hold an ownership interest.

Id. at 10. Plaintiff requests that, for management purposes, the Court certify three subclasses to account for the different contract forms. Plaintiff also moves to be appointed class representative and for its counsel, Zebersky, Payne, Shaw, Lewenz, LLP and Webb, Klase & Lemond, LLC (“WK&L”), to be appointed as class counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g). Id.

Defendant responds that the class should not be certified because Plaintiff seeks to stand in for thousands of commercial customers with differing contracts, circumstances, and costs that cannot be generalized. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, and its Motion must be denied.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class. See Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1569 (11th Cir. 1992). To certify a class action, the putative class must satisfy “the four requirements listed in Rule 23(a), and the requirements listed in any of Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 Fed.Appx. 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012)); see also Fitzpatrick v. General Mills, Inc., 635 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2011) ([T]he putative class must meet each of the four requirements specified in [Rule] 23(a), as well as at least one of the three requirements set forth in [Rule] 23(b).”); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A class action may be maintained only when it satisfies all of the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and at least one of the alternative requirements of Rule 23(b).”)(quoting Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1997)). “Under Rule 23(a), every putative class first must satisfy the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Next, under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is appropriate if:

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

“The burden of establishing these requirements is on the plaintiff who seeks to certify the suit as a class action.” Heaven v. Trust Co. Bank, 118 F.3d 735, 737 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Rutstein, 211 F.3d at 1233. The moving party “must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance” with the class certification requirements. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)). That is, “a party must not only be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or defenses, and adequacy of representation, as required by Rule 23(a) [but also] satisfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b).” Id. (emphasis in original). “A district court must conduct a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 prerequisites before certifying a class.” Vega, 564 F.3d at 1266 (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1996)).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Clearly Defined and Ascertainable

“Before a district court may grant a motion for class certification, a plaintiff seeking to represent a proposed class must establish that the proposed class is ‘adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.' Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., 303 F.R.D. 679, 684 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)). “An identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.” Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 Fed.Appx. 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). “A court should deny class certification where the class definitions are overly broad, amorphous, and vague.” Perez v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262 (S.D. Fla. 2003). “But membership can be capable of determination without being capable of convenient determination. Administrative feasibility is not an inherent aspect of ascertainability.” Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2021).[2] “If a plaintiff carries its burden on the above prerequisites, a plaintiff must, then, meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 341 F.R.D. 636, 642 (S.D. Fla. 2022).

Plaintiff argues that it has adduced sufficient evidence to meet the requisite standard for ascertainability. “A customer is a Class Member if Defendant's records show three objective criteria during the Class period, namely the customer was: (1) a commercial customer (i.e., not residential or roll off); (2) governed by a Contract-At-Issue; and (3) assessed at least one periodic increase to one of the Charges-At-Issue.” ECF No. [132] at 30. Defendant responds that Plaintiff's proposed class is not ascertainable because it includes...

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