Swift & Co. v. Doe

• Decision Date: 08 July 1958
• Docket Number: No. 30118,30118
• Citation: 315 S.W.2d 465
• Parties: 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2681, 35 Lab.Cas. P 71,679 SWIFT & COMPANY, a Corporation, and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporation (Intervenor), (Plaintiffs) Respondents, v. John DOE et al. (Whose Names Are Otherwise Unknown to Plaintiff); Nicholas M. Blassie et al., (Defendants) Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 465

315 S.W.2d 465

42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2681, 35 Lab.Cas. P 71,679

SWIFT & COMPANY, a Corporation, and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporation (Intervenor) (Plaintiffs) Respondents, v. John DOE et al. (Whose Names Are Otherwise Unknown to Plaintiff); Nicholas M. Blassie et al (Defendants) Appellants.

No. 30118.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

July 8, 1958.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

Sept. 3, 1958.

Norman W. Armbruster, Harry H. Craig, St. Louis, Wiley, Craig, Armbruster, Schmidt & Wilburn, St. Louis, of counsel, for appellants.

G. Carroll Stribling, Harold A. Thomas, Jr., Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling, St. Louis, for Swift & Company.

Harold L. Harvey, St. Louis, for Missouri Pacific R. Co.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis granting a permanent injunction against picketing. This appeal, originally taken to the Supreme Court, was transferred to this court for decision. The transfer opinion, Swift & Company v. Doe, Mo.Sup., 311 S.W.2d 15, clearly and succinctly states the factual background, pleadings, evidence, issues determined below and those preserved for review and briefed on appeal. Entirely sufficient for our purposes, we refer to, adopt and need not repeat here the first fifteen paragraphs of the transfer opinion written by Commissioner Holman, 311 S.W.2d loc. cit. 17, 18, 19 and 20.

Appellants-defendants' first contention is that the trial court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The principal question is whether peaceful, orderly stranger picketing of the premises of an employer engaged in interstate commerce, the object of which is to force, coerce and intimidate unorganized employees to join a union or to force, coerce and intimidate the employer, by economic pressure, to force, coerce and intimidate the employees to join a union, is an unfair labor practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, withdrawn under the doctrine of pre-emption from the orbit of state control, or whether such picketing is outside the field of federal pre-emption and therefore subject to regulation by a state equity court under state law. Related questions are (1) the effect of the dismissal of charges filed by Swift with NLRB; (2) the right of Missouri Pacific to resort to the state circuit court for injunctive relief.

Laws of the Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States 'shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' U.S. Constitution, Article VI. In the field of Federal-State relations we are bound by and must follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Under the controlling decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and of Missouri the state circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction upon the petition of Swift. Congress, intending to reach to the full extent of its power under the Commerce Clause, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601, has pre-empted the filed in labor relations matters affecting interstate commerce and has vested exclusive jurisdiction in NLRB to determine labor disputes involving unfair labor practices which are either protected or prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, AFL, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546; Graybar Elec. Co. v. Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Industries Emp. Union, Local 618, 365 Mo. 753, 287 S.W.2d 794; Swope v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., Mo.Sup., 303 S.W.2d 35; Jack Cooper Transport Co. v. Stufflebeam, 365 Mo. 250, 280 S.W.2d 832.

In Weber, supra, the court said, 348 U.S. loc. cit. 481, 75 S.Ct. loc. cit. 488:

'* * * where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance.'

Swift's petition specifically alleged that defendants' acts constituted unlawful picketing in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. Unfair labor practices reasonably bringing the controversy within the provisions of the Act were charged. Garner; Graybar. Defendants' answer denied these charges. This presented an issue within the legislative scope of the Taft-Hartley Act and it follows that the state circuit court was obliged to decline jurisdiction in deference to NLRB, Garner; Weber; Stufflebeam; Swope, notwithstanding the same acts are unlawful under state policy. ¹

What is the effect of the refusal of the federal administrators to issue a complaint? The specific conduct relied upon as the basis of the charge of an 8(b)(1)(A) ² and 8(b)(2) ² violation was that of 'Picketing and threatening to picket * * * for the purpose of thereby inflicting such severe economic pressure on said employer through disruption of transportation service, spoilage of product in inventory, and loss of business that such employer will thereby be forced to compel or influence its city salesmen to join the said union which said action on the part of the employer would be in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, * * *.' The charge did not contain the additional allegation made in the petition in the state circuit court, that the purpose of the picketing was to directly force and influence Swift's city salesmen to join the union. The Regional Director, after carefully investigating and considering the case, refused to file a complaint and dismissed the charges, considering that further proceedings were not warranted 'inasmuch as the charge alleges activities that do not fall within the scope of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2).' On appeal the General Counsel sustained the ruling of the Regional Director and 'concluded that both the legislative history of the Act and decisional precedent determine that * * * the peaceful picketing * * * (was) not violative of the Act' and that further proceedings were not warranted. We construe the ruling of the General Counsel to be a final determination that the facts charged did not constitute a violation of the Act * * * that the complaint did not state a case under the Act * * * and not (as the union would have us say) that by his ruling the General Counsel or NLRB 'sanctioned the picketing,' or (as Swift would have us say) that the ruling meant that NLRB had no jurisdiction under the Act, thereby destroying the entire basis for the application of the doctrine of pre-emption and leaving the state circuit court free to exercise its traditional jurisdiction. The ruling of the General Counsel was not a renunciation, disavowal or abnegation of jurisdiction of NLRB to entertain the proceeding if a proper complaint had been filed. It was an exercise of jurisdiction by the officer who is vested with final authority ³ on behalf of NLRB in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints, whereby he determined that the particular charges did not violate the Act. It was the construction of a statute, involving an exercise of judgment. No appeal from such a ruling by the General Counsel is provided for in the Act, ⁴ and his ruling, right or wrong, was final and terminated the proceeding. In Graybar the refusal of the General Counsel to issue a complaint, following an investigation of the charges, on the ground that there was 'insufficient evidence to warrant further proceedings' was held to constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by NLRB and a disposition of the case on the merits, and his dismissal of the charges was held not to revest jurisdiction in the state circuit court. Here the ruling of the General Counsel constituted an exercise of jurisdiction, and his dismissal of the charges did not revest jurisdiction in the state court. Graybar; Swope; Guss; Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 427, A.F.L. v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 77 S.Ct. 604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 77 S.Ct. 607, 1 L.Ed.2d 618, and Retail Clerks Local No. 1564 (AFL) v. Your Food Stores of Santa Fe, 10 Cir., 225 F.2d 659. In the absence of a cession of jurisdiction under Sec. 10(a) ⁵ of the Act [absent here and impossible since Missouri has no labor 'agency' as contemplated by Sec. 10(a)] the state circuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition of Swift.

The opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Guss, Fairlawn and Garmon, handed down after the entry of the judgment from which this appeal is taken, indicate that by vesting in NLRB jurisdiction over labor relations in cases affecting interstate commerce Congress has so completely displaced state power to deal with such relations that even in cases where NLRB has declined to proceed (for policy or 'other' reaso...