Taggart v. Drake University, 95-329

• Decision Date: 19 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-329,95-329
• Citation: 549 N.W.2d 796
• Parties: 110 Ed. Law Rep. 831, 11 IER Cases 1450 Rhonda TAGGART, Appellant, v. DRAKE UNIVERSITY, an Iowa Corporation, Tom Worthen, and Myron Marty, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 796

549 N.W.2d 796

110 Ed. Law Rep. 831, 11 IER Cases 1450

Rhonda TAGGART, Appellant, v. DRAKE UNIVERSITY, an Iowa Corporation, Tom Worthen, and Myron Marty, Appellees.

No. 95-329.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 19, 1996.

Fred L. Dorr of Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Harold N. Schneebeck and CeCelia C. Ibson of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville, Schoenebaum & Walker, P.L.C., Des Moines, and James R. Swanger and Margaret Callahan of Belin Harris Lamson McCormick, A P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

HARRIS, Justice.

Because they lack both the resources and expertise necessary to superintend such matters, courts have a profound reluctance to intercede in selection decisions for college faculties. Universities thus possess nearly unfettered discretion when deciding whether to reappoint an untenured professor for another year of service. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709-10, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972). The district court granted summary judgment for a university in this suit by a probationary faculty member who reasonably expected to be, but was not, granted tenure. Although we do not entirely agree with the trial court's analysis, we think summary judgment was correct.

The facts, as presented for submission of the summary judgment motion, indicate a classic clash between a highly talented art educator and her academic superior. Plaintiff Rhonda Taggart began working for defendant Drake University in its college of fine arts in 1985 as a part-time lecturer on graphic design. The following year plaintiff received a letter offering her a faculty appointment with the rank of instructor of art for the 1986-87 academic year. The letter stated Drake "operates in conformity with the general policies regarding tenure established by the [American Association of University Professors] AAUP." In accordance with AAUP standards, university regulations require the annual evaluation of all nontenured, regular faculty members. These evaluations serve as the basis for the dean's reappointment decisions. Nontenured faculty appointments at Drake are only for one-year terms, and are renewed (or terminated) on an annual basis. The chair of the art department, Condon Kuhl, explained to plaintiff that the normal procedure was to consider a faculty member for promotion after four years and for tenure during the sixth year.

After receiving highly favorable evaluations, plaintiff was offered and accepted subsequent appointments for the 1987-88 and the 1988-89 academic years and was given substantial wage increases. She was in fact promoted to the rank of assistant professor effective for the 1988-89 academic year. Her performance appears to have been superb. She received high accolades for revitalizing Drake's graphic design program, for her outside exhibitions and endeavors, and for her teaching prowess. In recognition of these outstanding efforts, she was named co-recipient of the Burlington Northern Junior Teacher of the Year award at Drake for the 1987-88 academic year. Each of plaintiff's letters of reappointment indicated she was a tenure-track faculty member.

This auspicious outlook went awry in 1988 when Tom Worthen became the new department chair. A dispute arose almost immediately concerning submission of plaintiff's work for critical review by the art faculty as part of her annual evaluation. Plaintiff objected to the lack of stated criteria or standards for judging her work, noting the uniqueness of the various activities performed by a graphic designer in a commercial setting.

One of the categories in the annual evaluation was labeled "scholarly and artistic developments." Activities in this category included professional research and study, publications, grants, presentations, performances, exhibits, and compositions. The nub of plaintiff's dispute with Worthen is this: it is unusual for graphic designers to exhibit art works in an academic or professional setting. This is because the work of graphic artists normally consists of consultations with private clients. Because of the uniqueness of her specialty, plaintiff insists it is more difficult to submit the work of a graphic artist for peer review than it would be for others in the art department.

So plaintiff refused to provide what Worthen deemed to be sufficient work for review and her annual evaluations, although still positive, began to suffer in the scholarship-artistic development category. The matter came to Dean Myron Marty's attention on several occasions, and he urged Worthen and plaintiff to come to an amicable solution. When the dispute remained unresolved, Dean Marty asked plaintiff to propose standards for judging her work. Her proposals were then sent to Worthen for his comments. But when plaintiff's proposals reached Worthen, he objected to the dean's interference in what he believed was strictly a faculty matter. The dean conceded the point and promptly withdrew his proposed solution.

In spite of this growing controversy, plaintiff was reappointed for the 1989-90 and the 1990-91 academic years. In February 1991, following two meetings of a faculty evaluation committee, Worthen recommended to Dean Marty that plaintiff's next appointment be a terminal one. Worthen told Marty that the terminal appointment was recommended because of plaintiff's refusal to provide adequate documentation or attend reviews and the poor judgment reflected in such refusals. By letter, Dean Marty informed plaintiff:

Consistent with the University's policies affecting probationary faculty members who are not recommended for continuation toward tenure, I am authorized to offer you a terminal appointment for the academic year 1991-92 with the rank and title of Assistant Professor of Art....

Plaintiff accepted the appointment but not its terminal nature. She challenged her termination, asserting it denied her several procedural rights. Dean Marty rejected plaintiff's challenge and, in accordance with Drake's academic charter, plaintiff appealed the rejection to the university's academic freedom and tenure committee. That committee concluded plaintiff had been given all procedural considerations due her and plaintiff appealed her case to the university's president. He refused to intercede.

Forced to seek other employment, plaintiff sued Drake, Worthen, and Dean Marty, alleging that Drake breached her employment contract, that Dean Marty intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her, and that Worthen defamed her before her colleagues. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was sustained and plaintiff has brought this appeal. Our review is on error. Iowa R.App.P. 4.

I. Employment can be at will, for a term, or permanent. Even though Drake makes some attempt to contend otherwise, the employment here was clearly more than at will. By all accounts it consisted of a series of one-year terms. The dispute involves claims that Drake violated its agreement during the series of terms regarding plaintiff's efforts to move from term employments to a permanent one.

To maintain a breach-of-contract action against Drake, plaintiff first has the obvious burden of proving the existence of an enforceable contract. Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Iowa 1995) (party seeking recovery on basis of unilateral contract has burden to prove existence of such contract). The trial court rejected plaintiff's claim that rules and regulations set forth in the faculty handbook, academic charter, and various memoranda issued by the dean became implied terms of her annual appointment letter and thereby gave rise to enforceable contractual rights.

Even though at will employment is not implicated here, at will cases explain how employee handbooks can be the basis of employment contracts. There is ample authority for the proposition that university rules, regulations, policies, and by-laws can become implied terms of a faculty employment contract and thereby create enforceable rights. Rehor v. Case Western Reserve Univ., 43 Ohio St.2d 224, 331 N.E.2d 416, 420 n. 2, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018, 96 S.Ct. 453, 46 L.Ed.2d 390 (1975); see also Ofsevit v. Trustees of the California State Univ. & Colleges, 21 Cal.3d 763, 148 Cal.Rptr. 1, 582 P.2d 88, 92 (1978); Board of Trustees of the State Colleges of Md. v. Sherman, 280 Md. 373, 373 A.2d 626, 629-30 (App.1977).

In order to rise to the level of an enforceable contract of employment, the handbook or other document given to an employee by an employer must meet three requirements: (1) the document must be sufficiently definite in its terms to create an offer; (2) the document must be communicated to and accepted by the employee so as to create acceptance; and (3) the employee must continue working, so as to provide consideration. McBride v. City of Sioux City, 444 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa 1989). The parties dispute only the first of these three requirements so we confine our discussion accordingly.

The record here reveals the existence of several procedural rights. A publication issued by the standing committee of the faculty senate on academic freedom and tenure in April 1991 states:

Rights of nontenured faculty are stated in the academic charter of Drake University, articles IV, V, VI, and VII. The committee on academic freedom and tenure will serve as a hearing body whenever a hearing is required as a result of a complaint that a nontenured faculty member's rights have been abridged.

The academic charter and its accompanying appendices outline seven procedural standards for the renewal or nonrenewal of appointments of probationary faculty members:

(1) Faculty members shall be advised early in their appointment of the substantive and procedural standards employed in decisions affecting renewal and tenure.

(2) There shall be a periodic evaluation of faculty members'...