T.S. v. County of Cook, Illinois

• Decision Date: 26 October 2021
• Docket Number: 16 C 8303
• Citation: 568 F.Supp.3d 940
• Parties: T.S., Q.B., and H.C., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, and Leonard Dixon, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

568 F.Supp.3d 940

T.S., Q.B., and H.C., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.The COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, and Leonard Dixon, Defendants.

No. 16 C 8303

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed October 26, 2021

Adam J. Pessin, Pro Hac Vice, Fine, Kaplan and Black, RPC, Philadelphia, PA, Stephen H. Weil, Jonathan I. Loevy, Mariah Esperanza Garcia, Michael I. Kanovitz, Sarah Copeland Grady, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff A Minor.

Danielle Mikhail, Francis J. Catania, Marissa D. Longoria, Cook County State's Attorney Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant The County of Cook, Illinois.

Francis J. Catania, Lyle Kevin Henretty, Patrick Daniel Morris, Cook County State's Attorney Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Leonard Dixon.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs T.S., Q.B., and H.C. were pretrial detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center ("JTDC") in 2015. During three short intervals that summer, Twentieth Century Fox and other Fox entities (collectively, "Fox Defendants") filmed scenes for the television show Empire at the JTDC. Plaintiffs allege that Empire filming disrupted the normal operations of the JTDC in ways that harmed them and other juvenile detainees. Of relevance here, they further argue that Defendant Leonard Dixon, the Superintendent of the JTDC, and Cook County, Illinois (collectively, "County Defendants"), owed them a fiduciary duty and breached it by permitting the filming. The court previously granted the Fox Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on state law claims against them. T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television , 548 F.Supp.3d 749, 786 – 91 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2021). The court also granted in part and denied in part the County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Id. at 777 - 87, 791-92. The County Defendants have now moved for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). For the reasons below, the motion [435] is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The court presumes familiarity with the facts of this case, which are described in detail in the court's summary judgment opinion. See T.S. v. Twentieth Century Fox Television , 548 F.Supp.3d 749, 763 – 73 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2021) (hereinafter the "June 10, 2021 order"). That order granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dixon on all claims against him except one: that he breached a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs.¹ Id. at 781-82. As a matter of first impression, the court held that detention center officials like Defendant Dixon owe juvenile detainees in their care a fiduciary duty, similar to that of a guardian-ward relationship. Id. at 778-80 (citing Parks v. Kownacki , 305 Ill. App. 3d 449, 461, 238 Ill.Dec. 547, 711 N.E.2d 1208, 1216 (5th Dist. 1999) (holding that a priest owed a fiduciary duty to a teenaged girl who lived with him in the church rectory, where the priest "exercise[d] all the control over her that a legal guardian would be allowed to exercise")).² In turn, a reasonable jury could find that Dixon breached his fiduciary duty by altering the operations of the JTDC in ways that harmed Plaintiffs and other juvenile detainees. Id. at 780 - 82. For example, a jury could find that spending more time on their pods due to filming worsened the psychological impact of detention. Id. at 780 - 81. Overcrowding in pods to accommodate filming also may have caused detainees to feel less safe. Id.

The court then concluded that Defendant Dixon was not entitled to sovereign immunity, at least at summary judgment. Id. at 782-83. Under Illinois law, the State of Illinois is generally immune from suit, but the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear certain claims against the State, including tort suits for damages. See Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 5/1 ; Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/8(d). "The determination of whether an action is in fact a suit against the State turns upon an analysis of the issues involved and the relief sought, rather than the formal designation of the parties. An action brought nominally against a State employee in his individual capacity will be found to be a claim against the State where a judgment for the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability." Currie v. Lao , 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158, 170 Ill.Dec. 297, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Richman v. Sheahan , 270 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that state immunity rules apply to state law claims in federal court). In other words, if a suit against a state employee is not "in fact a suit against the State," then the suit need not be brought in the Court of Claims.

In the June 10, 2021 order, this court noted an exception to sovereign immunity, recognized by both the Seventh Circuit and the Illinois Supreme Court, when the "plaintiff alleges that state officials or employees violated ‘statutory or constitutional law.’ " Murphy v. Smith , 844 F.3d 653, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Healy v. Vaupel , 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308, 140 Ill.Dec. 368, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (1990) ); see also Fritz v. Johnston , 209 Ill. 2d 302, 313, 282 Ill.Dec. 837, 807 N.E.2d 461, 468 (2004) ("Whenever a state employee performs illegally, unconstitutionally, or without authority, a suit may still be maintained against the employee in his individual capacity and does not constitute an action against the State of Illinois.") (quoting Wozniak v. Conry , 288 Ill. App. 3d 129, 134, 223 Ill.Dec. 482, 679 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (4th Dist. 1997) ). Illinois courts sometimes refer to this exception as the "officer suit exception." See, e.g. , Leetaru v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. , 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 78, 392 Ill.Dec. 275, 32 N.E.3d 583, 603 (Burke, J., dissenting). This court observed that the exception "appears to eviscerate the statutory immunity in many cases," but concluded the exception could apply in light of Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant Dixon violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. T.S. , 548 F.Supp.3d at 782-83.

That being said, Dixon will have an opportunity to raise sovereign immunity again as an affirmative defense at trial. Specifically, he may still be entitled to immunity if he can persuade the jury that he had a legitimate government purpose for imposing the challenged conditions of confinement, or that the conditions were reasonable in relation to that purpose. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson , 576 U.S. 389, 398, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) ; Hardeman v. Curran , 933 F.3d 816, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2019). This is so even though the court determined that qualified immunity shielded Defendant Dixon from Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. T.S. , 548 F.Supp.3d at 782-83. A reasonable jury could conclude that Dixon lacked a legitimate government purpose for imposing the challenged conditions of confinement, or that the conditions were excessive. Id. at 774-75. Dixon was entitled to qualified immunity only because Plaintiffs had identified no cases suggesting that the right to be free of the kinds of conditions imposed during filming was clearly established. Id. at 775 - 78.

The County Defendants have requested certification of the following issues for interlocutory appeal:

1. Does the Superintendent of the JTDC owe JTDC detainees a fiduciary duty pursuant to Illinois common law, separate from his Fourteenth Amendment obligations, and if so, what is the scope of that fiduciary duty? The Court held that Dixon did owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty and that the scope of the duty required him to safeguard Plaintiffs’ well-being.

2. Is Dixon entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiffs’ breach-of-fiduciary duty claim pursuant to the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 5/1 as a matter of law? The Court held that he is not.

(Defs.’ Mem. [436] at 1.) The County Defendants further request that this court amend its prior opinion to include the requested certification. See FED. R. APP. P. 5(a)(3). They have contemporaneously filed a petition with the Seventh Circuit appealing this court's class certification decision. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Defendants ask that this court grant their § 1292(b) motion so that the Court of Appeals may consider the two issues identified above along with their Rule 23(f) appeal.

DISCUSSION

To certify a question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the movant must show that: (1) it is a question of law, (2) the question is controlling, (3) there exists substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and (4) immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. , 219 F.3d 674, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2000). District courts may not certify an order for immediate appeal unless all of these criteria are met. Id. at 676. The Seventh Circuit has explained that a "question of law," as used in § 1292(b), means "a question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision, regulation, or common law doctrine rather than [ ] whether the party opposing summary judgment had raised a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 676. The purpose of an interlocutory appeal is to enable the court of appeals to decide an issue "quickly and cleanly without having to study the record ... [and] without having to wait till the end of the case." Id. at 677. But § 1292(b) is "not intended merely to provide review of difficult rulings in hard cases." United States v. All Funds on Deposit with R.J. O'Brien & Assocs. , Nos. 11 C 4175 & 12 C 1346, 2012 WL 13209677, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The party seeking certification bears the burden of persuading the court that "exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing...