Tartarini v. Dep't of Mental Retardation

• Decision Date: 23 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–P–1009.,11–P–1009.
• Citation: 82 Mass.App.Ct. 217,972 N.E.2d 33
• Parties: Paula TARTARINI v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL RETARDATION.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

82 Mass.App.Ct. 217

972 N.E.2d 33

Paula TARTARINI

v.DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL RETARDATION.

No. 11–P–1009.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 9, 2012.

Decided July 23, 2012.

Held Invalid

115 CMR 2.01

Thomas J. Frain for the plaintiff.

Marianne Meacham, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Present: SIKORA, CARHART, & SULLIVAN, JJ.

SULLIVAN, J.

Paula Tartarini appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, issued pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7), upholding a determination of the Department of Developmental Services, formerly the Department of Mental Retardation (department), finding Tartarini to be a person with borderline intelligence, not mental retardation, and therefore ineligible for services. See G.L. c. 123B, § 1, inserted by St.1986, c. 599, § 39; 115 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 2.01 & 6.04(1) (2006).¹ We reverse the judgment and order a new judgment remanding the case to the department for further proceedings.

Statutory and regulatory background. Because this case turns on the relationship between the statutory and regulatory definitions of mental retardation, we begin with the pertinent statute and regulation. General Laws c. 123B, § 1, defines “mentally retarded person” as follows:

“[A] person who, as a result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence, as determined by clinical authorities as described in the regulations of the department is substantially limited in his ability to learn or adapt, as judged by established standards available for the evaluation of a person's ability to function in the community” (emphasis supplied).

As relevant here, 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01, as adopted in 2006, provides the following definition of “mental retardation”:

“Mental Retardation means significantly sub-average intellectual functioning existing concurrently and related to significant limitations in adaptive functioning.Mental retardation manifests before age 18.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The same regulation defines “significantly sub-average intellectual functioning” to mean:

“an intelligence test score that is indicated by a score of 70 or below as determined from the findings of assessment using valid and comprehensive, individual measures of intelligence that are administered in standardized formats and interpreted by qualified practitioners.”

The mechanism for measuring intelligence is set forth in 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 6.02(3)(b) (2006).

In addition, the regulations define “adaptive functioning” to include three areas: (1) independent living/practical skills; (2) cognitive, communication, and academic/conceptual skills; and (3) social competence/social skills. 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01. Significant limitations in adaptive functioning are defined, in part, by reference to scores on standardized tests that measure the individual's adaptive functioning in these areas. See ibid.

Factual background. Tartarini had intelligence (IQ) test scores of 71 at age 18, 69 at age 40, and 71 at age 42. The department's hearing officer found that the score for the test administered closest to the age of 18 was determinative,² and that the standard error of measurement of plus or minus 5 points should not be applied in view of Tartarini's education and work history.³ Both the department's expert witness and the hearing officer found that the IQ score of 71 exceeded the cut-off score of 70, and that it was therefore not necessary to consider evidence of adaptive functioning. However, both did assess, in the alternative, Tartarini's adaptive functioning. The department's expert testified that Tartarini's scores on standardized tests of adaptive functioning did not meet the eligibility requirements set forth in § 2.01, and that Tartarini's scores were consistent with information concerning her education, work history, and daily living. The hearing officer found that Tartarini had tested sufficiently well on standardized tests of adaptive functioning to conclude that she did not have significant limitations in this area.⁴ The Superior Court judge, noting the deference which administrative decisions must be accorded, affirmed in all respects.

Discussion. On appeal, Tartarini challenges the validity of the regulatory scheme. Tartarini argues that the definition of significantly sub-average intellectual functioning in 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 is in excess of statutory authority and contrary to law. See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). We do not reach the other arguments raised by Tartarini, as we hold that this is the rare case where the departmental regulation is invalid because it is inconsistent with the legislation that authorized it. See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7)( b ). See also Costa v. Fall River Hous. Authy., 71 Mass.App.Ct. 269, 274, 881 N.E.2d 800 (2008), S. C.,453 Mass. 614, 903 N.E.2d 1098 (2009), citing Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481, 852 N.E.2d 1061 (2006) (questions of interpretation of regulations, like statutes, receive de novo review). For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the definitions of mental retardation and significantly sub-average intellectual functioning, as they are currently drafted, do not adequately fulfil the legislative directive that clinical authorities be described in the regulations. As a result, we conclude that the department cannot deny services on the basis of an assessment of intellectual functioning as provided in 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01.

“In determining the validity of the subject regulation, we recognize that an administrative regulation is ‘not to be declared void unless [its] provisions cannot by any reasonable construction be interpreted in harmony with the legislative mandate, and enforcement of such regulation [ ] should be refused only if [it is] plainly in excess of legislative power.’ Dowell v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 424 Mass. 610, 613, 677 N.E.2d 213 (1997), quoting from Berrios v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 411 Mass. 587, 595–596, 583 N.E.2d 856 (1992). Further, a party who questions the facial validity of a regulation ‘bears the heavy burden of “proving on the record ‘the absence of any conceivable ground upon which [the regulation] may be upheld’ ” ' (citation omitted). Id. at 612, 677 N.E.2d 213.” Green's Case, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 141, 144, 751 N.E.2d 913 (2001). This principle, however, is one of deference, not abdication. Ciampi v. Commissioner of Correction, 452 Mass. 162, 166, 892 N.E.2d 270 (2008). Gauthier v. Director of the Office of Medicaid, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 777, 790, 956 N.E.2d 1236 (2011).

The definition of mental retardation applicable to this case was adopted by the department in 2006. The regulation in effect before 2006 did describe clinical authorities, see G.L. c. 123B, § 1:

“ Mental retardation means, consistent with the currently (1994) accepted clinical authority of the American Association on Mental Retardation, substantial limitations in present functioning.”

115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (1994). The previous regulation further stated that “[m]ental retardation begins before age 18, and is manifested by significantly sub[-]average intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas....” Ibid. The pre–2006 regulation did not contain a specific definition of sub-average intellectual functioning, instead relying on the incorporated clinical authorities.

The department revised the regulations in 2006 after a judge of the Superior Court, relying on the guidelines promulgated by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) (now the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities [AAIDD] ), entered judgment on behalf of an applicant whose IQ scores ranged from 75 to 83. The judge rested his decision on the AAMR guidelines, finding that there was “no reference to a bright-line IQ cut-off score on which the [d]epartment's argument depends.” See Melican v. Morrissey, 20 Mass. L. Rep. 723, 727 (Super.Ct.2006).

The department argues that it was entitled to amend its regulations to respond to the omission identified in the decision. The department also argues that it was entitled to reject the AAMR standards as controlling when it promulgated the 2006 regulations. It maintains that the 2006 regulations, in fact, are based on “evolving standards” and that the regulations are based on “standardized testing” and the “appropriate exercise of clinical judgment.” We agree that the department may alter or amend its regulations, consistentwith applicable law, and that it has considerable discretion in defining sub-average intellectual functioning in accordance with clinical authorities. See Massachusetts Fedn. of Teachers, AFT, AFL–CIO v. Board ofEduc., 436 Mass. 763, 774, 767 N.E.2d 549 (2002). However, contrary to the statutory requirement, the 2006 regulations fail to describe the clinical authorities upon which the clinical judgments regarding intelligence are made. Cf. Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762, 774–775, 407 N.E.2d 297 (1980).

The Legislature did not give the department unfettered discretion to define mental retardation. The statute requires that the department's regulations be based on “clinical authorities.” G.L. c. 123B, § (1). The statute further requires that the clinical authorities be “described in the regulations.” Ibid. The statutory language is unequivocal. See Smith v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 646, 729 N.E.2d 627 (2000) (“[a]n agency regulation that is contrary to the plain language of the statute and its underlying purpose may be rejected by the courts”). See also Bureau of Old Age Assistance v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 326 Mass. 121, 123–124, 93 N.E.2d 267 (1950). We are not at liberty to ignore such a clear legislative command. See Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 633, 830 N.E.2d 207 (2005) (“if [court] conclude[s] that the statute is unambiguous, [it] give[s] effect to ...