Sweatt v. Bailey, Civ. A. No. 94-T-617-N.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-T-617-N.
• Citation: 876 F. Supp. 1571
• Parties: Charles SWEATT, Plaintiff, v. Chuck BAILEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

876 F. Supp. 1571

Charles SWEATT, Plaintiff, v. Chuck BAILEY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 94-T-617-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

January 31, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Banks Thomas Smith, Hall, Sherrer & Smith, Dothan, AL, for plaintiff.

Norman Gunter Guy, Jr., Brannan & Guy, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Charles Sweatt charges in this lawsuit that the defendants — Andalusia Chief of Police Jerry Williamson and police officers Chuck Bailey and Robby Messick in their individual and official capacities — intended to deprive him of his right to freedom from physical abuse, coercion, and intimidation guaranteed by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (West 1981), 18 U.S.C.A. § 245 (West 1969 & Supp. 1994), and the first, fourth, fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994).¹ Sweatt also brings state law claims for assault and battery, emotional distress, negligent employment, retention of incompetent employees, and failure to supervise, discipline, and train. Sweatt asks for compensatory and punitive damages. He invokes the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(a)(3) (West 1993) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993). This lawsuit is now before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons given below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On the night of March 1, 1993, officers Messick and Bailey arrested Sweatt for driving under the influence of alcohol and took him to the police station in Andalusia, Alabama for booking. There are conflicting accounts of what happened before, during, and after the booking procedure. This background discusses only those facts necessary to resolve the summary judgment motion before the court.

The defendants claim that Sweatt was uncooperative and threatening. They admit officers forcibly placed Sweatt in a chair, and they further admit that there was "an encounter" between police officers and Sweatt, but they insist that "minimal force" was used and Sweatt was uninjured.² Messick testified at a deposition that he did not strike Sweatt.³ Messick's written report, however, states that he and Officer Scott Simmons used force to place Sweatt in a chair.⁴

Sweatt bases his version of the events primarily on an unverified, but unchallenged, transcript of an audio tape of part of the incident and on his deposition testimony. Sweatt's response to the motion for summary judgment alleges that he was on the phone and stated that one of the officer's was an "ass."⁵ According to Sweatt, Messick hit him several times in the head.⁶ Messick also allegedly cursed at him.⁷ Officer A.L. Ricks described the incident as an "altercation" and said Messick lost his temper.⁸ Sweatt further stated that Bailey was present during the alleged attack.⁹ On the basis of his version of the events on March 1, 1993, Sweatt is suing Messick for the alleged incident and Bailey for failing to prevent the alleged incident.

In addition to accounts of the incident in question, other facts are important with regard to Chief Williamson's liability as a supervisor. Messick admits that, before his employment with the Andalusia Police Department, he was terminated from the Opp Police Department.¹⁰ Messick's termination occurred after at least one conference about his temper and a warning for slapping a prisoner during an argument started by Messick.¹¹ According to Messick, Williamson was among those who interviewed him for the Andalusia job.¹² Williamson does not remember interviewing Messick.¹³ Messick also stated that he never received training about how to handle intoxicated people, even though he often had to deal with people under the influence of alcohol.¹⁴ Chief Williamson stated that such training was provided.¹⁵ Messick further stated that he was never disciplined or reprimanded for his actions towards Sweatt.¹⁶ Officer Simmons testified at his deposition that he had seen Messick lose his temper on at least three occasions.¹⁷ Simmons further testified that on one of those occasions, Messick struck someone with a flashlight.¹⁸ Simmons reported this incident to supervisors and, at some point, to Chief Williamson.¹⁹

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Once the party seeking summary judgment has informed the court of the basis for its motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary judgment would be inappropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir.1993) (discussing how responsibilities on movant and nonmovant vary depending on who bears burden of proof at trial).

III. FEDERAL STATUTORY CLAIMS

A. Section 1985

Sweatt's complaint does not specify which subsection of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (West 1981) he claims the defendants violated. His brief, however, quotes only the second clause of § 1985(2).²⁰ The court assumes that this is the relevant provision. The United States Supreme Court has held that the "second part of § 1985(2) applies to conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice in state courts." Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). Sweatt has not even alleged any obstruction of justice in state court, let alone produced facts to support such an allegation. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to this claim.

B. Section 245

It is not immediately apparent to the court how 18 U.S.C.A. § 245 (West 1969 & Supp. 1994), which is a criminal statute concerning federally protected activities, applies to Sweatt's factual claims. Sweatt makes no § 245 argument in his response to the motion for summary judgment. In fact, Sweatt omits § 245 from the list of claims in his brief. Therefore, the court assumes that Sweatt is no longer pursuing his § 245 claim and grants summary judgment on that claim.

IV. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

Sweatt charges the defendants with violating his rights under the first, fourth, fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. To establish that a defendant is liable in his or her individual capacity under § 1983, "it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). To establish official-capacity liability, there must also be a policy or custom behind the deprivation. Id. The defendants do not dispute that they were acting under color of state law. They do contend, however, that Sweatt was not deprived of any federal rights and that they are immune from suit in both their individual and official capacities.

A. Qualified Immunity for Officers Messick and Bailey

Officers Messick and Bailey claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

A two-step analysis is followed to determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. The defendant must first show that he or she was acting within the scope of discretionary authority at the time of the alleged conduct. Once this is shown, the plaintiff must prove that the official's conduct violated clearly established law. E.g., Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir.1992).

1. Scope of Discretionary Authority

The court turns to the first prong, the scope of discretionary authority. Sweatt argues that because the booking process is ministerial rather than discretionary in nature, the defendants cannot meet their burden of proof in showing they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected an argument based on the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts in Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565-66 (11th Cir.1994). In that case, the district court found that qualified immunity did not apply because the defendants had failed to show that the act of transporting a prisoner was discretionary. The appellate court reversed, finding that basing a decision on whether an act is ministerial or discretionary too narrowly interprets the first part of the qualified immunity test. Under this analysis, the court rejects Sweatt's contention that the mere character, of the act of booking is decisive.

Instead, in order to show that he acted within the scope of discretionary authority, a defendant "must demonstrate objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority." Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir.1981);²¹ accord Jordan, 38 F.3d at 1566; Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir.1988). This is not a difficult burden to meet because of the level of generality at which this requirement must be interpreted. In Rich, the Eleventh Circuit asked whether an investigator is within his job duties and authority when he submits a probable cause affidavit, not when he submits a probable cause affidavit without a reasonable basis, as the plaintiff alleged. 841 F.2d at 1562, 1564. In Jordan, the Eleventh Circuit asked whether it was within the job duties...