Sutton v. State

• Decision Date: 16 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. S14A0482.,S14A0482.
• Citation: 295 Ga. 350,759 S.E.2d 846
• Parties: SUTTON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

295 Ga. 350

759 S.E.2d 846

SUTTON

v.The STATE.

No. S14A0482.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 16, 2014.

Danielle Patrice Roberts, Axam Roberts Legal Group, Decatur, Joyce Lynise Neal, The Neal Law Firm, PC, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Dep. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Vicki Samara Bass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Paige Reese Whitaker, Dep. Dist. Atty., Peggy Ann Katz, Asst. Dist. Atty., Fulton County District Attorney's Office, Atlanta, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant Christopher Sutton was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Dwight Smith.¹ HE APPEALS, ASSERTing, inter alia, the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

1. Appellant was one of five perpetrators who conspired to rob the murder victim, who was a tattoo artist. Three of the conspirators, appellant, Michael Smith and Miche Hunt arrived at the victim's house in appellant's mother's automobile. They entered the house, ostensibly for the victim to tattoo Hunt, and spoke with the victim about tattoos. Then Smith sat on the couch with the victim's cousin, 17–year–old Khiry Clemons, who was visiting the victim and playing a video game.

Clemons testified at trial that when Hunt went to the bathroom, Smith pulled out a gun and told him to get down on the floor; that appellant drew a gun on the victim, who fought back and attempted to grab the gun; that during the struggle the victim was shot in the head; that appellant and Smith fled; and that they were followed out the door by Hunt, who, after exiting the bathroom, stopped to pick up her belongings.

Michael Smith pled guilty to conspiracy to commit a crime and also testified at trial. He averred that he entered the murder victim's house with appellant and Miche Hunt; that he was carrying a .45 pistol, which had been given to him by another conspirator, Denarryl Head, and that appellant carried his own weapon; that, while they were speaking with the victim about tattoos, Hunt passed them a message instructing them to draw their guns when she went to the bathroom; that when appellant drew his gun, the victim pulled out his pockets to show appellant he did not have any money; that the victim grabbed appellant's gun; and that during the struggle for the gun, appellant shot the victim. Smith added that appellant later told him that he shot the victim in the course of the struggle because he “really didn't have a choice.”

Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because it rested solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Michael Smith, an accomplice to the crimes. See former OCGA § 24–4–8 (to sustain felony conviction, testimony of accomplice must be corroborated).² We cannot accept this contention.

“[S]light evidence of corroboration connecting the defendant with the crime satisfies the requirements of OCGA § 24–4–8 and that evidence may be entirely circumstantial. Also, evidence of the defendant's conduct before and after the crime may give rise to an inference that he participated in the crime.” Parkerson v. State, 265 Ga. 438, 439, 457 S.E.2d 667 (1995). See also Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 833–834, 225 S.E.2d 281 (1976). Here the testimony of Clemons identifying appellant as the shooter satisfied the corroboration requirements of former OCGA § 24–4–8. See Reeves v. State, 244 Ga.App. 15, 18(1)(c), 534 S.E.2d 179 (2000) (where two witnesses give same facts, the circumstance that one is accomplice does not render evidence insufficient under former OCGA § 24–4–8). The fact that Clemons initially identified the wrong man as the shooter was a matter for the jury to resolve. See Brookshire v. State, 230 Ga.App. 418, 419, 496 S.E.2d 757 (1998) (sufficiency of corroborating testimony is a jury question). See also Tiggs v. State, 287 Ga.App. 291, 293, 651 S.E.2d 209 (2007) (credibility of identification testimony is question of fact to be decided by jury).

2. GBI firearms examiner Bernadette Davy testified that a .380 cartridge was found at the scene; that that cartridge could not have been fired from a .45 pistol; that it was consistent with having been fired from either a Bryco or Lorcin .380 pistol; that, if those type of guns were working properly, it would take between seven and ten pounds of rearward pressure to fire them; and that that amount of pressure would be inconsistent with an accidental trigger pull. At the motion for new trial, appellant introduced evidence showing that Davy resigned from the GBI on April 1, 2009, following an investigation which demonstrated that she intentionally fabricated firearms data in another, unrelated case. Appellant asserts the trial court failed to grant his motion for new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. We disagree. A new trial will not be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence where, as here, the only effect of the evidence would be to impeach the credibility of a witness. Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491, 271 S.E.2d 792 (1980); Smith v. State, 222 Ga.App. 366, 371(6), 474 S.E.2d 272 (1996).

3. Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting the lead detective to testify that Miche Hunt told him appellant went inside the victim's house. In this regard, appellant argued the out-of-court statement was testimonial in nature and violated his right of confrontation because Hunt did not testify. See Gay v. State, 279 Ga. 180, 181–182(2), 611 S.E.2d 31 (2005) (confrontation clause bars admission of out-of-court, testimonial statements when declarant cannot be cross-examined). We cannot accept this contention because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 182, n. 3, 611 S.E.2d 31 (“a finding of harmlessconstitutional error requires that the error be harmless ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”). First, the detective did not state he was told by Hunt that appellant went inside the house. The detective was only asked “whether or not” Hunt made such a statement. The detective answered that question affirmatively; but before the detective was asked the logical followup question, appellant interposed an objection. The court sustained the objection and struck the detective's answer to the “whether or not” question.Moreover, the testimony was cumulative of other admissible evidence placing appellant in the house, to wit: the testimony of Michael Smith and Khiry Clemons, as well as the out-of-court statement of Jamilah Jarboe, appellant's girlfriend, who testified at trial.

In a related argument, appellant also claims the detective's testimony concerning Miche Hunt's out-of-court statement violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). We disagree. “ Bruton only excludes statements by a non-testifying co-defendant that directly inculpate the defendant.” Moss v. State, 275 Ga. 96, 98, 561 S.E.2d 382 (2002). Bruton is not implicated where the statement does not facially incriminate appellant and “only becomes incriminating when linked with other evidence introduced at trial.” Id. See also Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135, 137(6), 485 S.E.2d 783 (1997).

4. Appellant erroneously asserts the State failed to prove venue. Several witnesses, including the lead detective and a neighbor of the victim, testified the crimes occurred in Fulton County. See Bulloch v. State, 293 Ga. 179, 187(4), 744 S.E.2d 763 (2013) (venue may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence).

5. The trial court did not err in failing to give appellant's request to charge on bare suspicion. A defendant is not entitled to such a charge where, as here, the evidence raises more than a bare suspicion of guilt. Range v. State, 289 Ga.App. 727, 729–730(3), 658 S.E.2d 245 (2008). Nor did the trial court err in failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Voluntary manslaughter requires an assailant to act “solely as the result of a sudden violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.” OCGA § 16–5–2(a). An armed robbery assailant cannot claim he was provoked on the ground that the victim resisted his criminal act. Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 319(5)(a), 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002).

6. Appellant contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to (a) challenge Khiry Clemons' in-court identification of appellant as the shooter on the ground that it was based on a photographic lineup which was impermissibly suggestive; (b) object to the testimony of Bernadette Davy concerning the rearward trigger pull of a typical Bryco or Lorcin .380 pistol on the basis that it was speculative; (c) secure and communicate a plea offer to appellant and counsel him as to the maximum sentence he could receive and the length of time he would have to serve before he would be eligible for parole. He also posits that post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he neglected to (d) ensure that lead trial counsel would appear at the new trial hearing, as well as subpoena appropriate witnesses to testify about Davy's resignation from the GBI; (e) obtain the shell casing found at the scene for independent testing. To prevail on one or more of these grounds, appellant must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As to the first prong, counsel is “strongly presumed to have...