Tarrant Cty. Host. Dist. v. Henry

• Decision Date: 26 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2-00-101-CV,2-00-101-CV
• Citation: 52 S.W.3d 434
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) TARRANT COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A JPS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CAREER DEVELOPMENT, APPELLANT v. BELINDA HENRY, APPELLEE IN RE TARRANT COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A JPS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CAREER DEVELOPMENT, RELATOR
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 434

52 S.W.3d 434 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001)

TARRANT COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A JPS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CAREER DEVELOPMENT, APPELLANT v. BELINDA HENRY, APPELLEE

IN RE TARRANT COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT D/B/A JPS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CAREER DEVELOPMENT, RELATOR

No. 2-00-101-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth

July 26, 2001.

FROM THE 141ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.

OPINION ON REHEARING

DAUPHINOT, JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

We withdraw our opinion and judgment of March 30, 2001 and substitute the following in their place. We deny Belinda Henry's motion for rehearing.

In this interlocutory appeal and mandamus action, Tarrant County Hospital District, d/b/a JPS Institute for Health Career Development (the Hospital District) appeals from the trial court's order denying its plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity and seeks mandamus relief from the trial court's sanctions order. Because we hold that the Hospital District is immune from suit on some, but not all, of Henry's claims, we affirm in part the trial court's order denying the Hospital District's plea to the jurisdiction and reverse and render in part. Further, because we hold that the trial court abused its discretion with regard to part of its February 23, 2000 sanctions order, we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus in part.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Belinda Henry and Byron Graves worked for the Hospital District's Institute for Health Career Development (the Institute). The parties are in dispute about the nature of Henry and Graves's relationship. The Hospital District contends that Henry and Graves had a consensual sexual relationship, but Henry contends that Graves's sexual advances were unwelcome.

Graves testified that on the evening of July 31, 1997, Henry called and asked him to meet her at the Institute and that, when he arrived, Henry invited him into her office, where the two had consensual sex. Conversely, Henry contends that she went to the Institute that evening only to talk to Graves and to get her day planner; that, once inside, she could not leave the building because Graves locked the doors; and that Graves sexually assaulted her. On September 30, 1997, the Hospital District terminated Graves's employment and decided not to renew Henry's teaching contract.

Henry sued the Hospital District for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), breach of contract, and exemplary damages. On December 15, 1999, Henry moved for sanctions, alleging that the Hospital District had altered and withheld evidence during discovery. The Hospital District filed its special exceptions and plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity on February 2, 2000. On February 23, 2000, the trial court granted Henry's motion for sanctions and struck the Hospital District's pleadings.

On March 1, 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Hospital District's special exceptions and plea to the jurisdiction and denied the plea. On March 15, 2000, the Hospital District filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied without a hearing on March 23. The Hospital District filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction¹ and petitioned for mandamus relief from the trial court's imposition of death-penalty sanctions. This court stayed the underlying proceedings and consolidated the interlocutory appeal and the mandamus action into this docket number.

III. APPEAL

In five points on appeal, the Hospital District contends its immunity from suit has not been waived because Henry has not pleaded a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) for her intentional tort and negligence claims, the Hospital District is not an employer under the TCHRA, the Hospital District is immune from suit for exemplary damages under the TTCA and TCHRA, and, as a governmental entity, it is immune from suit on Henry's breach of contract claims.

A. Standard of Review.

We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review.² In determining whether jurisdiction exists, we look to the allegations in the pleadings, accept them as true, and construe them in favor of the pleader.³

The Texas Supreme Court has long recognized that sovereign immunity protects the State of Texas, its agencies, and its officials from lawsuits for damages, absent legislative consent to sue.⁴ The doctrine of sovereign immunity embraces two distinct principles: immunity from suit and immunity from liability.⁵ Immunity from suit bars a suit against the State unless the State has expressly consented to the suit.⁶ "In other words, although the claim asserted may be one on which the State acknowledges liability, this rule precludes a remedy until the Legislature consents to suit."⁷ Legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language, in either a statute or by other express legislative permission.⁸ Absent the State's consent to suit, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against a governmental entity.⁹ Because immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.¹⁰

In contrast, immunity from liability protects the State from judgments even if the Legislature has expressly consented to suit.¹¹ In other words, even if the Legislature has authorized suit against the State, the question remains whether the claim is one for which the State acknowledges liability.¹² The State neither creates nor admits liability by granting permission to sue.¹³ Immunity from liability is an affirmative defense and does not affect a court's jurisdiction to hear a case.¹⁴

B. Texas Tort Claims Act

1. Intentional Torts.

In its first issue, the Hospital District contends its immunity from suit for Henry's assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims has not been waived under the TTCA. In response, Henry concedes that these causes of action do not survive the TTCA's intentional tort exception¹⁵ and agrees to remove them from her petition. Because Henry cannot sue the Hospital District under the TTCA for intentional torts, the trial court erred in denying the Hospital District's plea to the jurisdiction on these claims. We sustain the Hospital District's first issue.

2. Negligence Claims.

In its second issue, the Hospital District contends its immunity from suit on Henry's negligence claims has not been waived because: (1) the claims are actually claims alleging an intentional tort (rape) and are therefore barred by the TTCA's intentional tort exception; and (2) in the alternative, even if Henry's claims are not for intentional torts, they are still barred because her alleged injuries were not caused by a condition or use of tangible property.

a. Intentional Tort Exception.

The TTCA "does not apply to a claim . . . arising out of assault, battery, . . . or any other intentional tort . . . ."¹⁶ This provision is an exception to the limited waiver of immunity brought about by the TTCA. Thus, even if immunity is waived under section 101.021 of the TTCA, a claim is still prohibited if it falls within the section 101.057(2) exception.¹⁷

The Texas Supreme Court has refused to apply the "arising out of" language in this exception "so broadly as to except from the waiver of immunity any claim, irrespective of its nature, for injuries resulting from an intentional tort . . . ."¹⁸ Instead, where a plaintiff alleges that both intentional and negligent acts caused her injuries, the supreme court has held the intentional tort exception does not preclude a cause of action under the TTCA based on the alleged negligence.¹⁹ In Delaney, the court held that the claim of a raped student against the university for negligent failure to repair a dormitory lock did not "arise out of" the rape and fall within the intentional tort exception of section 101.057(2) because the student's negligence claim was distinct from her intentional tort claim.²⁰ A plaintiff cannot, however, circumvent the intentional tort exception simply by pleading negligence. The plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would support a negligence claim apart from a claim for an intentional tort.²¹

Henry complains in part that Graves, a Hospital District employee, misused Hospital District property by disabling the alarm system at the Institute and using a key to lock the Institute doors so that she could not escape his attack. These are intentional tort claims that fall within the intentional tort exception to the TTCA's waiver of immunity from suit.²² Because immunity from suit has not been waived as to these claims, the trial court improperly denied the Hospital District's plea to the jurisdiction as to them.

Henry also contends, however, that her injuries were caused partly by the Hospital District's negligent failure to properly monitor its alarm system, its negligence in allowing Graves to have the ability to disarm the alarm system, and its negligence in allowing the doors at the Institute to be locked with a key. These claims do not circumvent the intentional tort exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity under the TTCA because, if Graves had injured Henry by negligently locking her in the building or by negligently disarming the alarm system, the Hospital District could not avoid liability based on section 101.057(2).²³ However, this is not the end of our inquiry. Even if a claim is not barred by the intentional tort exception of section 101.057, immunity from suit is not waived unless the plaintiff has alleged facts that state a claim within the TTCA's immunity waiver -- in this case, facts that state a claim under section 101.021(2).

b. Condition...