Sweeney v. McCormick

• Decision Date: 22 March 1990
• Citation: 159 A.D.2d 832,552 N.Y.S.2d 707
• Parties: John SWEENEY, Respondent, v. Mark C. McCORMICK et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 707

552 N.Y.S.2d 707

159 A.D.2d 832

John SWEENEY, Respondent, v. Mark C. McCORMICK et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

March 22, 1990.

O'Connor & Yoquinto (William D. Yoquinto, of counsel), Troy, for Mark C. McCormick and another, appellants.

Hancock & Estabrook (John T. Casey, Jr., of counsel), Albany, for respondent.

Before KANE, J.P., and MIKOLL, YESAWICH, MERCURE and HARVEY, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Prior, Jr., J.), entered May 23, 1989 in Rensselaer County, which granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability against defendants Mark C. McCormick and Crystal A. Wilmott, denied said defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against defendant Mark C. McCormick and directed that a jury assess the amount of damages.

Defendant Mark C. McCormick was operating a 1987 Dodge pickup truck owned by his sister, defendant Crystal A. Wilmott (hereinafter, with McCormick, collectively referred to as defendants) when it left the traveled portion of the road and struck plaintiff's parked and unoccupied 1988 Isuzu Trooper II. McCormick was arrested at the accident scene for driving while intoxicated and subsequently pleaded guilty to driving while ability impaired. The arrest report indicated that McCormick registered .12% on the Alco-Sensor test and .11% on the breathalyzer test. Plaintiff commenced this action seeking compensatory and punitive damages. After joinder of issue, plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and defendants cross-moved for partial summary judgment dismissing the punitive damages claim. Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion and denied the cross motion as to McCormick and granted it as to Wilmott. Defendants now appeal.

Initially, we reject defendants' contention that there are triable issues of fact regarding liability. Defendants opposed the motion, contending that McCormick had been confronted with an emergency situation when his vehicle had been cut off by a "small white vehicle", causing him to lose control and to strike plaintiff's vehicle. In our view, McCormick's affidavit is vague, conclusory, contradicted by documentary evidence in the record and falls far short of defendants' duty to raise a factual issue (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718) as to whether McCormick was "faced with a sudden condition, which could not have been reasonably anticipated" (1 NY PJI 2:14, at 83 [2d ed] [1989 supp]; see, McAllister v. Adam Packing Corp., 66 A.D.2d 975, 976, 412 N.Y.S.2d 50). Furthermore, it is settled law that the emergency doctrine has no application where, as here, the party seeking to invoke it has created or contributed to the emergency (see, Martin v. Alabama 84 Truck Rental, 47 N.Y.2d 721, 417 N.Y.S.2d 56, 390 N.E.2d 774; Shorr v. Cohen Bros. Realty & Constr. Corp., 81 A.D.2d 501, 503, 437 N.Y.S.2d 333). Thus, Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

Next, we turn to the issues surrounding plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff's contention in this regard, that McCormick's involvement in a property damage accident at a time when he had a blood alcohol level of .11% justifies an award of punitive damages, poses the legal question of whether evidence that a defendant was driving while intoxicated at the time of an automobile accident is alone sufficient to raise a jury question of punitive damages. For the reasons that follow, we answer the question in the negative.

The nature of the conduct which will justify an award of punitive damages has been variously described but, essentially, it is conduct "having a high degree of moral culpability" (Home Ins. Co. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 196, 203, 551 N.Y.S.2d 481, 550 N.E.2d 930), or activated by an evil and reprehensible motive (Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 179 N.E.2d 497) which manifests a "conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard" (Welch v. Mr. Christmas, 57 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 454 N.Y.S.2d 971, 440 N.E.2d 1317). Such conduct may consist of actions which constitute willful or wanton negligence or recklessness but need not be intentionally harmful (Home Ins. Co. v....