Sutton v. State, 95-04058
| Decision Date | 12 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-04058,95-04058 |
| Citation | 698 So.2d 1321 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2166 Karen SUTTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Joanna B. Conner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Michael J. Scionti, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for appellee.
Karen Sutton appeals the final judgment and sentence for possession of cocaine and possession of paraphernalia. Because we conclude that the trial court's error in denying Sutton's motion to suppress evidence requires reversal, we do not need to address the alleged errors that the trial court committed in imposing costs, fees, and probation conditions.
Sutton entered a plea of no contest to both charges, reserving her right to appeal the trial court's denial of her dispositive motion to suppress a device containing cocaine residue found on her person. The following evidence was adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress.
Sutton was a passenger of a car involved in a hit-and-run incident, driven by a man named Dudeck. The victims gave chase and contacted law enforcement by using a cellular telephone. Neither Sutton nor Dudeck exhibited any weapons during the chase. Dudeck eventually stopped and got out of his car while Sutton remained in the passenger's seat of the car. Deputy Sheriff Jones arrived at the scene, directed Dudeck to the patrol car, and conducted a pat-down search of Dudeck. No weapons were found. After the victims confirmed that Dudeck was the one who hit their car, the deputy arrested him. During Dudeck's arrest, Sutton remained in the car. She did not say anything, nor did she interfere with the arrest.
Two other deputy sheriffs arrived to help secure the scene. When they approached Sutton, who was still sitting in Dudeck's car, they saw an eighteen-inch metal pipe lying on the front seat of the car. When they asked Sutton to step out of the car, she was cooperative and quiet. The deputies described her movements as slow.
Deputy Dimercurio conducted a pat-down search of Sutton for weapons. In the course of the pat-down, the deputy detected an unusual object in Sutton's bra, which she was unable to identify. When the deputy asked Sutton what the object was, Sutton responded that "it's a pipe or tubing or something like that," and then Sutton proceeded to pull it out and hand it to the deputy. As the deputy continued with the protective pat-down, she felt a long object in the front pocket of Sutton's jeans, but was unable to identify the object. Believing that the object might be a weapon, the deputy removed the object from Sutton's pocket. After removing the object, the deputy was able to identify the object as a crack pipe.
Deputy Dimercurio testified at the suppression hearing that she conducted the pat-down search because Sutton was a passenger in a car which was involved in a hit-and-run incident. Furthermore, the deputy noted that there was a steel pipe located next to Sutton in the vehicle. The deputy conceded that there was nothing about Sutton's clothing that indicated she was concealing a weapon.
The "Florida Stop and Frisk Law" allows law enforcement officers to detain a person temporarily to ascertain the person's identity and the "circumstances of his presence" when there are reasonable indications "that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state." § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). However, a valid stop does not necessarily give officers the right to search an individual for weapons. See State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 822 (Fla.1981) (). The law provides that a frisk for weapons may occur only when the officers have "probable cause" to believe that the person is armed with a dangerous weapon and, therefore, offers a threat to the safety of the officer or any other person. See § 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (1993). The term "probable cause" in this statute has been...
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State v. Ashbrook
...furtive gesture of raising himself up from the car seat and reaching toward the floor warranted vehicle search); Sutton v. State, 698 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997)(Florida allows frisks of individuals after officers notice suspicious bulges in clothing or furtive movements by pass......
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D.L.J. v. State, 2D05-673.
...term "probable cause" in this statute to mean "reasonable belief." See State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981); Sutton v. State, 698 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The officer must be able to articulate some basis which would support a reasonable belief that an individual is arme......
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Howell v. State, 96-03392
...that Howell was armed with a dangerous weapon. Thus, the officer lacked authority to conduct a pat-down search. See Sutton v. State, 698 So.2d 1321,1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The State asserts that, even if a pat-down search was not justified, the seizure of the gun was nonetheless proper bec......
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K.S. v. State
...such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state.’ " Sutton v. State, 698 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1993) ).However, a valid stop ... does not necessarily validate a subsequent pat-dow......