E.T. Chapin Co. v. Scott

• Decision Date: 27 July 1927
• Docket Number: 4828
• Citation: 260 P. 172,44 Idaho 566
• Parties: E. T. CHAPIN COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Surety, Appellants, v. JOHN W. SCOTT, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

260 P. 172

44 Idaho 566

E. T. CHAPIN COMPANY, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Surety, Appellants, v. JOHN W. SCOTT, Respondent

No. 4828

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 27, 1927

MASTER AND SERVANT-COMPENSATION CASE-QUESTION OF LAW-"INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS"-EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-RECOVERY FOR INJURY PRECLUDED.

1. On appeal in workmen's compensation case, application of law to undisputed facts raises a question of law, and not of fact.

2. Person contracting to load lumber on cars at so much per running foot, and to furnish his own equipment and be responsible for demurrage thereon, and his partner, under C S., sec.

5819 were "independent contractors," and not employees precluding recovery, under the Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1917, chap. 81), to such partner for injuries received by him while loading poles.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, for Clearwater County. Hon. Edgar C. Steele, Judge.

Action for compensation. Judgment for respondent. Reversed.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions. Costs awarded to appellants. Petition for rehearing denied.

H. M. Morey, A. M. Waters, Graves, Kizer & Graves and Tannahill & Leeper, for Appellants.

The district court was without authority or jurisdiction to make any findings of fact whatever. (C. S., sec. 6270; Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Idaho 361, 228 P. 227; Johnston v. A. C. White Lumber Co., 37 Idaho 617, 217 P. 979.)

The jurisdiction of the district court in appeals of this character is limited solely to consideration of questions of law according to the facts as found by the Industrial Accident Board. (C. S., sec. 6270; Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, supra; Johnston v. A. C. White Lumber Co., supra.)

The burden is and always has been upon John W. Scott to prove that he was an employee of the Chapin Company and he has not sustained that burden. (Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 807, 159 P. 721.)

The court cannot take into consideration the question of whether Scott was an employee of Robert Lamont; the only question in issue is whether Scott was an employee of the Chapin Company. (C. S., sec. 6287a.) Scott was a partner with Lamont in so far as the performance of the work in question was concerned. (30 Cyc. 349; C. S., sec. 5818; State v. Cosgrove, 36 Idaho 278, 210 P. 393.)

Scott and Lamont were independent contractors in so far as the performance of the work in question was concerned. (Daly v. Blount Lumber Co., 213 A.D. 486, 210 N.Y.S. 814; Beach v. Velzey, 238 N.Y. 100, 143 N.E. 805; Southern Const. Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 112 Okla. 248, 240 P. 613; Diamond Block Co. v. Sparks, 209 Ky. 73, 272 S.W. 31; Dean v. Johnson, 214 N.Y.S. 448; Wagoner v. Davis Const. Co., 112 Okla. 231, 240 P. 618; Producers Lumber Co. v. Butler, 87 Okla. 172, 209 P. 738.)

Smith & Smith and A. H. Oversmith, for Respondent.

Findings of fact are not necessary where the facts have been agreed upon or admitted by the pleadings, but the making of such findings of fact by the Industrial Accident Board or by the district court does not constitute reversible error. (Edmundson v. Taylor, 17 Idaho 618, 106 P. 991; Fouch v. Bates, 18 Idaho 374, 110 P. 265; Basinger v. Taylor, 36 Idaho 591, 211 P. 1085.)

Where the facts are admitted or are not in dispute, only a legal question arises as to how these facts should be applied. (Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Idaho 361, 228 P. 227; Kaylor v. Callahan Zinc Lead Co., 43 Idaho 477, 253 P. 333; Johnston v. White Lumber Co., 37 Idaho 617, 217 P. 979; Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 253 P. 1104.)

The general purpose of the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act is to withdraw all phases of disputes between the employer and the employee from private controversy, and to insure speedy and certain relief to injured workmen, and the law should be liberally interpreted and construed so as to affect its general purpose. (C. S., secs. 6214, 6334; McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, 203 P. 1068; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 177 Cal. 614, 171 P. 429, L. R. A. 1918F, 856.)

The doctrine of an independent contractor has no application under the Idaho Compensation Act. (Fisk v. Bonner Tie Co., 40 Idaho 304, 232 P. 569; McDowell v. Duer, 78 Ind.App. 440, 133 N.E. 839; Kirkpatrick v. Industrial Accident Com., 31 Cal.App. 668, 161 P. 274.)

The words "employer," "workman" and "employee" are defined by statute. Under the Idaho statute and similar statutes courts have held that workmen are entitled to compensation under facts similar to the case at bar. (C. S., secs. 6320, 6321; Fisk v. Bonner Tie Co., supra; O'Boyle v. Parker-Young Co., 95 Vt. 58, 112 A. 385; McDowell v. Duer, supra.)

Whenever an employer possesses the right of terminating the contract of employment or discharging an employee, there is a strong presumption that the person employed is not an independent contractor. (Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 152 F. 681, 82 C. C. A. 29; Arizona Hercules Copper Co. v. Crenshaw, 21 Ariz. 15, 184 P. 996; Good v. Johnson, 38 Colo. 440, 88 P. 439, 8 L. R. A., N. S., 896; Knicely v. West Virginia Midland Ry. Co., 64 W.Va. 278, 61 S.E. 811, 17 L. R. A., N. S., 370; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 10 S.Ct. 175, 33 L.Ed. 440.)

GIVENS, J. Budge, Taylor and T. Bailey Lee, JJ., concur. Wm. E. Lee, C. J., dissents.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.--

Respondent, claiming to have been an employee of appellant E. T. Chapin Company, seeks compensation for injuries; appellants resist on the ground that respondent was an independent contractor.

The application of the law to undisputed facts raises a question of law not of fact. (Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Idaho 361, 228 P. 227.) In this case the facts were stipulated and there was no dispute though possibly different inferences could be drawn. If these inferences were correct findings of fact supported by sufficient evidence the commission's action thereon would be final, if legal conclusions, questions of law are presented for this court. The commission found in favor of appellants; the district court, on appeal, found in favor of respondent.

The material facts as stipulated were as follows E. T. Chapin Company, a corporation, one of appellants, the other being such company's surety under the Employers' Liability Act, purchased certain poles from the White Pine Lumber Company, a corporation, at Orofino, Idaho, to be delivered to Chapin Company at Orofino and by it loaded on cars, for which purpose Bob Lamont was engaged by Chapin Company at so much per running foot graduated according to different length poles. Claimant Scott became Lamont's partner in such loading operation, performing an equal share of the labor, paying half of the expenses and receiving an equal division of the profits. (C. S., sec. 5819; 30 Cyc. 349.) While loading poles his leg was severely injured. Under the agreement between Chapin Company and Lamont, Lamont was to furnish his own equipment, though in fact he used the company's but without the company's knowledge. Chapin Company sent the orders as to the particular size of poles to be loaded at any one time, bills of lading, etc., to the White Pine Lumber Company, which in turn ordered the necessary cars and notified Lamont when the cars were received and what kind of poles were to be loaded. Lamont was to be responsible for demurrage. Lamont hired the Orofino Transfer Company to assist and paid it, Chapin Company being in no way responsible therefor. All checks were made to Lamont and Scott's name did not appear in the files of Chapin Company. It was further stipulated that Chapin Company handled so-called "gypo" contracts in other places as follows: The men were placed on its own pay-rolls and were paid direct, and insurance was carried on them; such employees were also under the company's supervision and directed in their work by the company's foreman and the company reserved the right to discharge such workmen, and the work was done in accordance with the ideas and directions of such foreman the same as in this case except that here there was no supervision and no foreman. It was further stipulated that $ 135 compensation was paid under a misapprehension of claimant's status. With...