Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co.

• Citation: 118 Wis.2d 389,347 N.W.2d 617
• Decision Date: 13 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-954,83-954
• Parties: Rudolph TAHTINEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MSI INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 617

347 N.W.2d 617

118 Wis.2d 389

Rudolph TAHTINEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MSI INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 83-954.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Jan. 31, 1984.

Opinion Released March 13, 1984.

Opinion Filed March 13, 1984.

Ashley & Hannula and Daniel D. Hannula, Superior, for plaintiff-appellant.

Steven J. Ledin and Davis, Witkin, Weiby, Maki & Durst, S.C., Superior, for defendant-respondent.

Bell, Metzner & Gierhart, S.C., Steven J. Caulum and Thomas A. Lockyear, Madison, amicus curiae Wisconsin Insurance Alliance.

Gleisner Law Offices, William C. Gleisner, III, Hope K. Olson and David L. Nichols, Menomonee Falls, amicus curiae Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.

Before FOLEY, P.J., and DEAN and CANE, JJ.

CANE, Judge.

Rudolph Tahtinen appeals a judgment dismissing his action against MSI Insurance Company. Tahtinen sought to collect under the uninsured motorist provisions of each of three policies MSI issued to him, alleging that his damages greatly exceeded the coverage provided by any single policy. He contends the trial court erroneously ruled that the policies' "Other Automobile Insurance in the Company" clause, limiting coverage to the largest single policy coverage, bars recovery despite sec. 631.43(1), Stats., which allows "stacking" of multiple policy coverages. The trial court interpreted the statute to apply only when two or more policies are issued by different insurers. Because the language of sec. 631.43(1) applies regardless of how many insurers are involved and does not exclude situations involving two or more policies issued by a single insurer, we reverse and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to reinstate the complaint for further proceedings.

The interpretation of a statute in relation to a particular set of facts is a question of law, State v. Clausen, 105 Wis.2d 231, 243, 313 N.W.2d 819, 825 (1982), that we independently review, State v. Britzke, 108 Wis.2d 675, 680, 324 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Ct.App.1982), aff'd, 110 Wis.2d 728, 329 N.W.2d 207 (1983). The primary source of statutory construction is the language of the statute. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 110 Wis.2d 455, 462, 329 N.W.2d 143, 146 (1983). We must give effect to the ordinary and accepted meaning of statutory language. County of Walworth v. Spalding, 111 Wis.2d 19, 24, 329 N.W.2d 925, 927 (1983). It is improper to resort to extrinsic aids to interpret unambiguous statutes. A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses. State v. Derenne, 102 Wis.2d 38, 45, 306 N.W.2d 12, 15 (1981).

Section 631.43(1) unambiguously prohibits MSI's "other insurance in the company" clause. ¹ The first sentence of the statute refers only to "policies." The common and accepted meaning of the term "policies" is more than one policy, regardless of whether different insurers have issued them. Nothing in the second and third sentences requires the term policies referred to in the first sentence to be from more than one insurer. The latter sentences refer to insurers in the plural because they apply to situations that can only arise when more than one insurer is involved.

We agree with the trial court that statutory construction, not public policy, is the issue in this case. See Nelson v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 63 Wis.2d...