Taft v. Iowa Dist. Court for Linn Cnty.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–1714.,11–1714.
• Parties: David TAFT, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT for LINN COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

828 N.W.2d 309

David TAFT, Plaintiff,

v.IOWA DISTRICT COURT for LINN COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 11–1714.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 15, 2013.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for plaintiff.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John B. McCormally, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

HECHT, Justice.

A person detained by the State as a sexually violent predator sought a final hearing on his request for discharge or for placement in a transitional release program. In this petition for writ of certiorari, we are asked to decide whether the district court erred in denying the request for a final hearing. We annul the writ.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Taft was arrested in December 1987 for lascivious acts with a minor, based on allegations that he sexually molested his sister and committed other criminal sexual offenses. He was convicted and sentenced to two five-year terms and a two-year term to run concurrently. He served this sentence and was discharged on May 31, 1991.

Seven days after his discharge from prison, Taft reoffended by sexually assaulting two girls who were unknown to him—one who was eight years old and the other who was ten. He was arrested and charged with second-degree sexual abuse, assault causing injury, and burglary. He was convicted and sentenced to prison. Taft was discharged from prison for these offenses on January 10, 2005.

Proceedings were commenced for Taft's commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to the Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, Iowa Code chapter 229A on March 30, 2005. At the commitment trial, the State's expert opined that Taft suffered from mixed personality disorder (anti-social personality disorder) and pedophilia. A jury found Taft suffered from a mental abnormality which made it more likely than not that he would reoffend, and he was therefore committed to the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) under the provisions of Iowa Code chapter 229A.

The State filed a notice of annual review for 2010 and a report submitted by staff at the CCUSO. SeeIowa Code § 229A.8(2), (3) (2011)¹ (requiring annual examination of committed person's mental abnormality and report to the court). The report expressed the conclusion that Taft's mental abnormality persisted and he remained unfit for discharge or transitional release. Taft thereafter submitted a petition seeking a final hearing on whether he should be discharged from the CCUSO or placed in its transitional release program. See id. § 229A.8(4).

In May 2011, before the district court had ruled on Taft's 2010 petition, the State submitted its notice of annual review for 2011. This notice included a report prepared by the CCUSO staff asserting there was as of that time “no evidence of any change in Mr. Taft's mental abnormality” constituting a ground for his discharge. This assertion as to the persistence of Taft's mental abnormality was based in part on the result of an assessment that the staff interpreted as “clinically significant for sexual interest in minors.” The staff report further alleged six major disciplinary reports issued to Taft in the preceding six months disqualified him from eligibility for the transitional discharge program. The six disciplinary reports cited Taft for two instances of lying to staff, two instances of inciting disruptiveness, one instance of disrespecting the CCUSO staff, and one boundary violation.

Taft filed a petition requesting a final hearing on his 2011 annual review and his claims for either outright discharge or placement in the transitional release program. As Taft's request for a final hearing on the 2010 annual review had not yet been adjudicated, it was consolidated with the 2011 proceedings by agreement of the parties. Taft supported his prayer for relief with a report prepared by Dr. Craig Rypma, a licensed clinical psychologist. Dr. Rypma's report, based on his review of the reports generated by the CCUSO staff and a clinical evaluation, suggested Taft was no longer more likely than not to reoffend if discharged and recommended that Taft at least be placed in a transitional release program. In addition to Dr. Rypma's report, Taft submitted in support of his request for a hearing several exhibits including the major discipline reports he received at the CCUSO facility during 2010 and 2011.

After weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the district court concluded Taft had failed to produce a preponderance of relevant and reliable evidence tending to prove a final hearing should be held to determine whether Taft's mental abnormality had so changed that he was no longer likely, if discharged, to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses. The court further concluded Taft had failed to produce a preponderance of relevant and reliable evidence tending to prove a hearing should be held to determine whether he was suitable for placement in the CCUSO's transitional release program.

Taft filed an application for writ of certiorari with this court, claiming the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in weighing the expert reports presented at the annual review hearing. Additionally, he contends section 229A.8A(2)( e ) as applied in this case violated his right to due process by disqualifying him from placement in the transitional release program as a consequence of the disciplinary reports issued for infractions that did not involve sexual misconduct. See id.§ 229A.8A(2)( e ) (listing a major disciplinary report within six months of the annual report as one of many grounds for denying placement in transitional release program).

II. Standard of Review.

We review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 745 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Iowa 2008). We “examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its actions.” Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998). “Illegality exists when the court's factual findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.” Id.

III. Discussion.

A. Procedural Background of Annual Review Process. Iowa Code chapter 229A entitled “Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators,” was enacted by the general assembly in 1998. 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1171 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 229A (1999)). Legislative findings expressed in the first section of the statute noted the existence of “a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators” who need “very long-term” specialized treatment that is unavailable in other settings. Iowa Code § 229A.1. We have acknowledged that Iowa Code chapter 229A allows for the commitment of SVPs in order “ ‘to protect the public, to respect the needs of the victims of sexually violent offenses, and to encourage full, meaningful participation of sexually violent predators in treatment programs.’ ” Johnson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 756 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa Code § 229A.1 (2007)).

Recognizing that civil commitment proceedings must comport with the Due Process Clause, the general assembly established a protocol for periodic reviews of the status of each committed person. Id. at 848 (citing Iowa Code § 229A.8). The protocol includes an annual examination of a committed person's mental abnormality. Iowa Code § 229A.8(2). A report of the results of each annual examination must be submitted to the court that ordered the committed person's commitment. Id. § 229A.8(3). A committed person may present evidence including expert opinions for the court's consideration in the annual review. Id. § 229A.8(2).² The committed person may, as part of the annual review procedure, petition the court for discharge or placement in a transitional release program. Id. § 229A.8(4).

The court's annual review of the committed person's status may be based “only on written records.” Id. § 229A.8(3). If requested by either the attorney general or the committed person, the court may schedule a hearing on the annual review and receive arguments from counsel for the parties. Id. § 229A.8(5)( d ). This hearing may also be “conducted in writing without any attorneys present.” Id.

B. Legal Standard for Annual Review Decisions. Chapter 229A raises a rebuttable presumption in favor of extending a civil commitment. Id. § 229A.8(1). This presumption may be rebutted at the annual review stage

when facts exist to warrant a hearing to determine whether a committed person no longer suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged, or the committed person is suitable for placement in a transitional release program.

Id. § 229A.8(1) (emphasis added). The committed person can rebut the presumption at the annual review stage by producing a preponderance of evidence that facts exist to warrant a further hearing referred to in the statute as a “final hearing.” Id. § 229A.8(5)( e )(1).³ We now turn to the questions of what the committed person must prove at the annual review stage in order to satisfy this burden and what analytical framework is required under the statute for determining whether a final hearing is “warranted.” Id. § 229A.8(3) (“The court shall conduct an annual review and, if warranted, set a final hearing....”).

We recently were called upon in Johnson to interpret an earlier version of section 229A.8, which entitled a committed person to a final hearing upon production of “ ‘ competent evidence which would lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held.’ ” Johnson, 756 N.W.2d at 848 (quoting Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)( e ) (2007) (emphasis added)). We reasoned that “competent evidence” as used in that earlier version of the statute meant admissible evidence, not necessarily evidence more persuasive than evidence controverting it. Id. at 851 n. 4 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed.2004)). Explaining...