Surtees v. Hobson

• Decision Date: 13 February 1929
• Docket Number: (No. 1008-5189.)
• Citation: 13 S.W.2d 345
• Parties: SURTEES v. HOBSON et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

13 S.W.2d 345

SURTEES v. HOBSON et al.

(No. 1008-5189.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

February 13, 1929.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Eighth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by A. W. Surtees against A. W. Hobson and others. Judgment for defendants was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals [4 S.W.(2d) 245], and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

See also (Civ. App.) 297 S. W. 531.

Church, Lawley & Graves, of San Antonio, for plaintiff in error.

J. B. Lewright, Clamp & Searcy, and George Thomson, all of San Antonio, for defendants in error.

SPEER, J.

A. W. Surtees sued A. W. Hobson and others, to recover an interest in oil royalties paid by the defendants under the terms of a certain lease executed by Surtees as guardian for his four minor children, in which two of his adult children joined. The land leased had been the separate property of Ethel Surtees, wife of A. W. Surtees and mother of the children. The plaintiff based his claim upon the fact of his ownership by inheritance of a life estate in one-third of the land involved.

There was a judgment for the defendants, which judgment on appeal was affirmed. (Civ. App.) 4 S.W.(2d) 245.

The Court of Civil Appeals based its affirmance upon the conclusion that Surtees, by the execution of the lease under which the defendants had produced the oil in controversy, as guardian of his four minor children, his remaindermen, wherein he conveyed the estate — the lease — as the estate of his wards, was estopped by deed to set up a claim thereafter such as he is asserting in this case.

We are in full accord with the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals upon this point. It has been suggested in the arguments that estoppel would not lie because before Hobson had accepted the lease he had actual knowledge of plaintiff in error's life estate. But whether so or not, this fact would not operate to avoid the estoppel. It is not a case of estoppel in pais by conduct or representation inducing the acceptance of the lease, but rather, like all other estoppels by deed, it partakes of the nature of contract. Plaintiff in error as guardian, it is true, but nevertheless the owner of the life estate, has contracted with the lessees that the children of his deceased wife owned, and were entitled to convey, the estate thus leased. There is nothing inconsistent with this and with plaintiff in error's estate for life. This consideration suggests a further ground upon which the affirmance could as well...