Surrillo v. Drilake Farms, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 20221,20221
• Citation: 186 W.Va. 105,411 S.E.2d 248
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: , 60 USLW 2424 Julio SURRILLO, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. DRILAKE FARMS, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee. William OCASIO, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. Irvin KING, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees. Carmelo Rosairo VASQUEZ, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Irvin KING, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

Page 248

411 S.E.2d 248

186 W.Va. 105, 60 USLW 2424

Julio SURRILLO, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. DRILAKE FARMS, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee.

William OCASIO, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. Irvin KING, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

Carmelo Rosairo VASQUEZ, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Irvin KING, et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 20221.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 11, 1991.

Decided Nov. 1, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

1. " 'Under Section 1, Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, the judgment or decree of a court of record of another state will be given full faith and credit in the courts of this State, unless it be clearly shown by pleading and proof that the court of such other state was without jurisdiction to render the same, or that it was procured through fraud.' Syllabus Point 1, Johnson v. Huntington Moving & Storage, Inc., 160 W.Va. 796, 239 S.E.2d 128 (1977)." Syllabus Point 2, Gonzalez Perez v. Romney Orchards, Inc., 184 W.Va. 20, 399 S.E.2d 50 (1990).

2. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution operates to limit the jurisdiction of a state court to enter a judgment affecting the rights or interests of a nonresident defendant. This due process limitation requires a state court to have personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant." Syllabus Point 1, Pries v. Watt, 186 W.Va. 49, 410 S.E.2d 285 (1991).

3. "In order to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, reasonable notice of the suit must be given the defendant. There also must be a sufficient connection or minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state so that it will be fair and just to require a defense to be mounted in the forum state." Syllabus Point 2, Pries v. Watt, 186 W.Va. 49, 410 S.E.2d 285 (1991).

4. "To what extent a nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state depends upon the facts of the individual case. One essential inquiry is whether the defendant has purposefully acted to obtain benefits or privileges in the forum state." Syllabus Point 3, Pries v Watt, 186 W.Va. 49, 410 S.E.2d 285 (1991).

Garry G. Geffert, West Virginia Legal Services Plan, Inc., Martinsburg, for appellants.

William A. Johnston, Harrison & Johnston, Winchester, Charles F. Printz, Bowles, Rice, McDavid, Graff & Love, Martinsburg, for appellees.

PER CURIAM:

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the Circuit Court of Jefferson County was correct in holding that judgments obtained in Puerto Rico against the defendants below, Drilake Farms, Inc., a West Virginia corporation, and Irvin King, a resident of Jefferson County and officer of the aforementioned corporation, were unenforceable in this State. The defendants asserted that the Puerto Rican courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants, thereby precluding enforcement of the judgments.

The material facts are undisputed. The defendants are apple growers. In 1978, they wanted to hire temporary foreign laborers to harvest their fall crop. The federal government, however, permits the hiring of such workers only if qualified citizens of the United States are not available for such employment. Accordingly, employers desiring to hire foreign labor must first file with the local employment office an application for temporary foreign labor certification and a statement of the terms and conditions of employment. If workers are not available locally, a clearance order, containing the terms and conditions of employment, is circulated to other employment offices throughout the state. If the job cannot be filled on the state level, the clearance order is distributed through the United States Department of Labor to employment offices in other areas of the nation. Permission to import temporary foreign labor is granted only if a sufficient number of domestic workers cannot be recruited through this process. ¹

On April 28, 1978, the defendants filed with the local employment office in Winchester, Virginia, an application to recruit 27 Jamaican laborers to work in their orchards for a two-month period in the fall. It does not appear that any workers were recruited on the local or state level, because on August 2, 1978, a clearance order containing the defendants' job offer was forwarded to Puerto Rico. ² The Puerto Rican employment service set to work recruiting and screening applicants, obtaining the necessary documentation, and arranging for transportation to the defendants' job site.

By letter dated August 16, 1978, the Department of Labor advised the defendants that they would be allowed to recruit only eight Jamaican workers because nineteen Puerto Ricans were "available" to fill the jobs offered. On September 8, 1978, twenty-seven Puerto Rican workers, including the plaintiffs below, arrived in Winchester, Virginia. The defendants provided the plaintiffs with work, but fired them all within a few days.

The plaintiffs subsequently brought suit for damages in Puerto Rico, claiming that the defendants had breached their contracts of employment. Although the defendants were notified of the filing of the lawsuits, they made no personal appearance in the Puerto Rican courts, and default judgments were entered against them.

On February 18, 1987, the plaintiffs instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County to enforce the Puerto Rican judgments. Both sides moved for summary judgment. By order dated December 20, 1990, the circuit court ruled that the Puerto Rican courts did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants and that the default judgments were, therefore, not enforceable in West Virginia. The plaintiffs appeal from the circuit court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

We start with the principles we recently restated in Syllabus Point 2 of Gonzalez Perez v. Romney Orchards, Inc., 184 W.Va. 20, 399 S.E.2d 50 (1990):

" 'Under Section 1, Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, the judgment or decree of a court of record of another state will be given full faith and credit in the courts of this State, unless it be clearly shown by pleading and proof that the court of such other state was without jurisdiction to render the same, or that it was procured through fraud.' Syllabus Point 1, Johnson v. Huntington Moving & Storage, Inc., 160 W.Va. 796, 239 S.E.2d 128 (1977)." ³

In Syllabus Point 4 of Lemley v. Barr, 176 W.Va. 378, 343 S.E.2d 101 (1986), we stated:

" ' "If the court, which rendered the judgment, was a court of general jurisdiction, the presumption is it had jurisdiction of the particular case, and to render the judgment void, this presumption must be overcome by proof. ["] Syl. Pt. 3, Gilchrist v. O. & O.L. Co., 21 W.Va. 115 (1882).' Syl. Pt. 2, Fortner v. Fortner, , 282 S.E.2d 48 (1981)."

The burden of establishing that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction rests upon the party attacking the judgment. Lemley v. Barr, supra. See Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 72 S.Ct. 157, 96 L.Ed. 146 (1951).

The defendants here assert that the Puerto Rican courts lacked jurisdiction of their persons. In Syllabus Points 1 and 2 of Pries v. Watt, 186 W.Va. 49, 410 S.E.2d 285 (1991), we stated:

"1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution operates to limit the jurisdiction of a state court to enter a judgment affecting the rights or interests of a nonresident defendant. This due process limitation requires a state court to have personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.

"2. In order to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, reasonable notice of the suit must be given the defendant. There also must be a sufficient connection or minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state so that it will be fair and just to require a defense to be mounted in the forum state."

See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The only issue in this case is whether the defendants had sufficient contacts with Puerto Rico to establish personal jurisdiction.

In Syllabus Point 3 of Pries, we discussed the minimum contacts issue:

"To what extent a nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state depends upon the facts of the individual case. One essential inquiry is whether the defendant has purposefully acted to obtain benefits or privileges in the forum state."

See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). In Kulko v. Superior

Court, the Supreme Court noted that "the 'minimum contacts' test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite 'affiliating circumstances' are present." 436 U.S. at 92, 98 S.Ct. at 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d at 141, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 246, 78 S.Ct. at 1235, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1293. Minimum contacts can be established even where the defendant has never physically entered the forum state. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

The defendants assert that they had no contact whatsoever with Puerto Rico except the clearance order forwarded there by the Department of Labor. They state that they initiated the clearance order only because they were required by law to do so in order to hire foreign workers and maintain that the clearance order was forwarded to Puerto Rico without any request from them. The defendants also point out that they had no contact with or from anyone in Puerto Rico after the clearance order was forwarded there. They argue...