Swinney v. Jones

• Citation: 199 P.3d 512,2008 WY 150
• Decision Date: 17 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. S-07-0176.,S-07-0176.
• Parties: Roger SWINNEY, Carol Swinney, Ra Swinney, LLP, A Colorado Entity, and CE Swinney, LLC, A Wyoming Entity, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. James E. JONES, III, Lynne A. Lovelace, Laurel Miller Lunstrum, Cathleen A. Jones, Hilltop National Bank as Trustee, R.M. Whalen MD, PC PSP Trust, Aurla J. Welo, Anthony G. Ingram and Robert P. Ingram, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

199 P.3d 512

2008 WY 150

Roger SWINNEY, Carol Swinney, Ra Swinney, LLP, A Colorado Entity, and CE Swinney, LLC, A Wyoming Entity, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. James E. JONES, III, Lynne A. Lovelace, Laurel Miller Lunstrum, Cathleen A. Jones, Hilltop National Bank as Trustee, R.M. Whalen MD, PC PSP Trust, Aurla J. Welo, Anthony G. Ingram and Robert P. Ingram, Appellees (Defendants).

No. S-07-0176.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

December 17, 2008.

Representing Appellants: John H. Robinson, Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees, James E. Jones, III, Lynne A. Lovelace, Laurel Miller Lunstrum, Cathleen A. Jones and Aurla J. Welo: Kendal Royce Hoopes, Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; Peter C. Nicolaysen, Nicolaysen & Wilking, PC, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees, Anthony G. Ingram and Robert P. Ingram: Douglas R. McLaughlin, Casper, Wyoming; Mary Bell Guthrie, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee, Hilltop National Bank as Trustee, R.M. Whalen MD, PC PSP Trust: Stuart R. Day, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming; Argument for all Appellees by Mr. Day.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

BURKE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellants (Sellers) filed suit against Appellees (Buyers) alleging breach of a real estate sales contract. In response, Buyers sought dismissal and judgment on the pleadings asserting that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions. Sellers appeal, contending that the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Buyers from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] Did the district court err in determining that Sellers' claims are barred by the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007)?

FACTS

[¶ 3] On April 7, 1992, Elaine Erganbright entered into a contract for the sale of real estate to James Jones and Robert Ingram. In that contract, Ms. Erganbright agreed to convey a portion of the land she owned. She retained ownership to a contiguous parcel of real estate. As part of the agreement, easements were to be provided by Buyers to Sellers.¹ With regard to the easements, the agreement stated:

Purchaser shall provide to Seller the following:

A. Purchaser agrees to allow Seller an 80 foot roadway and utility easement within 225 feet of the northwest and abutting the northern side of the Ardon Addition from Country Club Road to the East boundary of Section 13, T33N, R79W of the 6th PM, Natrona County, Wyoming. The exact location of the easement shall be determined at the time of platting of the said lands. Easement shall be basically a straight roadway with exact location provided to Seller within 12 months of the closing date.

B. The Purchaser further agrees to existing and required utility easements along the north and south side of Country Club Road from the center line of Wyoming Blvd. to [Seller's] property.

C. Purchaser agrees to right of ingress and egress easement across Purchaser's property to the Seller's existing ranch roadway which is in the SW¼ SW¼ Section 13, T33N, R79W of the 6th PM[,] Natrona County, Wyoming.

D. Purchaser shall also agree to provide to Seller utility easements that may become necessary along Wyoming Boulevard and the easterly boundary of said lands described in Exhibit "A". Said easements shall be large enough for utility and/or roadway construction and maintenance and of a size approved by the City of Casper.

E. All easements provided above shall transfer to assigns or heirs.

F. All locations and sizes of easements are subject to any laws, rules and regulations of the City of Casper or any other governmental agencies.

G. To the knowledge of Seller, Seller warrants at the time of closing that there are no existing written or unwritten agreements that will negatively affect the value of said parcels.

The sale closed on September 15, 1992, and title was transferred to Buyers at that time. No easements were conveyed by Buyers to Sellers at closing nor were any provided within twelve months of the closing date. Nearly fourteen years after the closing, on August 18, 2006, Sellers initiated this litigation by filing a complaint alleging that Buyers had breached the contract because they failed to convey the required easements. Buyers answered the complaint and asserted as an affirmative defense that the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Buyers also alleged that the easements were null and void pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141. Buyers then filed motions pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12² requesting dismissal of the complaint because it was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i).³ Buyers also relied upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141 and contended in their motions that the easements referenced in the agreement were of no force and effect because the specific descriptions of the easements were not recorded within one year of the agreement.

[¶ 4] In response, Sellers alleged that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented Buyers from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. They also filed a motion to amend the complaint seeking to allege additional facts supporting their contention that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied. In the complaint and the amended complaint, Sellers alleged that Buyers first breached the agreement when they sold a tract of land in 2001, and further breached the agreement when they platted a portion of the property in 2003 without reserving the required easements. They alleged that they first learned in 2005 that the sale and platting did not contain a reservation of easements. Upon discovering this fact, Sellers alleged that they asked Buyers to comply with their contractual obligations to convey the easements. In November 2005, Buyers conveyed several easements to Sellers but, according to Sellers, the easements did not meet the contractual requirements. Sellers also specifically alleged that "[o]n numerous occasions from 1992 until 2002, representatives of [Buyers] asked [Sellers] for more time to complete the platting and convey the easements," and that they "assured [Sellers] that the easements would be provided when platting and sale occurred."

[¶ 5] The district court held a motion hearing on May 7, 2007. The court ruled that the limitation period on Sellers' cause of action began to run on September 15, 1993, one year after the closing date of the original land sale. It also denied Sellers' motion to amend the complaint. The court reasoned that amending the complaint would be futile because, even assuming the truth of all of Sellers' allegations, the limitations period had elapsed prior to commencement of the suit in 2006. The court did not explicitly address Sellers' claim of equitable estoppel. Sellers timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6] We review motions to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(c) similarly. Our review is de novo, and we employ the same standards and examine the same materials as the district court. We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dismissal is appropriate only if it is certain on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that create entitlement to relief. Dowlin v. Dowlin, 2007 WY 114, ¶ 6, 162 P.3d 1202, 1204 (Wyo.2007); W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Ecosystem Res., L.C. v. Broadbent Land & Res., L.L.C., 2007 WY 87, ¶ 8, 158 P.3d 685, 687 (Wyo.2007); W.R.C.P. 12(c). See also 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 1368, at 238 (3d ed. 2004). When interpreting pleadings, we have said that they "must be liberally construed in order to do justice to the parties." Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1980). "The plaintiff need only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation so as to give fair notice of the claim to the defendant." Id. A dismissal based upon the statute of limitations is proper when the complaint clearly demonstrates that the action is barred. Simon v. Teton Bd. of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 200 (Wyo.2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 7] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-102 provides that "[c]ivil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter" unless a different limitation is prescribed by statute. The parties agree that the statute of limitations applicable to this case is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i), which provides a ten-year limitation period for actions based upon a written contract. We have explained the purpose of statutes of limitation as follows:

Statutes of limitation have existed in the jurisprudence of the United States and the State of Wyoming for some time. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.1979). "They are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim litigation and spare citizens from having to defend when memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable by death or disappearance and evidence is lost." Id. See also Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of Pub. Utilities, 2001 WY 6, ¶ 9, 17 P.3d 13, [16] (Wyo.2001). The very purpose of a statute of limitations is to require diligence and prevent parties from sleeping on their rights.

Nuhome Investments, LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, ¶ 11, 81 P.3d 940, 945 (Wyo.2003).

[¶ 8] In an action founded upon the breach of a written contract, the limitation period begins running when the breach occurs. It is at this time that the cause of action accrues. Richardson Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 802 (Wyo. 1991). The land sale closing occurred on September 15, 1992. The district court determined that the limitation period began, at the latest, one year later. In making that determination the district court relied upon the language of the contract and upon...