Suss Pontiac-Gmc, Inc. v. Boddicker
Decision Date | 26 November 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 07CA0263.,07CA0263. |
Citation | 208 P.3d 269 |
Parties | SUSS PONTIAC-GMC, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard A. BODDICKER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Wagner Law Office, Craig E. Wagner, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Law Offices of Gary S. Cohen, Gary S. Cohen, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge RUSSEL.
Defendant, Richard A. Boddicker, appeals from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Suss Pontiac-GMC, Inc. We affirm and remand with directions.
Suss leased real estate from Boddicker under a contract that contained a purchase option. The contract stated that Suss could exercise the option by notifying Boddicker of its intent to buy the property. The contract also stated that, if Suss did not exercise the option by June 1, 2006, the rental provisions would automatically renew for five years.
The contract contained the following notice provision:
Any notice to Lessor provided for in this Lease shall be given by mailing such notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to Lessor at: [address].
Any such notice shall be deemed given on the date of mailing.
On May 25, 2006, Suss sent notice by first class mail of its intent to buy the property. On May 31, Boddicker replied, through counsel, that he had received the letter. Later, however, Boddicker declined to honor the option on the ground that Suss had failed to send its notice by certified mail.
Suss sued for specific performance of the purchase option. Boddicker counterclaimed that Suss had defaulted on rent payments required under the automatic renewal provision. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court held that Suss had properly exercised the option and granted summary judgment in Suss's favor.
A court may grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c); Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 613 (Colo.1999). The court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the undisputed facts. HealthONE v. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 887 (Colo.2002). We review de novo. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 298-99 (Colo.2003).
Boddicker contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Suss's favor. We uphold the trial court's ruling.
Should courts enforce an option that has been timely exercised by written notice when the contract states that notice shall be sent by "certified mail, return receipt requested," but the notice is delivered another way?
The answer is yes. When faced with this question, the great majority of courts have held that the option should be enforced if the alternative delivery method results in actual notice, timely received. See Osprey L.L.C. v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co., 984 P.2d 194, 197 n. 4 (Okla.1999) (collecting cases).
Three potential rationales support this result. First, an alternative delivery method may satisfy the parties' intent, even though it differs from the literal meaning of the contract language. Second, even if the alternative delivery method does not satisfy the contract, the deviation may be overlooked as inconsequential. Third, in some cases, a party may have waived the right to enforce the notice provision.
Here, the first rationale is sufficient to support the trial court's ruling.
Although offerors may insist on a particular method of acceptance, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 30 cmt. a, they rarely do so as a practical matter. See id. § 30 cmt. b ("Insistence on a particular form of acceptance is unusual."). The reason is simple: the method of acceptance generally has no effect on the substance of the agreement.
Because they are aware of this reality, courts look closely at contract terms that arguably restrict the method of acceptance. Very often, they find that the offeror intended something else:
[F]requently in regard to the details of methods of acceptance, the offeror's language, if fairly interpreted, amounts merely to a statement of a satisfactory method of acceptance, without positive requirement that this method shall be followed.
Illustrations: 1. A mails an offer to B in which A says, "I must receive your acceptance by return mail." An acceptance sent within a reasonable time by any other means, which reaches A as soon as a letter sent by return mail would normally arrive, creates a contract on arrival.
Id. § 60 cmt. a.
This interpretive principle applies with special force when courts examine contracts that contain options to renew leases or to buy leased property. These options are different from other offers in that they are shaped not by the offeror alone but by both parties in negotiation. Therefore, when interpreting option contracts, courts cannot focus solely on whether the offeror intended to restrict the method of acceptance; they must consider the intent and reasonable expectations of both parties. See Hoang v. Assurance Co., 149 P.3d 798, 801 (Colo.2007) ( ).
What do the parties intend when they agree to send a notice by certified or registered mail? In most cases, they intend nothing more than to forestall disputes about timeliness and actual delivery. See Gerson Realty Inc. v. Casaly, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 875, 316 N.E.2d 767, 767 (1974) (); cf. Blue v. Boss, 781 P.2d 128, 130 (Colo.App.1989) ( ).
Thus, even in jurisdictions that require strict compliance with the terms of an option contract, courts hold that an alternative delivery method is sufficient if it serves the same function as the method specified. See Univ. Realty & Dev. Co. v. Omid-Gaf, Inc., 19 Ariz.App. 488, 508 P.2d 747, 749 (1973) (); Osprey, 984 P.2d at 198 ( ); see also Fletcher v. Frisbee, 119 N.H. 555, 404 A.2d 1106, 1109 (1979) ( ); 243 So. Harrison St. Corp. v. Ogust, 113 N.J.Super. 74, 272 A.2d 578, 579-80 (1971) ( ); Gerson, 316 N.E.2d at 767-68 (same); Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw., Inc. v. C-3 Assocs., 32 Wash.App. 550, 648 P.2d 491, 492 (1982) ( ).
Conversely, courts generally disallow alternative delivery methods that fail to resolve questions about timeliness and actual receipt. See, e.g., In re Joyner, 74 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1987) (); Seven Fifty Main St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Spector, 5 Conn.App. 170, 497 A.2d 96, 98-99 (1985) ( ); W. Tire, Inc. v. Skrede, 307 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D.1981) ( ).
Here, the parties did not attach special significance to the method of delivery. Cf. Restatement (Sec...
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