Tanya B., In re, B089992

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Citation: 43 Cal.App.4th 1,50 Cal.Rptr.2d 576
• Decision Date: 20 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. B089992,B089992
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1591, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2619 In re TANYA B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TANYA B., Defendant and Appellant.

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50 Cal.Rptr.2d 576 43 Cal.App.4th 1, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1591, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2619 In re TANYA B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TANYA B., Defendant and Appellant. No. B089992. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California. Feb. 20, 1996.

[43 Cal.App.4th 3] Jeffrey Scott Yanuck, Sherman Oaks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Raymund F. Robles, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HASTINGS, Associate Justice.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in suspending a minor's driver's license for a period of more than one year as a condition of probation. Here, the court suspended a 17-year-old minor's license until she was 21 after she admitted a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152,

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subdivision (a), driving while under the influence of a drug. The minor contends on appeal that the period of suspension must be limited to one year pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13202.5. ¹ For reasons explained in this opinion, we disagree and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

43 Cal.App.4th 4

FACTS

On November 27, 1993, appellant Tanya B., then 16 years old, was arrested for driving under the influence of a drug. A search of her purse revealed a "snorter tube" commonly used in the inhalation of cocaine or methamphetamine. A urine sample taken from appellant tested positive for amphetamine and for marijuana metabolite. A petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging in count 1 that appellant drove under the influence of drugs in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) and in count 2 that she was under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted count 1, and count 2 was to be dismissed at the time of disposition.

At the disposition hearing, the trial court ordered appellant, then 17 years old, be a ward of the court and placed in the camp community placement program, but stayed the placement order and released her to her father on probation with a number of conditions, including that she not drive until the age of 21 years. The court explained, "From this date, young lady, until you are 21, can you [sic ] not drive. That is the state law." (Italics added.) No objection was made at the time, but defense counsel filed a motion for modification within two weeks in which he cited Vehicle Code section 13202.5 and argued that the order suspending appellant's license for nearly four years was unlawful and in excess of the court's jurisdiction. ²

At hearing on the motion, appellant's counsel advised the court that appellant "may have pled on the wrong count." The court responded that it would have imposed an identical license suspension if appellant had admitted count 2 instead of count 1. The court denied the motion for modification explaining that it would make the same order as to any minor found to have driven under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

43 Cal.App.4th 5

I

We first address respondent's contention that the issue raised in this appeal has been waived because it was not timely raised in the trial court. The only case cited by respondent in support of this contention is

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People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-234, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802, which held that a criminal defendant's failure to challenge the reasonableness of a probation condition at the time of sentencing waives the claim on appeal. However, Welch is not applicable to a juvenile court disposition: "In short, conditions of probation for minors are devised by the juvenile court and placed on a juvenile probationer to ensure his or her reformation and rehabilitation. The conditions are deemed necessary for that purpose and no choice is given to the youthful offender. By contrast, an adult offender 'has the right to refuse probation, for its conditions may appear to defendant more onerous than the sentence which might be imposed.' [Citations.] [p] Although an adult may choose to reject probation and accept incarceration, no such choice is offered a juvenile offender. It would be inconsistent with the juvenile court's determination of the best manner in which to facilitate rehabilitation of a minor if he could, for example, elect to forgo home placement on probation and instead choose detention at the California Youth Authority." (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 82, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.)

Therefore we reject respondent's contention that the issue has been waived.

II

Appellant contends the lengthy suspension of her driver's license was not required by any law, and violates the legislative mandate set forth in Vehicle Code section 13202.5 that the license of a person between the ages of 13 and 21 years who is convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 23152,...