Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion v. Grove

• Decision Date: 24 October 1911
• Docket Number: No. 21,892.,21,892.
• Citation: 176 Ind. 356,96 N.E. 159
• Parties: SUPREME COUNCIL CATHOLIC BENEVOLENT LEGION v. GROVE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

176 Ind. 356

96 N.E. 159

SUPREME COUNCIL CATHOLIC BENEVOLENT LEGION

v.GROVE.

No. 21,892.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 24, 1911.

Appeal from Superior Court, Allen County; Orin N. Heaton, Judge.

Action by Maxwell J. Grove against the Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Transferred from Appellate Court under Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 1405.

Breen & Morris, for appellant. W. G. Colerick, for appellee.

MYERS, J.

The Catholic Benevolent Legion is an association composed of a Supreme Council and state and subordinate councils. The Supreme Council is an incorporated body with power to make its own constitution, rules of discipline, and laws for the government of the entire Legion. It is the body to which final appeals are to be made in all matters of importance emanating from state and subordinate councils. On the 19th day of October, 1886, appellee became a member of the Catholic Benevolent Legion, and there was issued to him what is known as a “fourth-grade certificate”, whereby appellant promised to pay his wife, Emma J. Grove, upon the death of appellee, a sum not exceeding $3,000, and also promised to pay appellee a sum not exceeding $1,500 upon due proof that he had arrived at the age of expectancy, and that he was permanently disabled, unable to earn a livelihood, and was destitute of the means of support. This action was brought by appellee to recover from appellant one-half of the amount of said benefit certificate on the ground that he had arrived at the age of expectancy as fixed by the laws of the association, was permanently disabled and unable to earn a livelihood, and was destitute of the means of support. The cause went to trial upon a complaint in one paragraph, the material allegations of which are that appellee at the time of the issuance of the benefit certificate and ever since has been, and still is, a member in good standing in St. Julian Council in said Legion, and that at all times and in all things he had faithfully observed, complied with, and performed all duties and obligations required of and imposed upon him by the laws of appellant, and that he had promptly paid to appellant all dues and assessments imposed upon or required to be paid by him under its laws; that during said period he paid to appellant in money about $2,000; that since January 15, 1903. he has been, and still is, out of employment by reason of his physical inability to perform labor; that on or about October 31, 1905, in accordance with the laws of appellant, he presented to St. Julian Council, of which he then was and still is a member, his written application to obtain the benefits which he then and still is entitled to receive from appellant under its laws by reason of the benefit certificate issued to him by appellant, which application is set out, in which the ground for the payment of $1,500 to him is alleged to be that he is 71 years of age, and permanently disabled from attending to his business or gaining a livelihood, and destitute of the means of support. The facts are then alleged in detail as to the presentation of this request in the manner prescribed in the by-laws of appellant, which are set out, its disallowance by the president of the Supreme Council, who “wrongfully and unjustly rejected said application and wrongfully and unjustly disallowed appellee's claim *** and disapproved his application,” from which decision he appealed to the Supreme Council, and the decision of the president was sustained upon the ground that appellee was not destitute of means of support, and that the action of appellant under its laws is declared to be final, and his claim was refused and is due and unpaid.

The portions of the constitution and laws of appellant material to the cause are sections 2 and 6 of chapter 1, reading as follows:

“Sec. 2. Five thousand dollars shall be the largest amount paid by this Legion on the death of a member. And twenty-five hundred dollars shall be the largest amount paid for permanent disability benefit. Five thousand dollars shall be paid on the death of every sixth-grade member; four thousand dollars on the death of every fifth-grade member; three thousand dollars on the death of every fourth-grade member; two thousand dollars on the death of every third-grade member; one thousand dollars on the death of every second-grade member; five hundred dollars on the death of every first-grade member, and two hundred fifty dollars on the death of every industrial grade member. And one-half the amount of each grade may be paid to a member of that grade who shall become permanently disabled from attending to his business or gaining a livelihood and is destitute of means of support when he shall arrive at the age of expectancy as determined in the following table, unless otherwise provided by the law of the state in which the council is located, in which case the age of expectancy shall conform to the law of said state. Provided, however, that should a death occur, or a permanent disability be approved by the Supreme Council when one assessment on each member of the Legion would not amount to five thousand dollars, then the sum paid shall be a proportionate amount of one assessment on each member in good standing in the Legion on the date of its call, according to the grade of the deceased or disabled member; and such proportionate amount shall be all that can be claimed by any one.”

“Sec. 6. When application shall be made by a member for a permanent disability benefit, the president of the council, of which he is a member shall appoint a committee of three, who, with the medical examiner, shall investigate the application and report in writing to the council the nature, cause, duration, and all other circumstances attending such disability. The secretary of the council shall notify all other councils within the district of such application, and give the names and addresses of the members of the committee so appointed. If the report of such committee be in favor of the application the president shall announce that a ballot upon the granting of the same be taken at the next stated meeting of the council. At the next stated meeting such ballot shall be taken under the same rules as govern the ballot for admission to membership. If the application be granted by the council, notice of such action shall be forwarded to the secretary of the Supreme Council in the same manner as in case of death as provided for in section 3, so far as applicable. On the receipt of such official notice of permanent disability application, the secretary of the Supreme Council shall forward the same to the president of the Supreme Council, who shall make further investigation if deemed necessary and on his final approval he shall direct the secretary of the Supreme Council to draw an order on the treasurer of the Supreme Council in favor of the disabled member. The secretary of the Supreme Council shall thereupon draw such order for the amount specified, and on receipt of the treasurer's check, properly countersigned, forward it to the treasurer of the council of which the applicant is a member. The decision of the president in allowing or disallowing claims for permanent disability benefits shall be final and binding if no appeal be taken to the Supreme Council. Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Council within thirty days after notice of the president's decision shall have been given the applicant; and the decision of the Supreme Council on such appeals shall be final.”

A demurrer was unsuccessfully interposed to this complaint on the ground of insufficiency of facts to constitute a cause of action, which ruling is the first alleged error assigned.

[1] The first point made is that, as the laws of appellant make the action of the Supreme Council final, appellee is without remedy unless he alleges and proves that the action was fraudulent or he was deprived of a fair hearing, and that the allegation that the action of the president was wrongful and unjust is a mere conclusion. If the complaint were based upon that fact, appellant's position would doubtless be correct, but it is not based upon that fact, but upon the broader fact that the provision making the action of the president and council final is void, as being against public policy. We are not advised of any statute of this state pertinent to the questions involved.

It would be futile to attempt to reconcile the decisions in the various states upon the question of making final the decisions of the supreme tribunals of fraternal orders, and thereby excluding members from resort to the courts of law. It is sufficient to point out that our own courts have steadfastly denied the right of exclusion, in which many other states concur. Supreme Council v. Forsinger, 125 Ind. 52, 25 N. E. 129, 9 L. R. A. 501, 21 Am. St. Rep. 196;Supreme Council v. Garrigus, 104 Ind. 133, 3 N. E. 818, 54 Am. Rep. 298;Bauer v. Samson Lodge, 102 Ind. 262, 1 N. E. 571;Voluntary Relief Dep't v. Spencer, 17 Ind. App. 123, 46 N. E. 477;People's Mut. Ben. Soc. v. Werner, 6 Ind. App. 614, 34 N. E. 105;Supreme Lodge v. Raymond, 57 Kan. 647, 47 Pac. 533, 49 L. R. A. 373, and notes; Pepin v. Soc. St. Jean, etc., 23 R. I. 81, 49 Atl. 387, 91 Am. St. Rep. 620, and cases cited; Robinson v. Templar Lodge, 117 Cal. 370, 49 Pac. 170, 59 Am. St. Rep. 198, and notes; Railway Assoc. v. Robinson, 147 Ill. 138, 38 N. E. 168. Upon the general question that there can be no agreement in advance of a controversy arising whereby the jurisdiction of the civil courts is ousted, see Ditton v. Hart, 93 N. E. 961;Board v. Gibson, 158 Ind. 488, 63 N. E. 982; McCoy v. Able, 131 Ind. 417, 30 N. E. 528, 31 N. E. 453; Myers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio St. 101, 57 N. E. 1089, 81 Am. St. Rep. 613;Maitland v. Reed, 37 Ind. App. 471, 77 N. E. 290. If the action of the Supreme Council could not be made final as to a question of property rights, as we hold...