Taing v. Drewery
Decision Date | 14 November 2012 |
Citation | 954 N.Y.S.2d 175,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07657,100 A.D.3d 740 |
Parties | Srun TAING, appellant, v. Tiera N. DREWERY, respondent. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Johnson Liebman, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Charles D. Liebman of counsel), for appellant.
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J., ANITA R. FLORIO, SANDRA L. SGROI, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated June 10, 2011, which denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and (2), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the same court dated January 10, 2012, as, in effect, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination.
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.
On August 20, 2008, the defendant was driving across the Brooklyn Bridge from Brooklyn to Manhattan. She testified at her deposition that her highest rate of speed between stops in the “stop-and-go” traffic was only five miles per hour. She further testified that the car that had been driving in front of her for about five minutes, which was driven by the plaintiff, “slammed” its brakes, so she “slammed” her brakes in response. She further testifiedthat her car was only four feet behind the plaintiff's car five seconds before the accident, and that her car hit the plaintiff's car, although the airbags did not deploy.
The plaintiff commenced the instant action, alleging that he had sustained serious injuries as a result of the collision, and subsequently moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. By order dated June 10, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiff's deposition testimony that he made a sudden stop was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact to rebut the inference that the defendant was negligent. The plaintiff then moved for leave to reargue his motion for summary judgment. By order dated January 10, 2012, the Supreme Court, in effect, granted the motion for leave to reargue but adhered to its original determination. The plaintiff appeals.
When the driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his or her vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle ( see Gaeta v. Carter, 6 A.D.3d 576, 576–77, 775 N.Y.S.2d 86;Power v. Hupart, 260 A.D.2d 458, 688 N.Y.S.2d 194;Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a...
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