Adams v. Ernst, 27607.
| Decision Date | 08 November 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27607. |
| Citation | 1 Wn.2d 254,95 P.2d 799 |
| Parties | ADAMS v. ERNST, Director of Social Security, et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Action by Sanna D. Adams against Charles F. Ernst, Director of the State Department of Social Security, and the State of Washington, to review an order of the department denying plaintiff's claim for old age assistance. From a judgment reversing the order of department and commanding the director in his official capacity to make provisions for payment of the specified amount which was owing to plaintiff, the defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; Ernest M. Card, judge.
G. W Hamilton, Atty. Gen., and Harry L. Parr, Asst. Atty. Gen for appellants.
Frank L. Cathersal, of Tacoma, for respondent.
This is an appeal by the director of the department of social security and by the state from a judgment and decree of the superior court reversing an order of the department upon a claim for old age assistance, and commanding the director in his official capacity to make provision for the payment of a specified amount which, according to the court's finding, was owing to the claimant.
In order to understand the questions involved upon the appeal, it is necessary to set forth in some detail the proceedings which antedated and culminated in the judgment and decree.
On August 19, 1935, respondent, Sanna D. Adams, a resident of Pierce County, made application for old age assistance and, after an investigation of her needs and circumstances, was granted aid to the extent of twenty dollars per month beginning October 1, 1936. The old age assistance law in effect at that time was contained in chapter 182, Laws of 1935, p. 855, now appearing in amended form as Rem.Rev.Stat. (Supp.) § 9998-1 et seq. Thereafter, following a further investigation, the administrator of the Pierce county welfare department cancelled the allowance of assistance to respondent as of September 1, 1938, upon the ground that her daughter and son-in-law, with whom she was then living, were able to provide for her needs. At that time the old age assistance law had, in some respects, been amended by chapter 156, Laws of 1937, p. 548, which, like the act of 1935, now appears in amended form, and is included within, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Supp.) § 9998-1 et seq.
Respondent, being dissatisfied with the action of the county administrator, requested a hearing Before the board of county commissioners of Pierce county. A hearing was granted, and at its conclusion the commissioners recommended that the grant of assistance to respondent be continued as originally made. However, the supervisor of the division of old age insurance, being of the opinion that he could not follow the recommendation of the county commissioners, affirmed the prior decision of the county administrator.
From that ruling, respondent duly and regularly appealed to the director of the state department of social security, one of the appellants herein. A hearing was had on November 18, 1938, at which time testimony was taken, and thereafter, on December 31, 1938, the director made findings to the effect that respondent, although otherwise eligible for old age assistance, was living with her daughter and son-in-law who were partially able to provide for her needs. Upon such findings the director rendered a decision confirming a pending recommendation of the Pierce county welfare department that respondent be granted old age assistance in the sum of fourteen dollars per month to meet her needs, according to the department's established budget of itemized necessary living expenses.
Respondent, on January 26, 1939, filed in the superior court of Pierce county a notice of appeal from the decision of the director. The cause came on for hearing on February 21, 1939, at which time the official record of the proceedings taken Before the department was read and considered by the court. It appears from the final judgment herein that, at the conclusion of the hearing on February 21, 1939, the court orally announced its decision in favor of respondent, but the record Before us does not disclose the details of that decision, nor does it disclose that any minute entry or journal entry of such decision was ever made.
On February 25, 1939, the then existing statute with reference to old age assistance was amended in certain respects by chapter 25, Laws of 1939, p. 80, now appearing as part of, and included within, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Supp.) § 9998-1 et seq.
Thereafter, on March 6, 1939, the superior court made and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that respondent had met the eligibility requirements for old age assistance; that her daughter and son-in-law were unable to provide for her needs; that the final decision of the director should be reversed; that respondent was entitled to recover the sum of thirty dollars per month for old age assistance from and after July 1, 1937; that the total deficiency owing respondent from the department on March 1, 1939, amounted to $306; and that respondent was entitled to recover her costs and disbursements.
On March 24, 1939, the court signed and entered an order and judgment based on the findings and conclusions theretofore made, directing that a copy of the findings, conclusions and judgment be forwarded to the director, and commanding him to proceed in accordance therewith.
On the following day, March 25, 1939, the court, having been advised that its former order and judgment had failed to incorporate a money judgment in favor of respondent, thereupon signed and entered an amended order and judgment in which, in addition to the provisions of the former judgment, it ordered that respondent have a money judgment in the sum of $306 against the state of Washington and the director.
After the judgment had been served on him, the director on April 1, 1939, filed a written return calling attention to the amendatory statute which had become effective on February 25, 1939, this being subsequent to the court's oral announcement but prior to the signing and entry of the findings, conclusions and judgment. The conclusion of the director, as set forth in his return, was that the 1939 act barred the payment of any claim not made on the basis of need as defined in the recent act, and that, consequently, the judgment for thirty dollars per month, which was rested upon the provisions of the former statute, without a finding of need as that term was defined in the 1939 statute, was, likewise, barred by the act.
The whole matter was then brought to the attention of the court on April 12, 1939, (1) on the motion of the appellants that an order and judgment, nunc pro tunc, be entered in the cause correcting and modifying the judgment of the court theretofore entered on the twenty-fifth day of March, 1939, by removing therefrom any terms creating liability as for a money judgment against the state of Washington or the director, personally, (2) on the motion of appellants to strike from the order and judgment all reference to allowance of costs, and (3) on the oral demurrer of respondent to the sufficiency of the return of the director.
After argument, discussion and consideration, the court on April 21, 1939, signed and entered a judgment, designated as an 'order, judgment and decree, nunc pro tunc', which granted appellants' motions above set forth, and sustained, in part, respondent's demurrer to the return of the director, resulting in the continuance of appellants' liability, under the latter judgment, to provide for the payment to respondent of the sum of $306 as accrued pension deficiencies. The nunc pro tunc judgment further recited, as a finding, that the oral decision announced by the court on February 21, 1939, constituted the actual judgment in the cause and that the entry of the judgment on March 24, 1939, as amended by the judgment of March 25, 1939, was merely a procedural formality by which the oral decision was reduced to writing. The judgment of April 21, 1939, concluded by commanding the director to proceed in accordance with the original findings of the court and to provide for the payment to respondent of the sum of $306 in the ordinary course of conduct of the department. It is from this last judgment that this appeal was taken.
Appellants' first contention, and the only issue presented by their statement of the questions involved, is that the court had no jurisdiction to enter a nunc pro tunc judgment so as to make it effective as of the day when the oral decision was rendered.
The inefficacy of the contention is made apparent by the facts as hereinBefore stated. Appellants' motion for a nunc pro tunc order was directed specifically to the judgment of March 25, 1939, and not to the oral decision of February 21, 1939. The judgment of April 21, 1939, rendered pursuant to appellants' motions and respondent's demurrer to the director's return, does not purport to relate back to, or become effective as of, the day of the oral decision, as appellants seem to contend, but merely modifies the judgment of March 25, 1939. Respondent's counsel concedes this, for in his brief appears the following: (Italics supplied.)
We agree with respondent that, insofar as the retroactive...
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