Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 27 June 1939
• Citation: 190 So. 26,138 Fla. 746
• Parties: TAMPA ELECTRIC CO. v. JONES.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

190 So. 26

138 Fla. 746

TAMPA ELECTRIC CO. v. JONES.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

June 27, 1939

Rehearing Denied July 11, 1939.

Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; Harry N. Sandler Judge.

Suit by W. O. Jones against the Tampa Electric Company for injuries. To review a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error.

Reversed.

CHAPMAN J., dissenting.

COUNSEL

Knight, Thompson & Sutton, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.

Worth Bivens & Lively, of Tampa, for defendant in error.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

The appeal brings for review judgment in favor of plaintiff in a suit against the defendant to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of the negligence of defendant's servants in the operation of a street car on which plaintiff was a passenger.

The alleged injury occurred when an automobile driven by another collided with the side of the street car, broke a window and shattered broken glass against and upon the plaintiff.

There is some evidence in the record showing that the motorman just prior to the collision had not maintained for every second as high a degree of watchfulness as he might have, but there is no evidence whatever that such lack of watchfulness, if it did occur, was in whole or in part the cause of the collision or the injury.

The record shows conclusively that the involved automobile got out of control of the driver by skidding on a wet pavement and while so out of control, collided with the street car while the street car was being operated at a reasonable rate of speed between street intersections.

In suits for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of another, it is not only necessary that some negligent act of the defendant be shown but it must be shown that such negligent act caused, or contributed to, the result which inflicted the injury. The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.

In Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 70 So. 467, 469, L.R.A.1916D, 982, Ann.Cas.1918A, 576, we said 'Actionable negligence exists when a loss or injury to one without fault results directly from another's mere negligence, or when the loss or injury sustained by one is such as results in ordinary natural sequence from the negligence, or such as naturally and ordinarily should have been regarded as a probable, not as a merely possible, result of the simple negligence of another. Conversely when the loss or injury is not a direct result of the mere negligence, and the loss or injury is not a natural ordinary sequence or such as naturally and ordinarily should have been regarded as a probable, and not a merely possible, result of the simple negligence, the negligence is not actionable. See 2 M.A. L. p. 114 et seq. If an independent efficient cause intervenes between the negligence and the injury, and the original negligence does not directly contribute to the force or effectiveness of the intervening cause, the original negligence is not regarded as a proximate cause of the injury, even though the injury might not have occurred but for the original negligence. A proximate cause stands next in causal relation to the effect. Chicago & Eastern...