Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani
| Citation | 176 Wis.2d 365,500 N.W.2d 391 |
| Decision Date | 02 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-0089,92-0089 |
| Parties | Tracy SZARZYNSKI and Cindy Belanger, Plaintiffs-Joint-Appellants, v. YMCA, CAMP MINIKANI, d Defendant-Respondent, ABC Insurance Company and DEF Insurance Company, Defendants, Manpower Temporary Services and Harnishfeger Corporation, Defendants-Joint-Appellants. . Oral Argument |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Wisconsin |
Before WEDEMEYER, P.J., and SULLIVAN and FINE, JJ.
This is an action to recover compensation for personal injuries suffered by Tracy Szarzynski who, when she was approximately twelve years old, was injured while attending Camp Minikani, a recreational facility owned and operated by the defendant YMCA. Cindy Belanger, Szarzynski's mother, paid $362 for Szarzynski to spend 14 days at the camp. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the YMCA is a "nonprofit organization," as that term is used by section 895.52, Stats., and, accordingly, was immune from suit. We conclude that, so applied, section 895.52 violates the equal-protection clauses of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions. We reverse.
Section 895.52, Stats., grants broad immunity to those who permit the recreational use of their property by the public. It provides, as material to this lawsuit:
Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, employe [sic ] or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner's property to engage in a recreational activity:
1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational activities.
2. A duty to inspect the property, except as provided under s. 23.115(2). 1
3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or activity on the property.
Section 895.52(2)(a), Stats. The exceptions in subsections (3) to (6) vary the scope of the immunity depending on who owns the property:
There is no immunity for injuries suffered on state-owned property if:
the injuries occur at an event to which "the owner charges an admission fee for spectators," or
the injury was caused by either a "malicious act or by a malicious failure to warn" of a known unsafe condition on land designated "for a recreational activity."
There is no immunity for injuries suffered on property owned by "a governmental body other than this state" if:
the injuries occur at an event to which "the owner charges an admission fee for spectators," or
the injury was caused by either a "malicious act or by a malicious failure to warn" of a known unsafe condition on land designated "for recreational activities."
There is no immunity for injuries suffered on recreational property owned by a "private property owner" if:
the "owner collects money, goods or services in payment for use of the owner's property for the recreational activity during which the injury occurs" if the total value received by the owner for the recreational use of the property "during the year in which the injury occurs exceeds $2,000"; 2the injury was caused by either a "malicious act" or by "a malicious failure to warn" of a known unsafe condition;
the injury is to an invited social guest, and the injury occurs on platted land, residential property, or property within 300 feet of a structure on land that is classified either as "mercantile or manufacturing under s. 70.32(2)(b)2 or 3";
the injury is to the owner's employee "acting within the scope of his or her duties."
There is no immunity for injuries suffered on property owned by a "nonprofit organization" if:
the injury was caused by either a "malicious act" or by "a malicious failure to warn" of a known unsafe condition.
Section 895.52(5), Stats. Under the statute, a "nonprofit organization" is "an organization or association not organized or conducted for pecuniary profit." Section 895.52(1)(c), Stats. A "private property owner" is "any owner other than a governmental body or nonprofit organization." Section 895.52(1)(e), Stats.
Szarzynski advances three arguments to support her contention that we should permit her suit against the YMCA to proceed. First, she contends that the statute's definition of "nonprofit organization" is ambiguous and that a construction of the statute consistent with the legislature's intent would exclude organizations like the YMCA, which may not be organized for pecuniary profit but do "profit" because their revenues exceed their expenditures. Second, she submits that implementation of the statute denies her of property in violation of what she maintains is a substantive right to due process. Third, she argues that the statute's classification scheme denies her equal protection of the law. As noted, we agree with this last contention. Accordingly, we do not discuss the first two issues. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) ().
Equal protection of the law is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 3
Although no precise formula has been developed, the [United States Supreme] Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). In an attempt to add some precision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has identified five factors relevant to the equal-protection analysis:
(1) All classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof.
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation.
State ex rel. Baer v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis.2d 624, 633, 148 N.W.2d 21, 25-26 (1967) (). Although disputed by the YMCA, the law is clear in this state that each of these criteria "must be satisfied to sustain a legislative classification against an equal-protection attack." Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis.2d 59, 63, 435 N.W.2d 244, 246 (1989); see also Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 388, 225 N.W.2d 454, 458 (1975) ("This court has long required that any legislative classification must satisfy [the] five criteria" set out above. 4 Thus, although " 'legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,' " Funk, 148 Wis.2d at 69, 435 N.W.2d at 248 (citation omitted), section 895.52, Stats., falters on the second of the five factors--the requirement that the classification be "germane" to the law's purpose.
In enacting sec. 895.52, Stats., the legislature announced its intent:
The legislature intends by this act to limit the liability of property owners toward others who use their property for recreational activities under circumstances in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit.
1983 Wis.Act 418 sec. 1. This supplements the general purpose of section 895.52 and its predecessors to encourage owners of recreational property to open their land to the public. See Copeland v. Larson, 46 Wis.2d 337, 344, 174 N.W.2d 745, 749 (1970) ( predecessor statute). Thus, section 895.52 is to "be liberally construed in favor of property owners to protect them from liability." 1983 Wis.Act 418 sec. 1. The grant of immunity to entities "not organized or conducted for pecuniary profit," see sec. 895.52(1)(c), Stats. (emphasis added), is not germane to these goals.
"Profit" in the law is not the same as "benefit." The legislature has directed that when courts construe legislative language, words "that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such meaning." Section 990.01(1), Stats. "Profit," as used in the law, means:
Most commonly, the gross proceeds of a business transaction less the costs of the transaction; i.e., net proceeds. Excess of revenues over expenses for a transaction; sometimes used synonymously with net income for the period. Gain realized from business or investment over and above expenditures.
Black's Law Dictionary 1211 (6th ed. 1990). A "benefit," on the other hand, may, but need not be, "profit." Thus, Black's defines "benefit" as encompassing the concepts of "[a]dvantage; profit; fruit; privilege; gain; interest," and notes that "[b]enefits are something to advantage of, or profit to, recipient." Id. at 158. The concept of "benefit" is, therefore, more broad than is the concept of "profit," and section 895.52's classification based on whether an entity is "organized or conducted for pecuniary profit" is, accordingly, inconsistent with legislature's expressed intent. Stated another way, an entity may "derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit," 1983 Wis.Act 418 sec. 1, from the recreational use of its property even though it is "an organization or association not organized or conducted for pecuniary profit," section 895.52(1)(c), Stats. The record here is a forceful example.
The YMCA is a nonprofit organization. It is not, however, impecunious. At the end of 1988 its net worth exceeded $28 million. Indeed, in 1990 the YMCA's total revenue was more than $14 million, and it had a surplus (revenues over expenditures) of $110,041. More...
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Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani
...E. Doyle, Atty. Gen. GESKE, Justice. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani, 176 Wis.2d 365, 500 N.W.2d 391 (Ct.App.1993), reversing a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, Circuit Judge. The cir......