Tabor v. Moore

• Decision Date: 30 November 1972
• Docket Number: No. 42497,42497
• Citation: 503 P.2d 736,81 Wn.2d 613
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Langston TABOR et al., Petitioners, v. Frank MOORE, in his official capacity as Acting Chief of Police of the City of Seattle Police Department, Washington, and his Agents, Subordinates, and Employees, et al., Respondents.

Page 613

81 Wn.2d 613

503 P.2d 736

Langston TABOR et al., Petitioners, v. Frank MOORE, in his official capacity as Acting Chief of Police of the City of Seattle Police Department Washington, and his Agents Subordinates, and Employees et al., Respondents.

No. 42497.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Nov. 30, 1972.

Legal Services Center David Allen, John Gant, Lar Halpern, Seattle, for petitioner.

Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Kenneth W. Sharaga, Deputy Pros. Atty., Charles Delaurenti, Seattle, for respondent.

HUNTER, Associate Justice.

This is an action by the plaintiffs (petitioners), three taxpayers, challenging the procedures of the defendants (respondents), the Seattle Police Department and the King County Prosecuting Attorney and their officers and agents, in holding persons arrested without warrants on 'open charges' or 'suspicion.'

The plaintiff, asserting their standing as taxpayers, allege: (1) that the defendants are engaged in a deliberate 'continuing and ongoing practice of holding persons arrested without warrants on 'open charges' or 'suspicion" for unreasonable lengths of time; (2) that such practices are illegal and violative of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 of the Washington State Constitution; and (3) that these illegal acts necessarily involve the illegal expenditure of public funds which imposes a burden upon the taxpayers.

They seek alternatively or cumulatively declaratory, injunctive and mandamus relief against the defendants ordering them to cease and desist from the alleged practices. The plaintiffs request that the writ of mandamus require the defendants to take arrested persons before a magistrate without unreasonable delay and that an order be entered prescribing personal recognizance and bail procedures. They also request that the defendants be required to submit a plan to implement the judgment of the court. And, they urge that such a plan require that arrested persons be brought before a magistrate within a fixed number of hours unless an application for an extension of time, based upon a showing of good cause, be made to the presiding judge.

The trial judge concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute this action and granted the defendants' motion for a summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, 496 P.2d 361, affirmed the finding of the trial judge but it did not reach the question of standing, reasoning instead that the judiciary lacks the power to directly supervise the law enforcement officers under the separation of powers doctrine. From the Court of Appeals decision, the plaintiffs petitioned this Court for review, which we granted.

The plaintiffs contend that the Court of Appeals was in error when it determined that the judiciary lacks the power to grant the requested relief. We agree.

The recent case of Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash.2d 531, 496 P.2d 334 (1972) is dispositive of this issue. In all fairness, it should be noted that the Johnson case was published after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision.

Inherent within the reasoning and logic of the Johnson case is the conclusion that the relief requested may be granted by our judiciary. In that case three prisoners who were held on 'suspicion' for varying lengths of time filed a class action seeking relief identical to that requested in the instant case. In reversing the trial court holding that their suit was inappropriate as a class action, we stated that we were remanding the case.

to put the court in a position to render broad remedial relief for allegedly unconstitutional action by means of declaratory judgment or injunction . . .

Johnson v. Moore, 80 Wash.2d 531, 536, 496 P.2d 334, 337 (1972).

We believe it to be basic that if the alleged unconstitutional practices do exist in the Seattle or King County jails, the superior court is in a position to render the relief requested by the plaintiffs.

Granting this type of relief is not novel. Federal courts have long adhered to the rule that they will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief where federally protected rights have been invaded. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and cases cited therein.

Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939), was one of the first cases to uphold the power of the federal courts to enjoin unconstitutional police practices. In that case the Jersey City officials had a deliberate policy of using force and violence to interfere with the First Amendment rights of the members of the CIO. In response to said policy, the district court issued an injunction which (1) enjoined the city officials from interfering illegally, via illegal searches and seizures, illegal arrests and physical violence, with the rights of the members of the CIO to communicate their views as individuals to others on the streets in an orderly and peaceable manner, and (2) enjoined the enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of literature on the street without a permit, which the court found to be unconstitutional. Since Hague, the federal courts have used the injunctive processes in a number of cases where illegal police practices have been proved. See Note, 78 Yale ...