In re Ronald, B161818.

Decision Date30 July 2003
Docket NumberB161818.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re RONALD P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD P., Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marcus O. Tucker, Judge. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NJ15404.


Jeralyn Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


The minor, Ronald P., appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 602.) The juvenile court sustained an allegation of a delinquency petition filed September 28, 2001, charging the minor with second degree robbery, with a special allegation that the victim was over the age of 60. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 1203.09, subd. (f).) The juvenile court ordered that the minor be placed home on probation. The minor appealed. We appointed counsel to represent the minor. The minor argues the juvenile court improperly imposed a unconstitutionally vague and overbroad probation condition, and there was insufficient evidence to support the true findings of the allegation of robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) We affirm the wardship order.

We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the wardship orders. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690, 919 P.2d 640; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909; see also In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089 [standard of proof is the same in juvenile proceedings as that required in adult criminal trials]; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 269, 275, 186 Cal. Rptr. 898 [same].) On March 5, 2001, 75-year-old Antonio Aban was walking in an alley near his Baltic Avenue home. Mr. Aban used a cane to walk. Four male minors approached Mr. Aban from behind. Mr. Aban was held by the neck, while his back pocket was slashed. Mr. Aban's glasses were discarded by the minors. Mr. Aban fell on his back. Mr. Aban's wallet was thrown down after his money was removed. The minors also took Mr. Aban's necklace. Although Mr. Aban could not see well without his glasses, the minors looked Hispanic.

Thirteen-year-old Lucas S. witnessed what occurred, telephoned the police, and helped Mr. Aban. Lucas S. heard loud yelling in the alley as he was returning from school. Lucas S. saw Mr. Aban on the ground. Mr. Aban was being hit by three of the four or five individuals present. Lucas S. saw the individuals take Mr. Aban's wallet. Lucas S. recognized two individuals that attended his school and positively identified them at the time of the adjudication hearing. Lucas S. yelled as he ran towards the individuals. The minors ran toward a nearby park. Lucas S. helped Mr. Aban up from the ground.

First, the minor argues that the juvenile court improperly imposed a probation condition that he be prohibited from associating with "persons known to be users or sellers of narcotics/controlled substances." The minor further argues that the imposition of such a condition is unconstitutionally vague and violated his constitutional right to due process. The minor has waived the issue of the juvenile court's exercise of discretion on appeal. At the time the conditions of probation were imposed and read aloud, defense counsel made no objection. Thus, any contentions concerning the inappropriateness of the conditions are the subject of waiver and forfeiture. The California Supreme Court has specifically determined that an adult defendant may not challenge the reasonableness of conditions of probation for the first time on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 232-238, 851 P.2d 802.) In People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pages 232-233, the Supreme Court specifically disapproved the contrary holding of In re Jason J. (1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 710, 714, 284 Cal. Rptr. 673 a juvenile proceeding. In the decision of In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 170, 173, we reiterated that conclusion. (See also People v. Gardineer (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 148, 150; In re Khonsavanh S. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 532, 536-537; In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 971; but see In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 813-816.)

Notwithstanding such a waiver, we find the condition of probation at issue here was reasonably imposed. Section 730, subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part: "When a ward . . . is placed under the supervision of the probation officer or committed to the care, custody and control of the probation officer, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward. . . . The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." The juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to impose conditions of probation that will serve to rehabilitate the minor. (Ibid; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81-82, 876 P.2d 519; In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) That discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest abuse. (In re Abdirahman S., supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 968-969; In re Josh W., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 5; In re Tanya B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, disapproved on a different point by In re Justin S., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 812; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 59-60, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322.)

In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115, 929 P.2d 596, the California Supreme Court held: "' A clear and precise enactment may . . . be "overbroad" if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.' [Citation.]" A probation condition is subject to the void for vagueness doctrine, and thus "'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him . . . .'" (In re Jason J., supra, 233 Cal. App. 3d at p. 719, quoting People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 320, 324-325, 223 Cal. Rptr. 670.) The Gallo court set forth two principles to guide an evaluation of a probation condition to determine whether it is unconstitutionally vague: "The first principle is derived from the concrete necessity that abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context. A contextual application of otherwise unqualified legal language may supply the clue to a law's meaning, giving facially standardless language a constitutionally sufficient concreteness. . . . [P] . . . The second guiding principle is the notion of 'reasonable specificity' [citations] or '"'[r]easonable certainty.'"' (People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 300, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391 [] italics added; see also In re Marriage of Walton (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 [] [statute will not be held void for vagueness 'if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its language or if its terms may be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources']." (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1116-1117.)

In this instance, the condition that the minor not associate with those known to use or sell controlled substances was reasonably related to the enforcement of those matters as well as the his future threat to the safety of the public. (See In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 940-942 [condition requiring permission to leave the county is reasonable to prevent criminal behavior related to another county]; In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal. App. 3d 14, 18-20, 169 Cal. Rptr. 625 [search condition is reasonable in enforcing drug-related conditions even where there was no evidence the crime was drug or alcohol related].) In addition, our colleagues in the Fourth District Court of Appeal have held that juvenile conditions of probation may be broader than those imposed on adult offenders. The court held, "This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision. . . ." (In re Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 1232, 1242-1243, 285 Cal. Rptr. 16.) The minor argues the condition he not associate with persons known to be users and sellers of narcotics or controlled substances is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify the individuals be known to him. However, it is presumed any effort to enforce the probation conditions will only be done so after the...

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