Sykes v. Lochmann

• Decision Date: 09 January 1943
• Docket Number: 35643.
• Citation: 132 P.2d 620,156 Kan. 223
• Parties: SYKES et al. v. LOCHMANN.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

132 P.2d 620

156 Kan. 223

SYKES et al. v. LOCHMANN.

No. 35643.

Supreme Court of Kansas

January 9, 1943

Rehearing Denied Feb. 1, 1943.

Syllabus by the Court.

The application of Fair Labor Standards Act depends upon the character of the employees' activities, and not the business of the employer. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1988 §§ 1-19, and §§ 3(b, i, j), 6(a), 7(a), 29 U.S.C.A.§§ 201-219 and §§ 203(b, i, j), 206(a), 207(a).

Evidence supported finding that employees of packing house were engaged in the "production of goods for commerce" within Fair Labor Standards Act, where it appeared that hides and offal were sold by employer to purchasers within state with knowledge that they were to be shipped to points outside state, and that the employees customarily performed different types of work each day including slaughtering, skinning, and dressing carcasses of animals and other activities about the packing plant. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 1-19, and §§ 3(b, i, j), 6(a), 7(a), 29 U.S. C.A. §§ 201-219 and §§ 203(b, i, j), 206 (a), 207(a).

An employer may not claim an exemption for any employee under subsection (c) of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act if employee during any part of the work for which exemption is claimed does any work which does not fall within scope of the exemption. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 7(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(c).

Administrative interpretations of Fair Labor Standards, though not binding on court, are highly significant. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. A. §§ 201-219.

The exemption extended by subsection (c) of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act from the provisions of subsection (a) of section 7, during periods of not more than 14 work weeks in the aggregate in any calendar year, to employers engaged in handling, slaughtering, or dressing livestock, could not be claimed by such an employer, where it appeared that employees devoted only a part of their time to the handling slaughtering and dressing livestock, and that a part of their time was devoted to non-exempt activities. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219.

The section of Fair Labor Standards Act providing that the court shall in addition to any judgment awarded plaintiffs allow a reasonable attorney's fees contemplates that an employee shall receive full amount of any award made to him, and any contract that would allow an attorney any part of the award made to any employee would be void. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).

Where total amount of judgment awarded in favor of employees under Fair Labor Standards Act was $4,938.36, trial court did not abuse its discretion in rendering an additional judgment against employer for attorneys' fees in the sum of $2,000. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 16(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).

In an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 1-19 29 U.S.C. A. §§ 201-219, to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages and attorneys fees, the record is examined and held: (a) The application of the Act depends upon the character of the employees' activities; (b) the plaintiffs were engaged in the production of goods for commerce and are within the protection of the Act; (c) the 14-week exemptions from the hour provisions of the Act for seasonal operations have no application to the plaintiffs, and (d) there was no abuse of sound discretion on the part of the trial court in the allowance of attorneys' fees.

Appeal from District Court, Sedgwick County, Division No. 1; Ross McCormick, Judge.

Fred Hinkle, of Wichita, for appellant.

Roy L. Rogers and Clifford H. Pugh, both of Wichita (Joe T. Rogers, of Wichita, on the brief), for appellees.

ALLEN Justice.

This was an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages and attorneys fees. As authorized by the act plaintiff brought the action in his own behalf and on behalf of certain other employees similarly situated. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

The defendant Fred Lochmann is the owner and operator of a packing plant in Wichita known as the Sunflower Sausage and Packing Company. The cattle and hogs slaughtered at the packing plant were purchased by defendant at the union stock yards in Wichita. All the cattle and hogs were slaughtered in defendant's plant, and the edible portions of the animals were sold as meat products in the state of Kansas.

The hides of the cattle were sold to the Reed Hide Company of Wichita. The latter company sold and shipped the hides to a tannery in St. Louis, Missouri. The offal and bones were sold to the Wichita Desiccating Company, and after processing in the plant of that company the finished product was shipped to points outside the state of Kansas.

The plaintiff and the other employees customarily performed different types of work each day including the slaughtering, skinning and dressing the carcasses of the animals, separation of the bones and meat, removal of the hides and offal and other activities about the packing plant.

From the hides and offal defendant realized approximately the sum of $12,000 each year.

The plaintiff, Sykes, and the various employees on whose behalf the action was brought, are referred to as the plaintiffs. The petition set forth the pertinent facts as to the employment of the various plaintiffs, and asked judgment for the unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages and attorneys fees alleged to be due plaintiffs under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The answer of defendant contained a general denial, a specific denial that defendant during the time alleged in the petition was engaged in interstate commerce or producing goods for interstate commerce within the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, and a specific denial that defendant was indebted to the plaintiffs in any sum whatsoever.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict and defendant appeals.

The trial court made findings of fact to which reference will be made.

1. It is contended defendant was not engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, and that defendant's activities were not within the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219.

Section 6(a) of the Act provides: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages ***." 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a).

Section 7(a) of the Act provides: "No employer shall, except as otherwise provided ***, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, ***." 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a).

The Act defines "commerce", "goods" and "produced" as used in Section 6(a) and 7(a) above quoted, as follows:

"Sec. 3. *** (b) 'Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof." 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(b).

"Sec. 3. *** (i) 'Goods' means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof." 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(i).

"Sec. 3. *** (j) 'Produced' means produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on in any State; and for the purposes of this chapter an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the production thereof, in any State." 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(j).

Under the plain language of the statute and under the controlling decisions, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638; Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 63 S.Ct. 125, 87 L.Ed. --, the application of the act depends upon the character of the employees' activities.

The hides and offal were not only "goods" but were "produced" within the meaning of those terms as defined in the act.

In the Kirschbaum case the act was held applicable to maintenance employees of the operator of a loft building whose tenants were engaged in the production of goods for commerce. The employees were engineers, firemen, elevator operators, electricians, watchman, porters and carpenters. The court held that since the production could not proceed without the services of such maintenance employees they were engaged "in any process or occupation necessary to the production ***."

In the Warren-Bradshaw case the employees were members of a rotary drilling crew and worked on wells in Texas--the employer was not the owner or lessee of any of the land upon which the wells were drilled and had no interest in the oil produced. As the employer could anticipate at the time of the drilling that the oil produced from the wells would move into other states, the Act was held to extend to such employer.

Under these decisions the "necessary to production" requirement may be satisfied even where the employees do not physically come in contact with the goods produced.

Were the plaintiffs, employees of defendant, engaged in commerce within the meaning of the provisions of the Act? We turn to the findings of the trial...