Swails v. State
Decision Date | 14 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. S93A0395,S93A0395 |
Citation | 431 S.E.2d 101,263 Ga. 276 |
Parties | SWAILS v. STATE of Georgia. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Virgil L. Brown, Virgil L. Brown & Associates, Patricia A. Buttaro, Zebulon, for Swails.
Tracy G. Gladden, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., Jonesboro, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Gary D. Bergman, for the State.
Pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49, the State filed a petition for forfeiture of property seized from appellant's place of business. Appellant answered, seeking the return of the property. Although OCGA § 16-13-49(o )(5) and (p)(6) provide that the proceeding "must be held by the court without a jury[,]" appellant nevertheless filed a demand for jury trial and attacked the constitutionality of those statutory provisions. Following a hearing, the trial court found no merit in appellant's constitutional challenge to the statutory provisions mandating a bench trial. The trial court did, however, certify its order for immediate review. Appellant applied for an interlocutory appeal and we granted that application to determine whether a jury trial must be afforded upon demand in forfeiture proceedings under OCGA § 16-13-49.
1. This is not a case involving construction of a forfeiture statute which fails to provide whether it is a bench trial or jury trial that is mandated. Subsections (o )(5) and (p)(6) of OCGA § 16-13-49 expressly mandate that the proceeding "must be held by the court without a jury." Accordingly, the issue presented for resolution is whether the Federal or State Constitutions prevent that express legislative mandate from having any force and effect. Bryan v. Ga. Public Service Comm., 238 Ga. 572, 575, 234 S.E.2d 784 (1977).
2. The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved...." (Emphasis supplied.) Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 3 Pet. 433, 446-447, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830).
Under this broad construction, whereby a suit must be deemed to be one which is in "common law" if it is not otherwise in equity or admiralty, it necessarily follows that the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution mandates a jury trial in federal drug forfeiture actions wherein neither equity nor admiralty jurisdiction otherwise attaches. See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir.1980). The Seventh Amendment does not narrowly provide "that no jury trial is required in a cause of action created by statute since any such action would have been unknown to the common law and therefore beyond the reach of the Seventh Amendment." Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir.1972). Instead, the Seventh Amendment broadly applies "to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). Under the broadly construed language of the Seventh Amendment, "when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no functional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law." Curtis v. Loether, supra at 195, 94 S.Ct. at 1009.
It is clear, however, that the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution would not prevent our General Assembly from providing for a bench trial in statutory forfeiture proceedings. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354 (1926). That amendment Butler v. Claxton, 221 Ga. 620, 621, 146 S.E.2d 763 (1966).
3. Our State Constitution does not track the broad language of the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution preserving the right to jury trial "[i]n Suits at common law...." Instead, Art. I Sec. I, Par. XI(a) provides that "[t]he right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate...." Accordingly, for purposes of determining whether there is a state constitutional right to a jury trial in a given action, it is not sufficient to eliminate equity and admiralty jurisdiction and reach the conclusion that the action must, therefore, be a suit "at common law" in which a jury trial is mandated. The right to a jury trial under our State Constitution is not as broad as that afforded under the Federal Constitution. The provision of our State Constitution regarding the right to jury trial (Emphasis supplied in part.) Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 207-208 (1848). See also Hill v. Levenson, 259 Ga. 395(1), 383 S.E.2d 110 (1989). Obviously, the right to jury trial in drug forfeiture proceedings did not exist in 1798. This is true because the statute authorizing drug forfeiture is a "new remedy" which did not exist at common law, but which was enacted subsequent to 1798 so as to accommodate the "shifting state of society." See generally Bowman v. Davis, 51 Ga.App. 478, 479(3), 180 S.E. 917 (1935) ( ) (Emphasis supplied.) Benton v. Ga. Marble Co., 258 Ga. 58, 66(4), 365 S.E.2d 413 (1988). Since the provisions of OCGA § 16-13-49 create a statutory proceeding which was unknown in 1798, it follows that the General Assembly was authorized to provide for a bench trial in that proceeding and that the trial court in the instant case correctly overruled appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-13-49(o )(5) and (p)(6).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, SEARS-COLLINS and HUNSTEIN, JJ., who dissent.
Because the majority opinion denies the right to a jury trial guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI(a) of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983, I must respectfully dissent. The majority concludes the General Assembly was authorized to provide for trial without a jury in OCGA § 16-13-49(o )(5) because drug forfeiture proceedings did not exist prior to the adoption of the first Georgia Constitution. Believing that the right to a jury trial includes statutory proceedings of a similar nature that have arisen since the adoption of our Constitution, I would reverse the trial court.
As the majority notes, it is well established that in civil actions at law, Hill v. Levenson, 259 Ga. 395(1), 383 S.E.2d 110 (1989). In short, jury trials are available in proceedings that have a common law basis....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. One 1990 Honda Accord, New Jersey Registration No. HRB20D, VIN No. 1HGCB7659LA063293 and Four Hundred and Twenty Dollars
...at common law when Idaho constitution was adopted in 1889). But see People v. Allen, 767 P.2d 798 (Colo.Ct.App.1988); Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 431 S.E.2d 101(Ga.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011, 114 S.Ct. 602, 126 L. Ed.2d 567 (1993); State Conservation Dep't v. Brown, 335 Mich. 343, 55 ......
-
State v. Brown
...money, used in illegal drug transactions.... We agree with the rationale of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Swails [v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 431 S.E.2d 101,] 103 [(Ga.1993)] (citations The provision of our State Constitution regarding the right to jury trial "means that it shall not be taken ......
-
Matter of Bell
...(noting that constitutional prohibitions upon excessive fines apply with equal force to civil, in rem forfeiture actions); Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 431 S.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011, 114 S.Ct. 602, 126 L.Ed.2d 567 (1993) (finding that provisions mandating forfeiture proceedin......
-
State v. One 1990 Honda Accord, New Jersey Registration No. HRB-20D, VIN No. 1HGCB7659LA063293 and Four Hundred Twenty Dollars
...v. Marcus, 26 N.Y.2d 764, 309 N.Y.S.2d 204, 257 N.E.2d 652 (1970). But see People v. Allen, 767 P.2d 798 (Colo.App.1988); Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 431 S.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011, 114 S.Ct. 602, 126 L.Ed.2d 567 (1993); In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich.App. 134, 486 ......
-
Criminal Law - Frank C. Mills, Iii
...held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless continued for good cause and must be held by the court without a jury." Id. 33. 263 Ga. 276, 431 S.E.2d 101 (1993). 34. Id. at 276, 431 S.E.2d at 102. 35. Ga. const, art I, Sec. 1, para. 11(a) provides: The right to trial by jury sha......
-
Medical Malpractice as Workers' Comp: Overcoming State Constitutional Barriers to Tort Reform
...art. I, § 1, para. XI(a).128. Compare Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Ga. 2010), Swails v. State, 431 S.E.2d 101, 102-03 (Ga. 1993), Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 207-08 (1848), and Tift v. Griffin, 5 Ga. 185, 189 (1848) (all using 17......
-
The Party Respectfully Requests a Jury Trial on All Issues So Triable: What Issues Are Triable to a Jury and What Issues Should Be Triable to a Jury? a Comment on the Right to a Jury Trial, With a Focus on Civil Trials, and When the Right Exists
...244 Ga. App. 338, 340, 535 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2000); see Beasley v. Burt, 201 Ga. 144, 150, 39 S.E.2d 51, 57 (1946).30. Swails v. State, 263 Ga. 276, 278, 431 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1993).31. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1-133 (2021).32. Raintree Farms, Inc. v. Stripping Ctr., Ltd., 166 Ga. App. 848, 848, 305 ......