Tagala v. State

• Decision Date: 31 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. A-3076,A-3076
• Citation: 812 P.2d 604
• Parties: Eugene F. TAGALA, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Court of Appeals

Page 604

812 P.2d 604

Eugene F. TAGALA, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. A-3076.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

May 31, 1991.

Blair McCune, Asst. Public Defender, and John B. Salemi, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

Shelley K. Chaffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Douglas B. Baily, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

Before BRYNER, C.J., and COATS, J., and ANDREWS, Superior Court Judge. ^*

OPINION

COATS, Judge.

Eugene F. Tagala was convicted of murder in the first degree and tampering with physical evidence. AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) and AS 11.56.610(a)(1). He contends that Superior Court Judge James A. Hanson erred in denying his motion to suppress. In his motion to suppress, Tagala argued that statements which he made to the police should be inadmissible because the police failed to administer Miranda ¹ warnings, and did not honor his request for counsel. He also contends that his statements were involuntary. Tagala also challenges the state's use of the computer system to obtain the criminal records of prospective jurors. We affirm.

On October 2, 1988, David C. Stailey was shot and killed outside of the Baywatch Lounge in Homer. Witnesses informed the police that, just prior to the shooting, Stailey and Tagala were sitting together in the bar. Stailey left the bar a few minutes after Tagala. Moments later, gunshots were heard and Stailey came back into the lounge and fell to the floor. Witnesses also indicated that there was "bad blood" between the two men, prior assaults had occurred, and Tagala had previously stated that he carried a gun to protect himself from Stailey.

The Homer police tried unsuccessfully to locate Tagala throughout the night of October 2. They had information concerning the car he was driving. The next morning, a patrol officer saw the car. Sergeant Luther Christopher then spotted the car, made a u-turn, put on his overhead lights and pulled over the car which Tagala was driving. Two more police cars arrived, and the officers conducted a pat-down search of Tagala. After the officers conferred among themselves, they decided not to formally arrest Tagala and so informed him. Instead, they asked him to come to the police station and answer some questions. He agreed.

Tagala rode to the station in the front of a police car. He was not physically restrained. He entered the station house unaccompanied, and was directed to an interview room.

Officer Andrew Klamser interviewed Tagala for less than two hours. The interview was tape-recorded. At the start of the interrogation, Tagala was again informed that he was not under arrest and that he was "free to leave." Klamser did not give Tagala a Miranda warning. At some point, Tagala admitted that he shot Stailey. Later, he agreed to provide blood and urine samples. After the interview ended, Tagala accompanied police officers to look for the weapon he had discarded. ² The police then dropped Tagala at a friend's house where he had been staying. The police kept the house where Tagala was staying under surveillance.

Later that afternoon, Christopher returned to the house and asked Tagala to come back to the station for a second interview. He agreed. Christopher drove him to the station and then interviewed him. This time Christopher informed Tagala of his rights under Miranda.

During both interviews, Tagala frequently alluded to the fact that he and Stailey were both in the business of selling drugs. At one point during the second interview, when the subject of drug sales came up again, Tagala asked to speak to an attorney:

CHRISTOPHER: Okay, let's go over some of the ... things that you've talked about. You said that during the evening ... you were making your usual rounds, what do you mean, specifically, by "usual rounds"?

TAGALA: I usually hit all the bars. And see if there's anything going on out there, taking care of transactions, or taking orders, more or less.

CHRISTOPHER: Of drugs you mean?

TAGALA: Yeah.

CHRISTOPHER: Of the sales of drugs? Is that what [you're] talking about?

TAGALA: Well, now I think we better, before we get into that there[,] I think I might have to talk to an attorney on that angle. I don't want this used against me.

CHRISTOPHER: Of the sales of drugs you mean?

TAGALA: Right.

CHRISTOPHER: Okay.... [Y]ou spoke about the "future," what did you mean by the "future"?

After this exchange, the interview continued. At its conclusion, Tagala was arrested. On October 7, 1988, he was indicted for murder in the first degree and tampering with physical evidence.

Before trial, Tagala moved to suppress all of his statements to the police, claiming that they were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court denied the motion concerning the statements made in the first interview, finding that Tagala was not in custody during that interview. The court partially granted the motion in regard to the second interview, ordering any statements that Tagala made concerning the sale of drugs after he requested counsel to be suppressed. However, the court ruled that all of Tagala's other statements were admissible.

Tagala first argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements which he made to the police. The issues in a suppression motion involve mixed questions of law and fact. We will accept the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. We will make the ultimate determination, after independently reviewing the record, whether a confession was voluntary and whether the defendant waived his Miranda rights. Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981); Van Cleve v. State, 649 P.2d 972, 976 (Alaska App.1982).

The trial court denied Tagala's motion to suppress his statements to Officer Klamser during the first interview. The court ruled that Tagala was not in custody at that time. The court essentially adopted Tagala's version of the facts, but specifically found that the police did not physically restrain Tagala, and that Tagala entered the station house unaccompanied by an officer. The court also found that the police specifically informed Tagala that he was not under arrest, that he was free to leave, and that he could choose not to talk about anything he did not wish to discuss.

Tagala argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the facts show he was in custody at the time of the initial interview, and the police failed to advise him of his rights under Miranda. The state contends that the police did not subject Tagala to custodial interrogation, so that he was not entitled to the procedural protections of Miranda.

A court determines whether a person is in custody using an objective test--would a reasonable person believe that he or she was not free to leave. Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 717 (Alaska 1979); Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979); Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127, 130 (Alaska App.1989); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1178 (Alaska App.1985). In applying this objective test, the court considers the events prior to, during and immediately after the interrogation. Hunter, 590 P.2d at 895; Thompson, 768 P.2d at 130. Courts do not require the police to give Miranda warnings for an investigative stop; however, if the initial stop ripens into "custody" for purposes of the fifth and sixth amendments, the police must administer the warnings. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440-43, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150-52, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska App.1988).

The trial court relied on Thompson in determining that Tagala was not in custody at the time of the first interview. In Thompson, the defendant voluntarily agreed to come to the trooper office; he was told he was not under arrest and was free to leave. This court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.

Tagala argues that Thompson is distinguishable because the defendant there was "asked" to come to the station; he was clearly not in custody when he arrived. In contrast, Tagala contends that he was subject to a "felony stop" of his vehicle so that the interrogation was a continuation of the initial seizure.

Tagala claims that two earlier cases, Lowry and Hampel, are more closely on point in this case. Lowry v. State, 707 P.2d 280 (Alaska App.1985); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173 (Alaska App.1985). In Hampel, the defendant's vehicle was stopped pursuant to a homicide investigation. With guns drawn, the police conducted a pat-down search of the defendant and placed him in a patrol car. During a three-hour interrogation, the defendant was never left alone. Despite the fact that he was told he was not under arrest, this court concluded that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave and therefore, he was in custody during the interrogation. Hampel, 706 P.2d at 1178-79.

In Lowry, the defendant was also a suspect in a homicide investigation. In determining that he was not in custody during police questioning, the court stressed the fact that an officer initially telephoned Lowry, and Lowry agreed to meet with them. Before any show of force was used, the defendant indicated a predisposition to being interviewed. Lowry, 707 P.2d at 284.

There is little question that Tagala was detained during the initial investigative stop. However, "a temporary stop cannot be equated with a formal arrest, even when considerable force is used in effectuating the stop." Id. at 283 (citation omitted). Tagala argues that the circumstances of that initial stop--the use of overhead lights, the presence of several police cars and officers and the request to come to the station for questioning--would have led a reasonable person to believe that he was in custody. Indeed, this court has expressed concern that such circumstances might convince a detainee that he or she is in custody despite assurances to the contrary.

In such a case, there will...