Sweat v. Darr, 55299

• Decision Date: 08 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 55299,55299
• Citation: 684 P.2d 347,235 Kan. 570
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application of Sesmon SWEAT For a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Appellant, v. Johnnie DARR, Sheriff of Sedgwick County, Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 347

684 P.2d 347

235 Kan. 570

In the Matter of the Application of Sesmon SWEAT For a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Appellant, v. Johnnie DARR, Sheriff of Sedgwick County, Kansas, Appellee.

No. 55299.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

June 8, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Forty-eight states, including Kansas and California, and the United States, are signatories to the interstate Agreement on Detainers. K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq.; Cal.Penal Code § 1389 et seq. (West 1982).

2. The purpose of the Agreement on Detainers, as set forth in Article I, is to encourage the orderly and expeditious disposition of detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, in an effort to reduce uncertainty and facilitate prisoner treatment and rehabilitation in the state where the prisoner is incarcerated.

3. The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, K.S.A. 22-4301 et seq., is a Kansas intrastate procedure whereby persons imprisoned in this state may request final disposition of other Kansas charges pending against them.

4. This court has determined that the Agreement on Detainers and the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act are parallel acts designed to secure a speedy trial to the person incarcerated in a penal institution either in this or another state.

5. Substantial compliance with the provisions of the Agreement on Detainers and the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act is sufficient to invoke the protections afforded thereby. Ekis, Petitioner v. Darr, 217 Kan. 817, 539 P.2d 16 (1975).

6. To obtain the speedy trial guaranteed by section 10 of our Bill of Rights, and as legislatively defined by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, it is incumbent upon an accused incarcerated in a penal institution of this State to comply with all provisions of the Act, including the preparation of his written request for disposition of detainer to be addressed to the court in which the indictment, information or complaint is then pending against him and to the county attorney charged with the duty of prosecuting it. Townsend v. State, 215 Kan. 485, Syl. p 3, 524 P.2d 758 (1974).

7. A petitioner who fails in his obligation, under the Agreement on Detainers, to properly address his request for speedy disposition of charges pending against him must bear the burden and the consequences of the improperly delivered request. Here the petitioner has not "substantially complied" with his requirement under the Agreement on Detainers.

Eric A. Commer, of the Law Office of Lyle W. Britt, Chartered, Wichita, argued the cause and was on briefs, for appellant.

Geary N. Gorup, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Clark V. Owens, Dist. Atty., were with him on brief, for appellee.

LOCKETT, Justice:

This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner claims that by operation of the interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement) (K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq.) the Sedgwick County District Court was required to dismiss the criminal charges for which he was being held for trial in that court. The material facts are essentially undisputed. They are almost wholly established by documentary evidence.

On November 9, 1982, while in custody at the Sedgwick County Jail in Wichita, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. It was immediately issued. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing on November 16, 1982, the trial judge ordered the writ dissolved and that petitioner remain in the sheriff's custody for trial on the Sedgwick County charges. Petitioner was tried and convicted. Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court determining the State had failed to afford Sweat a speedy trial as required by K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq. The State filed its Petition for Review which this court granted.

In early 1982, petitioner was a prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at the California Rehabilitation Center, Norco, California (CRC). He was serving a two-year sentence for a 1981 California robbery conviction. The superintendent of CRC informed petitioner in writing that a detainer had been lodged against him with respect to untried 1981 Sedgwick County drug charges. There is confusion in the documentation of the date petitioner was informed. He was informed between March 22, 1982, and March 26, 1982. Petitioner was provided with a set of unprepared Inmate's Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints forms. Sweat determined to invoke the provisions of the interstate agreement on detainers. He partially filled in the blank portions of the forms and then returned the uncompleted set of forms to the California prison officials. Sweat had failed to correctly address copies of the forms to the court where the charges were pending and to the prosecuting official as required by the Agreement. The incomplete forms were incorrectly completed by the California authorities and signed by the superintendent of CRC. Sweat reviewed the completed documents. The completed documents and the California offer to deliver temporary custody, together with a form letter bearing the date of March 26, 1982, were sent by CRC by certified mail to the Sedgwick County sheriff on March 31, 1982.

The documents were received by the sheriff, but the particular date of their receipt by him is unknown. No copies of the documents were forwarded by the sheriff to the Sedgwick County District Court, or the Sedgwick County District Attorney. The documents were simply filed in the sheriff's office when received. No copies of any of the documents were mailed by CRC to the Sedgwick County District Court or to the Sedgwick County District Attorney. No documents were received by either the court or the district attorney's office from petitioner, his attorney, or any other office or person.

Sweat was later transferred to Soledad, California Correctional Training Facility where he was again notified of the Kansas detainer. A second set of forms to request disposition of the pending Kansas charges was supplied the petitioner. These forms were completed and then forwarded by the California authorities to the proper Kansas authorities. Petitioner remained in custody in California on his robbery conviction from March, 1982, to October 27, 1982, when he was returned to Wichita by the Sedgwick County sheriff upon acceptance of a California offer to deliver temporary custody. Sweat's return resulted from his second request for final disposition of untried Kansas charges. On January 24, 1983, more than 220 days after his initial request to be returned to Kansas, Sweat went to trial on the drug charges. A jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of marijuana was returned on January 27, 1983.

Forty-eight states, including Kansas and California, and the United States, are signatories to the interstate Agreement on Detainers. K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq.; Cal.Penal Code § 1389 et seq. (West 1982). The purpose of the Agreement, as set forth in Article I, is to encourage the orderly and expeditious disposition of detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, in an effort to reduce uncertainty and facilitate prisoner treatment and rehabilitation in the state where the prisoner is incarcerated. Article III contains the operative provisions of the Agreement, and in pertinent part states:

"(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint....

"(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.

....

"(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner." Emphasis supplied.

Article V provides for the transfer and temporary custody of the requesting prisoner to the state in which the charges are outstanding. It also provides:

"(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect."

Furthermore, Article IX instructs that...