Superintending School Committee of Town of Winslow v. Winslow Ed. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 13 August 1976
• Citation: 363 A.2d 229
• Parties: 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2398, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,017 SUPERINTENDING SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the TOWN OF WINSLOW v. WINSLOW EDUCATION ASSOCIATION.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 229

363 A.2d 229

93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2398, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,017

SUPERINTENDING SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the TOWN OF WINSLOW v. WINSLOW EDUCATION ASSOCIATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Aug. 13, 1976.

Drummond, Wescott & Woodsom, by Hugh G. E. MacMahon, Harry R. Pringle, Portland, for plaintiff.

Locke, Campbell & Chapman, by Frank G. Chapman, Augusta, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and ^*WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

In Chassie v. Directors of School Administrative District No. 36, Me., 356 A.2d 708 (1976), appellant argued that 20 M.R.S.A. § 161(5) was a bar to requiring, by interest arbitration, the insertion into a labor relations contract between a teachers' association and the teachers' employer a provision that the failure of the school superintendent to recommend reemployment of a probationary teacher be made the subject of the grievance procedure, including grievance arbitration, of such labor relations contract. We said of such argument when it was there raised:

'We find it unnecessary to reach this issue and we intimate no opinion as to what our answer might be should occasion arise to come to grips with such issue.' Me., 356 A.2d at 709.

In Superintending School Committee v. Portland Teachers' Association, Me., 338 A.2d 155 (1975), the issue with which we were then confronted arose in the framework of a claim that even though 'class size' is classified as 'educational policy' and, therefore, under the terms of 26 M.R.S.A. § 965(1)(C) it could not be made subject to interest arbitration, its impact on working conditions could properly be made the subject of 'grievance' arbitration, if a contract so provided. On that occasion we said:

'We do not now decide, nor do we intimate what our decision would be, if a contract such as the one before us contained a clause which provided for grievance arbitration in areas excluded from interest arbitration as educational policies under 26 M.R.S.A. § 965(1)(C).' (Emphasis in original.) Id., n. 4 at 158.

We now have before us a case in which interest arbitration was had concerning a teacher association proposal that a clause be inserted in the contract reading as follows:

'No teacher shall be disciplined, including reprimand, reduction in rank or compensation, suspension and dismissal, and no teacher on a continuing contract shall be denied renewal of contract, without just cause. Any such action asserted by the Committee or any agent or representative thereof shall be subject to the grievance procedure set forth in Article III.

'A probationary teacher whose contract is not renewed shall be entitled to written notice of the reasons for the failure of the Committee to renew the contract and a hearing before the Committee if requested by the teacher.'

The arbitrators ordered the 'teacher rights' clause in the contract be expanded to include the 'just cause' section and the grievance procedure found in the proposed new clause.

The school committee employer sought review of the arbitrators' award in the Superior Court using Rule 80B, M.R.Civ.P., as the vehicle by which the matter was brought before the court. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school committee employer.

This appeal by the teachers' representatives followed.

We deny the appeal.

This case raises two issues which are of first impression.

(1) Whether a school committee can be forced, through interest arbitration, to accept a clause providing for 'just cause' in any disciplinary action or nonrenewal of contract and for grievance arbitration on whether the committee acted in fact with 'just cause.' (This in view of the provision of 20 M.R.S.A. § 161(5) and § 473(4).)

(2) Whether the 'just cause' provision relates to an 'educational policy' decision exempt from collective bargaining. ¹

We hold that the provisions of 20 M.R.S.A. § 161(5) ² and § 473(4) vest the right and obligation to take action thereunder in the superintending school committee, and the school committee cannot be forced by interest arbitration to make their action taken thereunder subject to binding grievance arbitration. Since the order of the arbitrators is invalid on this ground, we need not reach the issue of whether the clause is an educational policy decision exempt from collective bargaining by express provision of 26 M.R.S.A. § 965(1)(C). Nor do we find it necessary to decide whether a school committee could have, prior to the enactment of P.L.1976, c. 723, voluntarily agreed to the inclusion of a provision for grievance procedure concerning such matters. ³

The factual framework here before us is substantially as follows. The Winslow Education Association (the Association) and the Superintending School Committee of the Town of Winslow (the Committee) had entered into collective bargaining agreements for the school years 1971-1972 and 1972-1973. One of the items agreed upon in the 1972-1973 contract was a 'teacher rights' clause providing certain procedural safeguards for teachers during any appearance before the superintendent, the school committee, or any committee or member thereof, which related to a formal disciplinary hearing concerning continuation of employment.

During the 1972-1973 school year, the parties negotiated for a contract to take effect the following year. The negotiations broke down, however, over four items, three of which are not concerned in this appeal. The fourth item sought to broaden the already existing 'teacher rights' clause by requiring 'just cause' for disciplinary actions, such as reduction in rank or dismissal, and by subjecting disciplinary actions to the grievance procedure already provided for in the 1972-1973 contract. The final step in the grievance procedure called for binding arbitration.

Following the breakdown of negotiations, the parties went into interest arbitration in accordance with 26 M.R.S.A. § 965(4).

The arbitration panel, consisting of a representative from both the Committee and the Association as well as a neutral arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association, ordered that the 'teacher rights' clause be expanded to include the 'just cause' section and the grievance procedure.

In determining whether a matter is subject to interest arbitration, a two-step examination must be made. The first step is to decide whether the matter is within the statutorily defined scope of bargaining. If it is, the next step is to determine whether the matter is limited by any other existing statutory enactments. Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 3 of the Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 at 21, 282 N.E.2d 109 at 112 (1972). See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 at 268-269 (1975).

While no Maine statute expressly requires that interest arbitration in the field of education be limited by other existing statutes, this court has declared that 26 M.R.S.A. § 965(1)(C) is so limited. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, Me., 304 A.2d 387, 397 (1973). Having decided that we need not reach the issue of 'educational policy,' we will focus our discussion on the second step.

Whether 'just cause' standards, including binding grievance procedures, are permissible subjects for a collective bargaining agreement has been frequently litigated. No case, however, is directly on point. Either the litigation arises in a different procedural posture from the instant case or the statutes involved differ significantly from the Maine statutes.

In Board of Education of District of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers Local No. 3, AFT, AFL-CIO, Pa., 346 A.2d 35 (1975), the Pennsylvania court confronted the question of whether an agreement to submit the propriety of dismissing a nontenured teacher to arbitration was within the scope of collective bargaining. The question arose, after the board had already agreed to the contract, when the union filed a grievance on behalf of a dismissed teacher.

Where a board has voluntarily entered into a contract of this sort, a reviewing court must take a somewhat different view than should be taken when a board states at the outset that it will not enter into such a contract. In the first instance, the parties have bargained with each other, and the price for including a 'just cause' provision may well have been the exclusion of another provision beneficial to the teachers. Furthermore, the board presumably knew what it was doing when it entered into the contract.

'We think it reasonable to believe that the Board entered into the master contract with due deliberation and legal advice, or it would not have adopted it. It cannot now abrogate its own contract for any of the reasons that have been presented here.' Danville Board of School Directors v. Fifield, 132 Vt. 271, 315 A.2d 473, 476 (1974).

See also Local 1226 Rhinelander City Employees AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis.2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 at 36 (1967), where the court distinguished the board's arguments rulating to interest arbitration by noting that the case actually involved a grievance arising from an already existing agreement.

Where there are no existing contractual rights that may suffer by refusing to uphold 'just cause' and arbitration provisions, a court may have wider latitude in deciding whether such provisions are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.

There are other cases seemingly on point, until distinguished by a close examination of the statutes involved. In Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 3 of the Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., supra, the board questioned its power to enter into a 'just cause' and binding grievance arbitration provision. The New York court held that this was a 'term or condition of employment' and as such was mandatorily bargainable under the Taylor...