Sylvain v. Masonite Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 February 1984
• Citation: 471 A.2d 1039
• Parties: Guy SYLVAIN and Colette Sylvain, et al. v. MASONITE CORPORATION.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1039

471 A.2d 1039

Guy SYLVAIN and Colette Sylvain, et al. v. MASONITE CORPORATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 10, 1984.

Decided Feb. 23, 1984.

Rudolph T. Pelletier (orally), Madawaska, for plaintiffs.

Stevens, Engels, Bishop & Sprague, Albert M. Stevens, Richard C. Engels (orally), Presque Isle, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.

SCOLNIK, Justice.

In a jury trial in Superior Court, Aroostook County, the plaintiffs recovered general verdicts against the Masonite Corporation (Masonite) for damages resulting from the purchase of hardboard siding. On appeal, Masonite argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts against it. We disagree and affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs in this action are seven married couples from Fort Kent who purchased and installed on their respective residences hardboard siding manufactured and sold by Masonite. Within a short time of installation, days in one case, weeks in several other cases, and months in the remainder of cases, the plaintiffs experienced difficulties with the siding. Some of it stained and later warped, buckled, and swelled. With the passage of time, many of the problem boards developed rot, delaminated at the lower edges, swelled over the nailheads, and became unsightly in appearance. The degree of these symptoms varied from home to home and from season to season. Masonite denied liability, and the plaintiffs subsequently instituted this action.

In an eight day trial, the jury was presented with several theories of liability--breach of implied warranty of merchantability, strict liability, and negligent failure to warn that the siding was dangerous. A general verdict was returned in favor of all the plaintiffs.

On appeal, Masonite maintains that there was no evidence that a defect existed in the siding at the time it left Masonite's control. Thus, it argues, the evidence was insufficient to support any of the plaintiffs' theories. It further asserts that there was no evidence of bodily injury or damage to property other than the Masonite siding to support the strict liability theory, 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 (1980), and that there was no evidence of bodily injury to support the failure to warn of a dangerous chattel theory, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965).

Because neither party requested special verdicts under M.R.Civ.P. 49(a) or a general verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories under M.R.Civ.P. 49(b), we are unable to ascertain upon which count or counts the jury based its verdicts. We must therefore sustain the general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support any of the alternative theories of recovery submitted to the jury. Depositors Trust Co. v. Farm Family Life Insurance Co., 445 A.2d 1014 (Me.1982); London v. Smart, 127 Me. 377, 143 A. 466 (1928). Since we find the evidence sufficient to support the breach of implied warranty of merchantability theory, we affirm the judgments.

11 M.R.S.A. § 2-314 (1964) sets forth six minimal quality standards of merchantability:

(2) Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as

(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and

(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and

(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and

(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and

(e) Are adequately contained,...