Supervisor Assessments of Anne Arundel County v. Southgate Harbor

• Decision Date: 03 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 126,126
• Citation: 279 Md. 586,369 A.2d 1053
• Parties: SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY v. SOUTHGATE HARBOR et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 586

279 Md. 586

369 A.2d 1053

SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY v. SOUTHGATE HARBOR et al.

No. 126.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 3, 1977.

Ward B. Coe, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Ronald A. Baradel, Annapolis (Hartman & Crain, Annapolis, on the brief), for appellees.

Argued before SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and ORTH, JJ., and ROBERT F. SWEENEY, Chief Judge of the District Court of Maryland, specially assigned.

SMITH, Judge.

We are here concerned for the first time with the proper method of assessment for condominiums. We shall reverse a determination by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County that appellants, Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County (the Supervisor), improperly assessed the condominiums in question. The basic contention is that it was discriminatory error for the assessor to use a square foot basis of valuation of the land of the condominiums when a front foot basis was used for certain other land in the Annapolis area. The Maryland Tax Court found no error. Appellees here, Southgate Harbor et al. (the Taxpayers), then entered an appeal to this Court. After our decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521 (1975), we transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for its consideration. The Supervisor appealed the unfavorable decision of that court to the Court of Special Appeals. ¹ We granted the writ of certiorari prior to consideration of the case by that court.

We are here involved with two condominiums in Annapolis. The date of finality for the assessments in question is January 1, 1973. The tax court said in its opinion:

'The (Taxpayers) called . . . an attorney . . . who testified that from the tax record rolls of Anne Arundel County he had complied approximately 235 waterfront properties and their assessed value for land, that he furnished this data to Mr. Harry Keith (a professional mechanical engineer and a Professor at the United States Naval Academy) who was the owner of Unit No. 9, Southgate Harbor. Mr. Keith testified that he took the information furnished him by Mr. Scott and programmed this information into a computer, from which he established the following: The average per square foot land assessment was 83 cents and the average mean assessment per square foot was 59 cents. From this data he also established the average front foot assessment at $129.57 and the average mean front foot at $99.05. His testimony was supported by computer print outs and charts.

'The (Taxpayers) then called Mr. George Lewis, Field Supervisor of Assessments for Anne Arundel County, as an adverse witness to determine from him the method used by the Department to establish land values, and the resulting assessments thereon, for waterfront properties in Annapolis. The(y) . . . elicited from Mr. Lewis that residential waterfront property was assessed by the Department uniformly on a front foot basis and that waterfront condominium property was uniformly assessed on a square foot basis bacause of its density.

'The Court is of the opinion that the basis upon which the Department assessed the land is not arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious or illegal. Furthermore, the Court feels that there was a complete absence of any affirmative evidence on behalf of the (Taxpayers) to justify granting the relief sought by the(m) . . . and accordingly the assessment appealed from must be affirmed as to the land.'

Lewis took issue with any implication that the waterfront properties mentioned were comparable to those of the Taxpayers, pointing to differences in accessibility by water and in the depth of the water. In fact, with reference to one group he said that there was 'nothing but . . . mud in front of them; no water at all.' As a consequence, he said that when these assessments were used in computing an average there were 'indications of a mean that doesn't mean very much.'

The Taxpayers have presented to evidence of any kind as to the value of their property. Thus, there is no contention that their land is assessed at more than its full cash value. The requirement of Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.) Art. 81, § 14(b)(1) is that real property 'shall be assessed at the full cash value thereof on the date of finality,' a term defined as meaning 'current value less an allowance for inflation, if in fact inflation exists.'

The Taxpayers seize upon the language in the original Horizontal Property Act, Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) Art. 21, § 11-122(b) at the time here applicable, stating that condominium units shall be assessed 'in the same manner and to the same extent as such assessments are levied and collected in the case of individual land parcels.' From this they argue, and the circuit court judge agreed, that if other waterfront land in the Annapolis area was assessed on a front foot basis then their land must also be so assessed.

We have said on many occasions that a hornbook rule of statutory construction is that in ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part and that all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible. We have further said that a corollary to that rule is that if there is no clear indication to the contrary and it is reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. See, e. g., Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 317, 353 A.2d 256 (1976), and the cases there cited. Therefore, we turn to the whole of the statute dealing with the manner of assessment of condominiums. Code (1957, 1973 Repl.Vol.) Art. 21, § 11-122 provides in pertinent part:

'(a) Each property hereafter declared into a horizontal housing regime in the manner hereinabove set forth shall continue its original identity and unity for the purpose of evaluating the whole for assessment purposes in the manner now prescribed by law. The total evaluation thus produced shall be distributed among the condominium units into which the property was divided and the assessment of each unit shall be in direct proportion to the share and interest of each unit as established in the master deed and the declaration of the property into the regime and an individual assessment thereby placed on each condominium unit in accordance with such proportion that such unit bears to the whole property covered by the original declaration.

'(b) Each of said condominium units shall be carried on the tax records of the county or City of Baltimore in which it is located as a separate and distinct entity and all real estate taxes, including general and special assessments, shall be assessed, levied, and collected against each of the said several, separate and distinct units in conformity with the percentages of ownership established by the declaration in the same manner and to the same extent as such assessments are levied and collected in the case of individual land parcels.'

The term 'property' as used in § 11-122 is defined in § 11-101(m) as 'mean(ing) and includ(ing) the land, whether leasehold or in fee simple, the building or buildings, all improvements and structures thereon, and all easements, rights and appurtenances thereunto belonging.'

We have also said that we consider the language of a statute in its natural and ordinary signification. Bartell v. Bartell, 278 Md. 12, 17, 357 A.2d 343 (1976), and St. Paul Fire & Mar. v. Ins. Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 139, 339 A.2d 291 (1975). Thus, we read the command here as one that a property brought 'into a horizontal housing regime' shall first be evaluated as a whole in the same manner in which it would be evaluated were it not under the Horizontal Property Act. After this has been done the value thus established is to be divided among the various units in the proportion established by the deed. Then under subsection (b) the assessed value for each of those units is to be carried on the tax records and taxes are to be collected from their owners based on those assessments in the same way in which taxes would be collected from the owner of a property not under the Horizontal Property Act based on the existing assessment for that property. Accordingly, the phrase 'in the same manner and to the same extent' in subsection (b) does not mandate that any given method of valuing a property must be used for all land in a given area.

If we were to read the statute in the manner in which the Taxpayers read it, then other principles would come into play. The General Assembly when it enacted this statute is presumed to have been acquainted with our decisions and to have acted accordingly. See Bd. of Ex. of Land Grim, Arch. v. McWilliams, 270 Md. 383, 387, 311 A.2d 792 (1973), and the numerous cases there cited. In Baltimore City v. The State, 105 Md. 1, 7, 65 A. 369, 371 (1906), our predecessors observed, 'The nature, location and other characteristics of the various kinds of property and interests subject to taxation render inevitable some diversity of method in their assessment.' We echoed that statement in Weil v. Supervisor of Assess., 266 Md. 238, 254, 292 A.2d 68, 76 (1972), when we said that '(v)aluation of land is not an exact science,' a statement we repeated in Fairchild Hiller v. Supervisor, 267 Md. 519, 521, 298 A.2d 148 (1973). In Bornstein v. State Tax Comm., 227 Md. 331, 338, 176 A.2d 859, 862 (1962), Judge Henderson for the Court said that '(t)he mere fact that other classes of property may be assessed by a different method does not present a valid constitutional objection.' This was after having observed:

'It is firmly established in this State that the relative weight to be accorded to any relevant factor in a particular case is for the assessing authorities and not for the courts. Seaboard Commercial Corp. v. Tax Comm., 181 Md....