Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1947
• Citation: 204 S.W.2d 87,185 Tenn. 169
• Parties: DAVIS v. WABASH SCREEN DOOR CO. et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

204 S.W.2d 87

185 Tenn. 169

DAVIS v. WABASH SCREEN DOOR CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 31, 1947

Appeal from Probate Court, Shelby County; Samuel O. Bates, Judge.

Suit under Workmen's Compensation Act by Elizabeth Davis against Wabash Screen Door Company, employer, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, insurance carrier. From a judgment for defendants, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Leon Feuerstein and Herschel Feibelman, both of Memphis, for appellant.

Albert F. Johns, of Memphis, for appellees.

PREWITT Justice.

This suit was instituted in the probate court of Shelby County by the petitioner, Elizabeth Davis, against the defendants, Wabash Screen Door Company and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, insurance carrier, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 6851 et seq. of Williams' Code.

The petitioner was, at the time of the injury alleged, an employee of the Wabash Screen Door Company, and had worked for the company for more than ten years prior to the injury. During this time she had been working in the weaving department. However, ten days before the injury she was transferred to serve as a sawyer's helper. Her duties consisted of passing small boards to the sawyer and receiving the boards when they had been cut to proper lengths. She was also required to clean the table on which the saw was attached.

The saw was of the circular rotating type and, in the idle position rested under the level of the table. In order to operate the saw a switch on the wall back of the operator was engaged. This caused the blade of the saw to revolve but did not bring the saw up and forward. Then the operator pressed on a foot lever which brought the revolving saw up and forward where it remained as lone as the foot lever was pressed. The saw had no guard.

The petitioner was not required to operate the saw in any manner. She was not told what put the saw in motion, how to operate the switch and foot lever, nor was she given any safety instructions.

On May 28, 1945, at a time when the operator had left the table and the electric switch was off, the petitioner had her right first finger cut off by the saw. She insists that she was cleaning the table at the time of her injury; while the company claims that she was sawing on a small piece of lumber.

The probate judge, in an exhaustive and painstaking written opinion, held that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employment of petitioner. There is material evidence showing that the petitioner was sawing on a small board at the time her finger was cut off.

The probate judge found that petitioner turned on the electric switch herself and undertook to cut a small piece of lumber and in so doing, cut her finger. When asked by an employee of the company to whom she reported for first aid treatment how the accident happened, the petitioner told him that she guessed the devil got into her and that she undertook to saw a board and in doing so lost her finger.

It is well settled that the findings of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if sustained by any material evidence. McBrayer v. Dixie Mercerizing Co., 178 Tenn. 135, 156 S.W.2d 408; Leonard v. Cranberry Furnace Co., 150 Tenn. 346, 265 S.W. 543.

The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Shockley v. Morristown Produce & Ice Co., 158 Tenn. 148, 11 S.W.2d 900; Home Ice Co. v. Franzini, 161 Tenn. 395, 32 S.W.2d 1032.

An injury arises out of the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Mayor and Aldermen of Town of Tullahoma et al. v. Ward, 173 Tenn. 91, 114 S.W.2d 804.

In Leonard v. Cranberry Furnace Co., supra, it was held that liability imposed upon employers is subject to some fundamental limitations; unrestricted hazard would be destructive of enterprise. It is essential that the injury to the employee...