Tapp v. Tapp

• Decision Date: 09 March 1951
• Citation: 192 Tenn. 1,236 S.W.2d 977,28 Beeler 1
• Parties: , 192 Tenn. 1 TAPP v. TAPP.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 977

236 S.W.2d 977

28 Beeler 1, 192 Tenn. 1

TAPP v. TAPP.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 9, 1951.

Hugh F. Carey, Jr. and Harsh, Pierce, Cochran & Rickey, all of Memphis, for plaintiff in error.

McDonald, McDonald & Kuhn, Memphis, for defendant in error.

NEIL, Chief Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case in which the injured employee was denied an award for injuries admittedly sustained in the course of his employment. The trial judge held that it was not an accident 'arising out of' his employment. This is the only question raised in the assignments of error.

The undisputed facts show the accident and injury to have happened under the following circumstances. Lee Tapp was in the regular employment of the Tapp Lumber Company. At the time of the accident he was driving an automobile and was making a delivery of some hardware pursuant to the directions of his employer. He was in the act of turning from the main highway onto Prescott Street when he was suddenly seized with a coughing spell due to an asthmatic condition. As a result of the coughing spell he 'blacked out', and the automobile which he was driving ran into a deep ditch causing some severe and painful injuries.

The three assignments of error raise the single question: Whether or not injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred in the course of employment, but was precipitated by a physical disability unconnected with the workman's employment, are compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Tennessee as injuries which result from an accident 'arising out of' the workman's employment.'

We have no case in this State in which we have dealt with this question. It is conceded by counsel for appellees that our Workmen's Compensation Act has been given a liberal construction so as to secure for the beneficiaries of the Act every protection which it authorizes. Turner v. Bluff City Lumber Co., 189 Tenn. 621, 227 S.W.2d 1; Code Section 6901 and cases cited.

The decisions are both numerous and conflicting in which the courts have construed the Sections of the Code defining an 'accident' which 'arises out of and in the course of employment.' Code, § 6852. It will serve no purpose for us to undertake to distinguish the instant case from 'border line case' cited by able counsel for both the appellant and the appellee. Indeed arguing by way of analogy in compensation cases adds nothing to the law.

It is important that we preface our consideration of the issue here involved with the statement that in giving a liberal construction to the statute, 'Any reasonable doubt as to whether the act or injury of the employee arose out of the employment should be resolved in favor of the employee or dependent.' See NACCA Law Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 83, 84, and cases cited. In Horovita on Workmen's Compensation, p. 153; 'Hence board or commission awards based on a liberal construction of the words 'out of' are upheld whenever 'rationally possible.", citing Shutte's Case, 290 Mass. 393, 395, 195 N.E. 354. It is further said by the same author; 'But where any reasonable relation to the employment exists, or the employment is a contributory cause, the court is justified in upholding an award as 'out of' the employment.', (p. 153) citing cases.

We have uniformally held that an award is justified only 'when there is * * * causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.' Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87; Mayor and Aldermen of Town of Tullahoma v. Ward, 173 Tenn. 91, 114 S.W.2d 804; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Barnes, 182 Tenn. 400, 187 S.W.2d 610.

Counsel for defendant relies upon numerous cases holding that where the fall, or the accident, to the employee involves a non-industrial heart attack, dizzy or epileptic seizures, or any idiopathic condition (the same being personal to the worker), there is no right to an award under workmen's compensation statutes. The contrary seems to be the rule in many cases as where the injuried employee, suffering from a cardiac condition, or any idiopathic condition, falls against an object which is a hazard to the employment. Connelly v. Samaritan Hospital, 1932, 259 N.Y. 137, 181 N.E. 76; Cusick's Case, 260 Mass. 421, 157 N.E. 596; and Varao's Case, 316 Mass. 363, 55 N.E.2d 451. Contention is made by the defendant's counsel that the burden is upon the petitioner to prove a causal connection between his employment and the injury, and that since the cause of his 'black-out' has no causal connection with his job he is not entitled to compensation. It cannot be denied that the burden rests upon the employee to show a causal connection between his injury and his employment. But by 'causal connection' is meant not proximate cause as used in the law of negligence, but cause in the sense that the accident had its origin in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee while doing his work. Barlau v. Minneapolis-Moline P. I. Co., 214 Minn. 564, 9 N.W.2d 6.

The case most strongly relied on by defendant is Brooker v. Industrial Accident Comm., 176 Cal. 275, 168 P. 126, L.R.A.1818F, 878, where a carpenter, working on a scaffold thirty-nine (39) feet above ground, was seized with an epileptic fit and fell to the ground, injuring himself so badly that he died. Recovery was denied. Other cases are cited in support of the view that such cases are not compensable.

But in similar, or analogous, situations other courts have expressed a different view, holding that the idiopathic condition of the employee was contributory to the accident as a 'remote cause.' Thus in Carroll v. What Cheer Stables Co., 1916, 38 R. I. 421, 96 A. 208, L.R.A. 1916D, 154, the driver of a hack, while helpless from dizziness and temporary unconsciousness fell from the cab and was injured. Compensation was allowed. It was an accident 'arising out of' his employment.

The opinion refers to a well considered English case (Wicks v. Dowell & Co., Ltd., 2 King's Bench Div. (1905) 225) where a workman, employed in unloading coal from a ship and who was required to stand by the open hatchway...