Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County

• Decision Date: 01 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-506.,03-506.
• Citation: 2005 MT 17,106 P.3d 548,325 Mont. 365
• Parties: Antoinette SVALDI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ANACONDA-DEER LODGE COUNTY, and Anaconda School District No. 10, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

106 P.3d 548

2005 MT 17

325 Mont. 365

Antoinette SVALDI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ANACONDA-DEER LODGE COUNTY, and Anaconda School District No. 10, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 03-506.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 30, 2004.

Decided February 1, 2005.

For Appellant: Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Cannon & Sheehy, Helena, Montana.

For Respondents: William M. O'Leary, Corette, Pohlman & Kebe, Butte, Montana.

Justice JOHN WARNER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Antoinette Svaldi ("Svaldi") appeals from an order of the District Court for the Third Judicial District, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, granting summary judgment in favor of the County, thereby dismissing her claim for severe emotional distress. We affirm.

¶ 2 We re-state and address the following issues raised by Svaldi on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Did the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Attorney negligently breach a legal duty owed to Svaldi when he told a newspaper that he was discussing with her attorney a deferred prosecution agreement that concerned possible criminal charges against her?

¶ 4 2. Did the County Attorney negligently breach a legal duty owed to Svaldi when he revealed to a newspaper the initial offense report naming Svaldi as a possible suspect in an offense?

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Prior to her retirement in May 1998, Svaldi had been teaching in the Anaconda public school system for approximately 25 years. On March 2, 1998, parents of children taught by Svaldi made an assault complaint against her to the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Police. Several of the parents alleged Svaldi had assaulted and/or was verbally abusive to their children. A written initial offense report was created and was forwarded to the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Attorney's Office along with a request for prosecution.

¶ 6 About the same time as the initial offense report was filed, the parents made written complaints concerning the same matters against Svaldi to the Anaconda School District ("School District"). In response to the complaints, the School District placed Svaldi on administrative leave pending investigation. The School District conducted an independent investigation and prepared an investigation report. The County Attorney, Michael Grayson ("Grayson"), obtained a copy of the School District's investigation report through an investigative subpoena.

¶ 7 On or about April 27, 1998, Grayson contacted Svaldi's attorney in this matter, Mark Vucurovich ("Vucurovich"), to discuss the possible criminal prosecution and the possibility of a deferred prosecution agreement. In a letter dated April 28, 1998, Vucurovich informed Svaldi of the details of his conversation with Grayson.

¶ 8 On May 5, 1998, Vucurovich submitted a letter to Robert Brown ("Brown") the attorney for the School District, informing him that Svaldi intended to retire at the end of the 1998 school year. In the letter, Vucurovich authorized Brown to discuss Svaldi's retirement with County Attorney Grayson at a meeting scheduled between Grayson, the complaining parents and Brown. The letter also stated, "[Svaldi] is retiring based upon assurances from the School District that there will be no criminal prosecution in this matter." However, Vucurovich admitted he was aware that any decision regarding criminal prosecution would be made by the County Attorney, not by the School District.

¶ 9 On May 12, 1998, Grayson sent a letter and deferred prosecution agreement to Vucurovich. The proposed deferred prosecution agreement was for a term of two years and required Svaldi to "retire from teaching children in any capacity."

¶ 10 Subsequently, a reporter from the Anaconda Leader, an area newspaper, contacted Grayson about the case. Grayson informed the reporter that his office was discussing a deferred prosecution agreement with Svaldi's attorney in exchange for Svaldi's promise to retire from teaching. Upon request, Grayson also provided the reporter with a copy of the initial offense report. Svaldi did not sign a deferred prosecution, she retired, and Grayson did not pursue criminal prosecution.

¶ 11 Svaldi sued the County and the School District for damages alleging breach of her right to privacy and claiming damages for severe emotional distress. The School District and the County both moved for summary judgment. On April 23, 2003, the District Court entered its Opinion and Order granting summary judgment in favor of the School District and the County. Svaldi does not appeal the judgment in favor of the School District. She appeals the judgment in favor of the County.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Our standard in reviewing a district court's summary judgment ruling is de novo. Renville v. Fredrickson, 2004 MT 324, ¶ 9, 324 Mont. 86,

¶ 9, 101 P.3d 773, ¶ 9. "Accordingly, such review affords no deference to the district court's decision and we independently review the record, using the same criteria used by the district court ... to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate." Renville, ¶ 9. Moreover, all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the offered proof must be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Renville, ¶ 9.

III. DISCUSSION

ISSUE ONE

¶ 13 Did the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Attorney negligently breach a legal duty owed to Svaldi when he told a newspaper that he was discussing with her attorney a deferred prosecution agreement that concerned possible criminal charges against her?

¶ 14 Svaldi brings suit to collect damages for the County Attorney's alleged negligent violation of the Criminal Justice Information Act. Section 44-5-101, MCA, et seq., (the "Act"). Svaldi first argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County Attorney was discussing with Svaldi's attorney possible agreements that the State not file charges against her in exchange for an agreement that she retire from teaching. Accordingly, Svaldi argues the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the County. Svaldi next argues that "discussions" relating to a possible deferred prosecution agreement constitute confidential, not public, criminal justice information under the Act. Therefore, County Attorney Grayson acted negligently when he told a reporter from the Anaconda Leader that he was discussing the option of a deferred prosecution agreement with Svaldi's attorney.

¶ 15 The basis underlying Svaldi's claim is that Grayson breached a duty owed to her by releasing confidential criminal justice information to the press. It is not an issue of material fact whether Grayson actually had bi-lateral discussions with Svaldi's attorney, or whether Svaldi had actual knowledge of any discussions Grayson had with her attorney. The factual basis of this claim is what Grayson said to the press. The parties do not dispute that Grayson made a statement to the press, wherein he identified Svaldi, and said he was discussing a possible deferred prosecution agreement with Svaldi's attorney. There is no dispute concerning the contents of the statement. Thus, there is no material issue of fact. The issue is one of law; whether the information disseminated by Grayson constituted a tortious release of confidential criminal justice information. Therefore, the District Court did not err in concluding there were no disputed issues of material fact.

¶ 16 By statute, criminal justice information is classified as either public criminal justice information, or confidential criminal justice information. Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. City of Bozeman Police Dept. (1993), 260 Mont. 218, 222, 859 P.2d 435, 437-38. Public criminal justice information is defined in § 44-5-103(13), MCA, and includes information "of convictions, deferred sentences, and deferred prosecutions." Confidential criminal justice information is defined in § 44-5-103(3), MCA, and includes information related to criminal investigations or criminal intelligence, fingerprints and photographs, or "any other criminal justice information not clearly defined as public criminal justice information."

¶ 17 "With some qualifications, public criminal justice information may be disseminated without restriction." Bozeman Daily Chronicle, 260 Mont. at 223, 859 P.2d at 438; § 44-5-301(1), MCA. The dissemination of confidential criminal justice information, on the other hand, is restricted by statute. See § 44-5-303, MCA.

¶ 18 Svaldi asserts that only those deferred prosecution agreements that are in writing and executed by the parties as provided by § 46-16-130(1)(b), MCA, constitute public criminal justice information. She argues that since no such agreement was ever signed in this case, the information concerning the possibility of such an agreement that Grayson revealed to the newspaper reporter was not public criminal justice information, and could, therefore, not be disclosed. We agree that only those deferred prosecution agreements that are actually executed meet the definition of public criminal justice information in § 44-5-103(13), MCA. However, that does not mean that discussions related to the possible offering of a deferred prosecution agreement meet the statutory definition of confidential criminal justice information.

¶ 19 Mere discussion of a possible deferred prosecution agreement, which is one of several options available to a county attorney in handling a case, does not constitute a discussion of criminal justice information. Criminal justice information is defined as "information relating to criminal justice collected, processed, or preserved by a criminal justice agency." Section 44-5-103(8)(a), MCA. A county attorney's discussions related to the possibility that a deferred prosecution agreement may be offered do not concern "collected," "processed," or "preserved" information obtained by a...