Sutherland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 November 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 23340.,23340. |
| Parties | SUTHERLAND v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County; Taylor Smith, Judge.
"Not to be published in State Reports."
Action by Frank Sutherland against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Judgment reversed and remanded, with directions to enter a new judgment for plaintiff if he should file a remittitur, and otherwise judgment reversed and remanded for new trial.
Edgar & Banta, of Ironton, and Fordyce, White, Mayne & Williams and R. E. La Driere, all of St. Louis (Harry Cole Bates, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
W. A. Brookshire, of Farmington, for respondent.
BENNICK, Commissioner.
This is an action by one of the former employees of the St. Joseph Lead Company in and about its lead mines in St. Francois county, Mo., to recover from defendant, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, certain total and permanent disability benefits alleged to be due him under a policy of group insurance issued by defendant to the lead company for the benefit and protection of the latter's employees.
The disability clause of the policy provided that upon receipt at its home office in New York City of due proof that any employee, while insured under the policy, and prior to his sixtieth birthday, had become totally and permanently disabled as the result of bodily injury or disease so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit, the company would waive the payment of further premiums as to such employee, and six months after receipt of such proof, and in lieu of the payment of insurance at his death, would commence to pay monthly installments of benefits computed as to number and amount upon the basis of the amount of insurance in force on the life of the employee, such payments to continue within the limits of the coverage of the policy for so long as the employee's total and permanent disability should itself continue.
Plaintiff was admittedly insured under the policy in the sum of $4,000, at which figure, in the event he sustained a total and permanent disability within the coverage of the policy, he was entitled to receive a maximum of one hundred monthly installments of benefits of $45.67 each.
The evidence disclosed that plaintiff had last worked for the lead company on February 27, 1932, when he was laid off on account of a reduction in the company's force, or at least one of the officials of the company's employment service department testified to such reason for his dismissal. Plaintiff counts, of course, upon the fact that at and prior to the date of his dismissal he had sustained a total and permanent disability within the meaning of the policy so as to be entitled to receive the monthly benefits provided for therein.
Issue was joined under defendant's answer upon the questions of whether plaintiff had in fact become totally and permanently disabled while employed by the lead company and while the policy was in force and effect as to him, and of whether plaintiff, prior to the institution of his action, had made due proof of disability to defendant in accordance with the terms and conditions of the policy.
Upon a trial to a jury a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff, and against defendant, for the sum of $319.69, the full amount sued for, which represented the aggregate of seven monthly installments of benefits claimed to have been due at the time of the filing of suit. Judgment was rendered accordingly; and defendant's appeal to this court has followed in the usual course.
There are but two points presented by defendant on this appeal, the first, that the limit of plaintiff's recovery, under the facts of the case, was one installment of $45.67, and not the seven installments aggregating $319.69 as allowed him by the jury; and the second, that inasmuch as the sum to which plaintiff was entitled at the time of the filing of suit was less than $50, below which the jurisdiction of the circuit court does not extend (section 1938, R.S. 1929, Mo.St.Ann. § 1938, p. 2605), the court below was without jurisdiction over the action.
The point made by defendant regarding the excessiveness of the verdict is indeed well taken.
The disability clause of the very policy in suit has recently been construed by this court on several occasions as serving to postpone the commencement of the payment of the monthly installments called for by the policy for a period of six months after the receipt of due proof of...
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