Tampa Electric Co. v. Watson

• Decision Date: 22 April 1941
• Parties: TAMPA ELECTRIC CO. v. WATSON et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

1 So.2d 739

146 Fla. 695

TAMPA ELECTRIC CO. v. WATSON et al.

Florida Supreme Court

April 22, 1941

Knight & Thompson, Peter O. Knight, and C. Fred Thompson, all of Tampa, and Cook, Harris, Barrett, McGlothlin & Dew, John D. Harris, and H. L. McGlothlin, all of St Petersburg, for petitioner.

Charles F Blake, Maybry, Reaves, Carlton & White, O. K. Reaves, and Morris E. White, all of Tampa, for appellees.

BUFORD, Justice.

We concur in most that is said in opinion prepared by Mr. Justice WHITFIELD in this case but, after careful consideration, we cannot concur in the conclusions and judgments reached and entered.

As we construe such conclusions and judgments, the effect will be to reverse the orders appealed from only to the extent that such orders struck from the bill of complaint allegations challenging the method used by the Utility Board in determining the proportion to be credited to the utility here under consideration of the value pro tanto of property located in the City of Tampa and used for the purposes of this utility, together with other purposes; and challenging the propriety of the basis 'present fair value' to determine the 'just and true valuation' of the applicable investment, instead of using the investment or cost value of the property owned in the City of Tampa and used for the purposes of this utility.

It was recognized by the Utility Board, and is recognized by this Court, that not all property owned by Tampa Electric Company and located within the City of Tampa is to be figured in the involved fair value of the property of the Utility Company as a basis for rate making, but only that property which is being used exclusively for the purposes of this utility and that part of other unseverable property which is used pro tanto by this utility for the purpose of its function and is used at the same time for other purposes.

It is apparent from the record before us that some of the property involved is used for at least four separate and distinct purposes, viz.: (a) the operation of an ice plant or plants; (b) the operation of a street railway system; (c) the production of electric current for distribution of power and lights in a wide area beyond the limits of the City of Tampa; and (d) the production of electric current to furnish power and lights for the municipality and the public within the same.

The statutes referred to in the opinion by Mr. Justice WHITFIELD contemplate, and we hold, that for the purpose of fixing electric power and light rates within the City of Tampa, only the value of the property located within the City and devoted to the accomplishment of the purpose of furnishing electric power and lights to the City and public in the City may be taken into account.

It may be that some of the property is used exclusively for this purpose while other indivisible property is used simultaneously for this purpose and for one or more of the other affiliated enterprises so as to require its pro tanto applicable value to be determined.

We are convinced that the method which appears to have been used by the Board to arrive at the applicable value of the property which constitutes the investment in this utility is just as fair, equitable and practical as any which may be devised and that its use may logically result in arriving at the 'just and true valuation' of the property investment and which valuation must be determined as the basis for fixing rages which may be charged for the particular service.

We are also of the opinion that the Board was and is justified under the statute in using the present 'fair value' of the applicable property as the basis of valuation for rate-making purposes instead of using the actual cost or investment value and making deductions or additions for depreciation or betterments.

We, therefore, conclude that certiorari should be awarded the challenged orders affirmed, and the cause remanded to the court below.

So ordered.

CHAPMAN, THOMAS, and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

BROWN, C. J., and WHITFIELD, and TERRELL, JJ., dissent.

WHITFIELD, Justice (dissenting).

Application is made by the plaintiff below for a writ of certiorari under Supreme Court Rule 34 to review portions of an interlocutory order of the Circuit Court denying a motion to dismiss the bill of complaint with leave to amend, and striking stated parts of the bill of complaint. Petitioner is engaged in the sale and service of electricity within and without the city of Tampa and also in the operation of an electric street car service. The questions to be determined involve the interpretation of some of the provisions of Chapter 20160, Special Acts of 1939, relating specifically to the valuation of the 'investment' of the utility company in the process of regulating rates and charges for the sale and service of electricity in the City of Tampa.

In view of the language contained in the title and in the body of Chapter 20160, the public service being regulated in his case must be regarded as being the sale and service of electricity in the city of Tampa, and not the rendering of street car transportation service. The several services, though for many years voluntarily unified in operation, may be regulated severally and separately as the lawmaking power determines. See sec. 30, Art. XVI, Constitution of Fla., effective Jan. 1, 1887, Chapter 20205, Special Acts of 1939, provides for regulations of the rates for transportation by street cars propelled by electricity in the city of Tampa, Florida.

Section 30, Article XVI, of the constitution of 1885 is as follows: 'The Legislature is invested with full power to pass laws for the correction of abuses and to prevent unjust discrimination and excessive charges by persons and corporations engaged as common carriers in transporting persons and property, or performing other services of a public nature; and shall provide for enforcing such laws by adequate penalties or forfeitures.' This provision of the constitution authorizes statutory regulation of all those engaged in rendering intrastate service of a public nature, the public service subjects to be regulated, and the nature, extent and method of the regulation, being for legislative determination within organic limitations. see Gainesville G. & E. Power Co. v. City of Gainesville, 63 Fla. 425, 58 So. 785; Southern Utilities Co. v. City of Palatka, 86 Fla. 583, 99 So. 236; Id., 268 U.S. 232, 45 S.Ct. 488, 69 L.Ed. 930, and authorities cited.

The 'jurisdiction and powers' of the municipality are prescribed by law, section 8, article VIII, constitution. Special or local laws relating to municipal government prevail over inconsistent general laws on the same subject. Sec. 24, Art. III, constitution; State v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61. Section 17 of Chapter 20160, Sp. Acts of 1939, provides that stated provisions of the act are specific and controlling.

The quoted organic section does not define the rules and methods for its execution, but expressly vests the legislature 'with full power to pass laws' for the purposes stated in the section; and when valid statutory enactments prescribe the rules and methods for making rates and regulations to effectuate the 'correction of abuses and to prevent unjust discrimination and excessive charges', such statutory enactments, as judicially interpreted, control, subject only to organic limitations.

The utility company is not required by law to operate its public street car transportation portation service jointly or interminglingly with its public service in the sale and service of electricity for light, heat and power purposes; and Chapters 20160 and 20205, Special Acts of 1939, enact provisions covering each of petitioner's two stated public services in the city of Tampa as a separate and distinct subject of statutory regulation, though they are both voluntarily operated by the same corporation. The statute operates prospectively, not retrospectively, and does not violate any organic property rights of the company. Such statute is clearly within the law enacting power of the legislature under the last quoted organic section. Long continued voluntary and useful services in the combined operation by a single corporation of the two distinct services of a public nature do not affect the 'full power' 'vested' in the legislature by section 30, Article XVI, of the Florida Constitution, 'to pass laws * * * to prevent unjust discrimination and excessive charges by persons and corporations * * * performing * * * services of a public nature.' Statutes may regulate each distinct subject of public service severally as the law-making power may determine. The constitution does not prescribe the method of public utility regulation except that it shall be pursuant to laws.

In State v. Broad River Power Co., 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537, the litigation was not as to rates, but the adjudication was the duty of the company to continue its unified transportation and electric light and power services under its franchises even though the transportation service was not profitable. The discussions in other somewhat similar cases in other jurisdictions cited for petitioner are governed by the differing facts and the controlling law in those cases severally. In this case the questions to be now determined are to be adjudged according to the facts shown and the applicable and controlling statutory provisions under the Florida constitution, where no provision of the Federal law is thereby violated.

The administrative board appointed under Chapter 20160 may exercise only such authority as is conferred upon it by statute; and the board must proceed in the exercise of its delegated administrative authority, duties and functions by such method as may be required by the law. See Secs. 15 and...