Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co.

• Decision Date: 11 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. 43702,43702
• Citation: 86 Wn.2d 439,546 P.2d 81
• Parties: , 1 Media L. Rep. 1716 William TASKETT, Appellant, v. KING BROADCASTING COMPANY, a Washington Corporation, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 439

86 Wn.2d 439

546 P.2d 81, 1 Media L. Rep. 1716

William TASKETT, Appellant, v. KING BROADCASTING COMPANY, a Washington Corporation, et al Respondents.

No. 43702.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Feb. 11, 1976.

[546 P.2d 82] Robert H. Stevenson, Seattle, for appellant.

Davis, Wright, Todd, Riese & Jones, Evan L. Schwab, Marshall J. Nelson, Seattle, for respondents.

HUNTER, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff (appellant), William Taskett, appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Superior Court for King County in favor of the defendants (respondents), KING Broadcasting Company and James Harriott, KING'S anchorman on the evening news. The plaintiff's action sounds in libel, and this appeal raises the question of whether 'actual malice' needs to be established when the statement was directed at a private person, yet pertains to an issue of public concern.

For almost 20 years the plaintiff had been engaged in the advertising business in the Seattle area, owning 95 percent of an agency incorporated under the name Bill Taskett & Associates, Inc. The agency was principally involved in the placement of ads for other businesses and private individuals with the radio and television media.

In December of 1972, the plaintiff's business had suffered serious financial setbacks. He had lost one of his most lucrative accounts, and there were insufficient assets with which to meet his total debts. The threat of lawsuits and pressure from creditors finally took its toll causing the plaintiff to follow the advice of his attorney and file for a statutory dissolution of the corporation. A certified public accountant was appointed as trustee and a notice of dissolution was sent out to all creditors, including the defendant. Feeling in need of rest, the plaintiff and his wife decided to take a short vacation in Mexico. Under the mistaken belief that a prior deposit would be applied by his landlord against his rent owing for his office space in November and On January 11, 1973, KING television, on its evening newscast, carried a story about the disappearance of the plaintiff. Mike James, a reporter for the defendant, had investigated the story, talking to the individual who was living in the plaintiff's apartment, the trustee, various creditors, and looking at court files which related to suits being brought against the plaintiff. James ascertained that the plaintiff was in Mexico by finding a note in the plaintiff's office with a hotel number on it. Upon calling the hotel, James discovered that the plaintiff had just left. The story was then turned over to John Heffron, the news director at KING, for his final approval. The text of the story is set out in fall in the appendix to this opinion. Suffice to say that the plaintiff contends the story depicted him as a 'thief and a swindler,' which constituted libel per se, since, he contended, it was wholly unfounded in fact.

December of 1972, the plaintiff did not make any payment for these two months, and he left Seattle without[546 P.2d 83] giving any notice. Upon departing, the plaintiff sublet his apartment to a friend. At this time his liabilities exceeded $90,000, while his assets were but a fraction of this amount.

Upon learing of the story, the plaintiff returned to Seattle, but was unable to gain employment, which ultimately necessitated the moving of his family to California. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, who moved for summary judgment relying on this court's decision in Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash.2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971), which required the plaintiff to establish 'actual malice' with convincing clarity. Prior to reaching its decision, the recent holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), was brought to the attention of the trial court, which permitted each state to establish its own standard for libel actions brought by private individuals over stories relating to matters of public concern. However, the trial court granted the motion citing the Miller decision. Even though the court found that the plaintiff was a private individual and that the story related to a matter of general public Prior to 1964, the libel laws of the individual states had developed from the common-law, free of any first amendment considerations. However, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the United States Supreme Court departed from the common-law approach and enunciated the following test:

concern, it also stated that any change in the law would have to come from the State Supreme Court. The plaintiff's appeal was certified to this court by the Court of Appeals.

The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

In 1967, the Court extended its rule to those instances involving Public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). In response to these newly announced constitutional considerations, we adopted the above rule, so far as it applied to public officials and public figures, in Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wash.2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967). From this point, the United States Supreme Court took the final step and extended the New York Times rule to comments which pertained to private individuals, yet dealt with matters of public or general interest. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). However, unlike New York Times and Curtis, Rosenbloom was decided by a mere plurality decision. Regardless of the obvious conflicting opinions on our highest court, upon being confronted with the same issue, we accepted what was then considered to be a Constitutionally required rule, and formally adopted the Rosenbloom plurality decision in Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wash.2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971).

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra and its progency In Gertz, the plaintiff, a private attorney practicing in Chicago, brought an action against Robert Welch, Inc. for an article published in the defendant's monthly magazine, which characterized him as a 'Leninist' and a 'Communist-fronter' who was behind a Communist campaign conspiring to discredit law enforcement agencies across the country. The jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000. However, anticipating the Rosenbloom decision, the federal district court entered a judgment, notwithstanding the verdict applying the New York Times standard. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972). The United States Supreme Court reevaluated its Rosenbloom decision in an attempt to achieve a more realistic accomodation between the states' legitimate interest in protecting private individuals from defamatory falsehoods, and the need for a free press. The court concluded that the New York Times rule, while retaining its validity as to public officials and public figures, 'inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake' when applied to private citizens, and that the states' interest in providing a remedy to these defamed individuals Required a different rule where the substance of the statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. at 346 and so long as they do not impose liability without fault, The States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.

clearly represents an attempt to reconcile the state's interest in protecting the reputations of its citizens and the constitutional guarantee of a free and vibrant press, the latter being made paramount to the former. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash.2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969). However, the court lacked solidarity on this basic issue as witnessed by the fact that each time the New York Times rule was extended, dissention increased, ultimately resulting in the Rosenbloom plurality. Therefore, it came as little surprise when the court granted certiorari 'to reconsider the extent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen.' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. at 325, 94 S.Ct. at 3000 348, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. The court did not mandate that the states abandon the 'actual malice' approach as applied to private individuals, but rather, on page 347, 94 S.Ct. on page 3010, held that

(Italics ours.) We agree that the 'actual malice' standard, when applied to private individuals, imposes a totally unacceptable burden, and therefore a change is required.

The basic policy underlying the New York Times standard was the need to perpetuate an uninhibited 'marketplace of ideas,' by providing a near absolute constitutional protection to the press. However, this Marketplace approach fails to recognize that 'there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues.' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 340, 94 S.Ct. at 3007; Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., supra. Furthermore, prior to the advent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, this state had consistently held that '(m)alice is not a necessary element of civil libel, and is immaterial upon the issue of whether published words are defamatory.' Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc., 54 Wash.2d 743, 755, 344 P.2d 705, 712 (1959). See also, Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63 Wash.2d 763...