Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 December 1953 |
| Parties | , 196 Tenn. 198 TABOR v. MASON DIXON LINES, Inc., et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Phillips & Hale, Rogersville, for plaintiff in error.
Ben C. Davis, Ernest F. Smith, M. Lacy West, Kingsport (Penn, Hunter, Smith & Davis, Kingsport, of counsel), for defendant in error Scottie Powers.
The plaintiff in error instituted this suit against the defendant, Scottie Powers, in his administrative capacity, and others to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage sustained in an automobile accident which occurred in this State on November 18, 1951. The defendant Scottie Powers was a non-resident of Tennessee and was using the roads of Tennessee when the accident occurred. The original summons was issued on November 13, 1952. The process was served on the defendant, Scottie Powers under our nonresident substituted service statute, section 8671, Code, by serving it on the Secretary of State of Tennessee on November 25, 1952. The defendant then filed pleas in abatement claiming, in substance, that the agency of the Secretary of State to accept service of process for nonresident defendants had expired on November 18, 1952, or one year after November 18, 1951, as provided by Code Section 8671 when the Secretary of State attempted to accept service as an agent on and after November 25, 1952, and that, therefore, the Secretary of State was not the defendant's agent, and was without authority at the time that he accepted service of process to accept service for the defendant.
After argument and briefs the trial court sustained the defendants' pleas in abatement. The necessary proceedings were then had and an appeal duly perfected to this Court where able argument has been heard and we now have the case for determination. We have read and reread briefs of the parties and have spent several days making an independent investigation of the question. Frankly the question is extremely interesting and rather intriguing, to say the least.
Under Code Section 8671 a non-resident using the roads of this State upon which to operate his vehicle agrees that if there is an accident in this State that the Secretary of the State of Tennessee (Italics ours.)
It is the very earnest and rather plausible sounding argument of the plaintiff in error that this statute should be considered a limitation statute and read in pari materia with Code Section 8571 which provides in substance that the suing out of the summons is the commencement on an action and that even though it is not served on the defendant within the year, if proper action is taken, that the suing out of the summons will be sufficient to toll the one year statute of limitations Code Sections 8592, 8595. In the case of Carroll v. Matthews, 172 Tenn. 590, 113 S.W.2d 742, this Court did hold and construe Code Section 8671 () in pari materia with our general venue statute in civil actions. The rule of interpretation, in pari materia, is set forth in Stevens v. Linton, 190 Tenn. 351, 354, 229 S.W.2d 510. For such a rule to be applicable it is necessary that the statute to be construed is ambiguous and, or its significance is doubtful and we are not to apply the rule to effect a construction contrary to the manifest intention of the Legislature. It seems to us that it was the intention of the Legislature enacting the Code Section presently under consideration (8671) that their intention was to make this an agreement statute for those non-residents using our roads to agree that one in this State (The Secretary of the State of Tennessee) should be the agent of the non-resident using our roads. This is not a limitation statute but an appointing statute appointing this official as the agent of the non-resident. There being no ambiguity in this statute we do not think that the statute should be read in pari materia with the limitation statute or the saving statute Code 8571 above referred to.
In Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566, 119 A.L.R. 855 this Court held that the absence of non-residents from this State who had used the roads of our State for the purpose of operating their automobiles and had absented themselves from the State did not toll the one year Statute of Limitations in view of the statute (8671) authorizing service on the defendants through the Secretary of State, since the non-resident defen...
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Kozak v. Retirement Bd. of Firemen's Annuity and Ben. Fund of Chicago
...similar statutes as an aid to construction. (See 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 51.01 (1973).) In Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc. (1953), 196 Tenn. 198, 264 S.W.2d 821, the court explained that for the rule of in pari materia to be applicable, "it is necessary that the statute ......
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Hall v. Haynes, W2007-02611-SC-R11-CV.
...Wallace v. Wallace, No. 01A01-9512-CH-00579, 1996 WL 411627, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 24, 1996) (quoting Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc., 196 Tenn. 198, 264 S.W.2d 821, 822-23 (1953)).I. Personal Service of Process Upon Defendants Within the State of TennesseeA. On Individuals Tennessee Ru......
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Rittenberry v. Lewis
...The defendants contend that the statute is in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed. Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc., 196 Tenn. 198, 264 S.W.2d 821; Ellis v. Georgia Marble Co., 191 Tenn. 229, 232 S.W.2d 45. Here service was effectuated upon the trustees, rather tha......
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Anderson v. Outland
...1947, ch. 235, sec. 1; 1949, ch. 47, secs. 1, 2; C.Supp.1950, sec. 8671.)' This provision was construed in Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc. (1953) 196 Tenn. 198, 264 S.W.2d 821. There, the accident occurred November 18, 1951, summons issued November 13, 1952, and was received by the Secreta......