Taub v. Aquila Southwest Pipeline Corp.

• Citation: 93 S.W.3d 451
• Decision Date: 17 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 14-01-00355-CV.,14-01-00355-CV.
• Parties: Henry J.N. TAUB, Appellant, v. AQUILA SOUTHWEST PIPELINE CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 451

93 S.W.3d 451

Henry J.N. TAUB, Appellant, v. AQUILA SOUTHWEST PIPELINE CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 14-01-00355-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

October 17, 2002.

Rehearing Overruled January 16, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Marcus Hill, William E. Ryan, Houston, for appellants.

Reagan Douglas Pratt, Houston, for appellees.

Panel consists of Chief Justice BRISTER and Justices ANDERSON and FROST.

OPINION

JOHN S. ANDERSON, Justice.

The issue in this case is the scope of the legislature's grant of exclusive jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings to the county civil courts at law in Harris County.

Appellant Henry J.N. Taub appeals a final judgment in a consolidated condemnation and trespass case. Rendered after two partial summary judgments and a jury trial, the judgment (1) awarded appellee Aquila Southwest Pipeline Corporation a permanent easement and right of way for a natural gas pipeline on Taub's property; (2) awarded Taub $1,386 in condemnation damages, based on the jury's findings; and (3) assessed costs against Taub. Concluding, as a matter of first impression, the district court did not have jurisdiction over Aquila's condemnation action against Taub, we vacate that portion of the district court's judgment granting Aquila its easement and awarding Taub condemnation damages. We affirm the district court's judgment to the extent it incorporated its own earlier take nothing summary judgment in favor of Aquila on Taub's claims against Aquila.¹

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taub is the owner of a 70-percent undivided interest in a 53-acre tract of land, lying partly in Waller County and partly in Harris County. The remaining 30-percent undivided interest is owned by two trusts and three individuals. Aquila is a publicly regulated gas utility, holding a Texas Railroad Commission permit to operate gas pipelines in Texas.

In April 1995, in the Harris County Civil Court at Law, Aquila filed a petition in condemnation against Taub and the co-owners of the 53-acre tract, seeking to condemn a 50-foot wide natural gas pipeline easement. On April 19, 1995, the county civil court at law appointed special commissioners, who set a hearing for May 18, 1995. Two of Taub's co-owners received notice of the hearing; Taub did not. At the May 18 hearing, the commissioners assessed damages to the landowners, as their interests appear, in the total amount of $2,741.² Aquila deposited that amount into the registry of the court. The commissioners also signed a notice to Taub of a hearing to be held November 27, 1995.

Around May 25, 1995, Aquila's construction crew first entered the property. The crew completed construction around June 26, and the pipeline began operating August 11, 1995.

On October 20, 1995, Taub was served with notice of the November 27 commissioners' meeting. Taub, however, was granted a continuance to January 4, 1996.

In the meantime, Taub sued Aquila in district court, asserting common law trespass, unauthorized placement of signs, conversion of topsoil, and wanton disregard of Taub's rights. He sought general, special, exemplary, and punitive damages.³ He also sought a temporary restraining order, a temporary injunction, a permanent injunction, and, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment. Aquila counterclaimed for condemnation in that action, seeking the same easement it sought in the county civil court at law.

On January 4, 1996, the commissioners met to hear Taub's evidence. They again assessed damages to the landowners, as their interests appear, in the total amount of $2,741. Taub objected to the commissioners' award on several grounds, including inadequate damages.

Aquila subsequently moved for partial summary judgment in the county civil court at law. The county civil court at law granted Aquila's partial summary judgment motion, ordering that Aquila had conclusively established the right to condemn Taub's property for a pipeline easement. Both parties agreed to consolidate in the district court the cases then pending in the two different courts, and the county civil court at law transferred its case to the district court, where Taub's trespass action and Aquila's condemnation counterclaim were still pending.⁴

Aquila also filed motions for summary judgment in the district court. The district court granted Aquila's motions, ordering that Taub take nothing on his claims against Aquila and leaving only Aquila's condemnation counterclaim against Taub's 70-percent interest in the easement to be tried. The district court submitted the condemnation case to a jury solely on the questions of the market value of the permanent easement, damages to the remainder, and fair market rental value of the temporary workspace easement. The jury found a fair market value of $1,320 for the permanent easement, no damages to the remainder, and fair market rental value of $660. The trial court rendered a final judgment on December 22, 2000, awarding Aquila the requested easement, permitting Taub to withdraw $1,386 plus interest from the amount Aquila had deposited into the court's registry, and ordering costs assessed against Taub and in favor of Aquila.

DISCUSSION

In three issues, Taub challenges two summary judgments rendered in favor of Aquila: (1) the first summary judgment rendered by the county civil court at law granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Aquila as plaintiff in the condemnation action, and (2) the second summary judgment rendered by the district court granting motions filed by Aquila as defendant in the trespass action. The first summary judgment condemned Taub's interest in the easement Aquila sought, and left only the amount of Taub's damages to be determined.⁵ The second summary judgment ordered Taub take nothing on his claims against Aquila. The final judgment, rendered by the district court, granted Aquila its easement, awarded Taub the condemnation damages found by the jury, and assessed costs against Taub and in favor of Aquila.⁶ The judgment concluded: "This is a final judgment, intended to resolve all claims remaining after the previous partial judgments rendered in these actions. All relief not granted herein, or in a prior partial judgment entered in these actions, is denied."

I.

Jurisdictional Issue

A. Sua Sponte Review

Neither party in the initial briefs challenged the jurisdiction of the district court to hear Aquila's condemnation case.⁷ Nevertheless, a trial court has no discretion to entertain a suit absent subject matter jurisdiction. State v. John R. Phenix Assocs., Inc., 6 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)). Absence of subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error, which an appellate court must review at any time it appears. John R. Phenix, 6 S.W.3d at 290. When lack of subject matter jurisdiction is apparent from the record, it may be raised by the court if not raised by the parties. See Texas Ass'n. of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446 n. 10. An appellate court's jurisdiction over the merits of a case extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken. George v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 976 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Given the exclusive jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings specifically granted to the civil courts at law in Harris County, we conclude, in what appears to be a case of first impression, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of Aquila's condemnation counterclaims.

B. Jurisdictional Provisions

(1) The Texas constitutional provision. We begin with the grant of jurisdiction to the district courts, as found in the Texas Constitution: "District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (emphasis added). Thus, the constitution specifically envisions the enactment of laws conferring exclusive jurisdiction over actions, proceedings, and remedies on courts other than district courts.

(2) Exclusive jurisdiction over "eminent domain proceedings, both statutory and inverse." Texas Government Code section 25.1032(c) provides in relevant part: "A county civil court at law has exclusive jurisdiction in Harris County of eminent domain proceedings, both statutory and inverse, regardless of the amount in controversy." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1032(c) (Vernon Supp.2002).⁸ "Eminent domain" refers to "[t]he power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of state power." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed.1990); see also Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating eminent domain is right of the state, or of those to whom power has been delegated, to condemn private property for public use, and to take ownership and possession of property on paying owner due compensation). "The process of exercising the power of eminent domain is commonly referred to as `condemnation' or `expropriation.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed.1990); see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (stating condemnation is procedure by which a sovereign state exercises its right to take private property for public use, without consent, but on payment of just compensation). Under Texas Government Code section 25.1032(c), the Harris County Civil Court at Law had exclusive jurisdiction over Aquila's condemnation action.

C. Aquila's Contentions Supporting Jurisdiction in the District Court

(1) Specific versus general provisions. Aquila,...